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Abstract 
 
Since the listing of the Satrix 40 in November 2000, Exchange Traded Fund (ETFs) have grown 
to become an investment vehicle of choice amongst retail and institutional investors of the 
Johannesburg Securities Exchange (JSE). Albeit gaining such an enormous traction, investors’ 
remains curious about ETFs ability to successfully replicate the movements of their target 
benchmark indices and also their capability to yield arbitrage profit opportunity through 
mispricing. In addition to that, investors are also interested to know whether ETFs as an index 
tracking investment vehicle are resilient in variously cycles of the economy.  Motivated by this 
gap in the body of knowledge, this research undertakes to evaluate the tracking ability and 
pricing efficiency of 19 ETFs listed on the JSE over various cycles of the economy.  
According to Faulkner, Loewald and Makrelov (2013) South African economy experienced 
the effect of the 2008 global financial crisis between 1 September 2008 and 30 June 2009. For 
that reason, the examination period of this research is segmented into four main categories 
namely: full examination period which spans from the launch date of each of the ETF under 
review until 30 September 2015, pre-crisis period that is between the launch date and 29 August 
2008, crisis-period dated 1 September 2008 and 30 June 2009 and the post-crisis or the 
recovery phase being 1 July 2009 through 30 September 2015.  
The tracking ability results across all the sub-periods suggested that, on average, ETFs yields 
daily returns which closely resemble that of their target benchmark indices but with relatively 
high level of volatility. With regard to the tracking error as another tracking ability 
measurement, it was discovered that the ETFs under review were inadequately replicating the 
movements of their target benchmark indices irrespective of the economic cycle. In tandem 
with the evidence documented by Mateus and Rahmani (2014) from the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE), tracking errors were substantially high during the 2008 global financial crisis 
as opposed to the prior and the post crisis period. 
Across all the examination periods, sizeable amount of tracking error was found to be 
associated to the ETFs which mimics the international broad-market access underlying indices. 
Amongst other things, the diversity of these indices as well as the trading hours overlap 
between the JSE and their host market were found to be the key attributing factors. On the 
contrary, ETFs which replicates most liquid target benchmark indices such as the FTSE/JSE 
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Top 40 index appeared to have lower tracking error on relative basis. In this regard, the liquidity 
of the FTSE/JSE Top 40 index proved to be the main attribute. Apart from the diversity or the 
liquidity of indices, the length of the examination period also had a significant influence 
towards the magnitude of tracking errors. In this instance, shorter examination period were 
found to be characterised by noise or volatility in the market which makes it difficult for the 
ETFs providers to promptly rebalance their portfolios and align them to their target benchmark 
indices. Over and above these factors, this research discovered that tracking errors across all 
the sub-periods were largely driven by management fees and daily volatility of the ETFs market 
prices, more especially during the crisis period. On the one hand, trading volume and the effect 
of dividends distribution had a negative influence towards the magnitude of tracking errors. 
On the question of how efficient these 19 ETFs are, the empirical findings revealed that 
significant deviation between the ETFs closing price and the Net Asset Value (NAV) does exist 
either being a discount or premium. In line with the prior work on the JSE by Charteris (2013), 
ETFs which mimics local based indices were found to be trading mostly on a discount to the 
NAV whilst the opposite was true in the case of the international broad-market access ETFs. 
At the same token, international broad-market access ETFs portrayed sizeable amount of 
premiums across all the cycles of the economy. In line with the analysis of tracking errors, such 
enormous premiums were mainly driven by lack of synchronicity in the trading hours between 
the JSE and host market wherein these ETFs target benchmark indices are listed.   
Empirical literature suggests that ETFs that exhibit discount and premium which fails to persist 
for more than one trading day are deemed to be efficiently priced since there is limited 
opportunity to arbitrage. On that note, this research found that mispricing of ETFs which 
mimics most liquid indices such as the domestic broad-market access and sectorial indices 
disappears within a period of one trading day. For that reason, majority of these ETFs were 
considered to be efficiently priced against their NAV. Contrarily, discounts and premiums 
exhibited by ETFs which mostly replicate style based and the international broad-market access 
indices appeared to be persistent even to the fifth trading day. From the attribution point of 
view, the complexity of these ETFs underlying indices as well as the trading hours overlap 
between the JSE and the host market of these indices were found to be the main drivers of such 
level of mispricing. In addition to that, attribution analysis through linear regression proved 
that transaction cost (bid-ask spread), daily volatility of the ETFs market prices as well as the 
impact of trading volume had a positive influence towards the existence of discounts and 
premiums observed across all sub-periods.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
1.1 Research background 
The concept of passive investing through exchange traded funds (ETFs) have grown in leaps 
and bounds since their inception in the late 1980s. This phenomenon hinges upon the prominent 
capital market theories. Coined by Harry Markowitz in 1952, the Modern Portfolio Theory 
(MPT) asserts that investors are better off by holding a well-diversified portfolio of assets from 
different asset classes. Markowitz (1952) popularised the MPT and the importance of mean-
variance efficiency in the portfolio construction process. The concept of mean-variance 
efficiency suggests that risk averse investors should pick assets which yields the maximum 
expected return for a given level of risk and shun the one that yields low expected return for a 
given level of risk. To date, this ground-breaking theory is currently deemed as the fundamental 
framework of portfolio selection.  
Building upon the work of Markowitz (1952), Tobin (1958) introduced the Separation 
Theorem. This proposition posits that investors should separate the choice of their portfolios 
into two steps namely: identifying the mean-variance efficient risky portfolio, known as the 
market portfolio; and subsequently allocate their capital to a combination of the risk-free asset 
and the market portfolio. Subsequent to this proposition, robust research on market efficiency 
and predictability of assets prices were conducted. This phenomenon is first popularised by the 
early works of Kendall (1953) who discovered that stock prices move in the random fashion 
such that, no market participant can predict their future trends. The research work by 
Samuelson (1965) titled “Proof that anticipated prices fluctuate randomly”, affirmed that stock 
market prices fluctuate randomly because the best guess of future prices occur in the current 
price as information is already reflected in prices. This proposition is commonly known as the 
random walk theory. Samuelson (1965) concludes by nullifying the use of technical analysis 
to earn abnormal returns by predicting future prices.  
In parallel, Fama (1965) began to shed more light on the assertion of market efficiency and 
passive investing through the use of buy and hold strategy. According to Fama (1965), stock 
market is deemed efficient when prices fully and speedily incorporate all the available 
information due to the rational behaviour of market participants. He justify this proposition by 
postulating that stock market prices instantly absorb all the past, current and the future events 
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such that their movements becomes random in fashion and also be the best estimates of their 
intrinsic values. In conclusion, Fama (1965) invalidates the relevance of fundamental and 
technical analysis in efficient markets and suggests the use of passive buy and hold strategies.  
In an attempt to incorporate the MPT and market efficiency proposition, Sharpe (1964) and 
Litner (1965) introduce the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). They describe the CAPM 
as a mathematical linear model which relates the expected returns of an asset or portfolio to its 
systematic or the market risk that cannot be diversified. The relevance of this proposition was 
soon confirmed by the empirical evidence of Mossin (1966), Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972) 
as well as Fama and Macbeth (1973). The advent of the CAPM was followed by the 
introduction of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), the cornerstone theory about passive 
investing as it nullify the relevance of market timing and stock selection. Coined by Fama 
(1970; 1991), the EMH posits that the stock market is informational efficient such that 
information is accurately and speedily incorporated in asset prices. Therefore, no market 
participant can consistently earn above risk-adjusted returns but rather be better off by investing 
in a buy and hold strategy. Remarkably, Fama (1970; 1991) argues that the EMH cannot hold 
unilaterally, instead it should always be tested jointly with the market equilibrium model such 
as the CAPM. As a result, tests on the EMH in conjunction of the CAPM is then referred to as 
tests of the joint hypothesis.  
Although the tenet of market efficiency grew in popularity during the 1970s, counter arguments 
also emerged by casting doubt to the joint hypothesis along with the behavioural aspect of 
capital market participants. In defence of the fundamental analysis, Basu (1977) discovers the 
value effect, an anomaly which postulates that financial ratios such as book to market value, 
price to earnings, price to cash flow and dividend yield ratios are important determinants of 
cross-sectional equity returns. In the same vein, Banz (1981) reveals that the size of the firm 
has significant explanatory power of cross-sectional returns which is in contravention to the 
CAPM framework which assumes that the market risk is the only explanatory variable in 
describing asset returns. Turning to the behavioural aspect of capital market participants, 
behavioural finance emerged to expose the irrationality of capital market participants by 
holding the view that, capital market participants are mere human beings who have limitations 
in one way or the other. The early works of Festinger, Riecken and Schachter (1956) 
demonstrates that investors suffer from cognitive dissonance, an error which occurs when 
investors tries to reduce tensions when their attitude and behaviour are in conflict with each 
other. Kahneman and Tversky (1979; 1982) introduced the prospect theory which discusses 
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the irrational behaviour of individuals when making decisions under the condition of 
uncertainty. In a follow-up study, De Bondt and Thaler (1985; 1987) took up the influential 
findings of Kahneman and Tversky (1982) and demonstrates that investors suffer from the 
cognitive error of overreacting to unexpected news reports such that in the long run, stock 
prices revert to the mean and subsequently yield excess returns. On the other hand, Jegadeesh 
and Titman (1993) discovered that short-term under-reaction by investors causes short-term 
momentum movements of stock prices which creates rooms for making abnormal returns.  
The empirical evidence of these capital market anomalies from the South African market is 
pioneered by the early works of Plaistowe and Knight (1987) as well as De Villiers, Lowings, 
Pettit and Affleck-Graves (1986). Meanwhile, evidence on the use of these capital market 
anomalies as investment styles is widely discussed in the series of studies carried out by van 
Rensburg (2001) as well as van Rensburg and Robertson (2003a, 2003b, 2004). Even though 
the aforementioned anomalies have been more prevalent and robust in various markets and 
time periods, their interpretation remains an endless debate amongst academics. In this regard, 
Haugen and Baker (1996) as well as van Rensburg (2001) presents the four main possible 
interpretation of capital market anomalies namely, the joint hypothesis problem, rational, 
irrationality and methodological biases.  
The discussion about the relevance of market efficiency also spilled over into the investment 
practice through the debate of active management versus passive management. Kon (1983) 
argues that stock selection and market timing ability of active investment managers fail to 
consistently yield significant risk-adjusted returns. Meanwhile, El-Hassan and Kofman (2003) 
suggests that both strategies are exposed to the unavoidable market risk, but actively managed 
funds are also exposed to the risk associated with their stock selection skills and their market 
timing ability. On the other hand, Malkiel (2005) built upon the early work of Jensen (1968) 
as well as Sharpe (1991) and reveals the superiority of passive management after accounting 
for investment costs such as brokerage costs, bid-ask spreads, and market impact costs. With 
all being said, the critics of active management on the basis of risk, costs and manager’s timing 
and selectivity skills have contributed to the popularity of passive investing strategies such as 
index mutual funds and ETFs. 
Motivated by the critics of active management, capital markets witnessed the introduction of 
index tracker funds during the late 1970s. Dellva (2001), describes index tracker funds such as 
index mutual funds and ETFs as financial products which consist of lower costs, lower turnover 
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and superior performance relative to their active management counterparts after accounting for 
transaction costs. In an attempt to document the history of ETFs, Gastineau (2001) pronounce 
that portfolio trading (also known as the program trading) is the first index tracker fund which 
was launched in the late 1970s with an aim to trade all the constituents of the Standard and 
Poor (S&P) 500 index in one single trade. Gastineau (2001) also postulate that the advent of 
portfolio trading occurred concurrently with the inception of the first index mutual fund, the 
Vanguard 500 index mutual fund which was formed in August 1976.  
The formation of portfolio trading and index mutual funds is then followed by the proliferation 
of ETFs in 1989. Gastineau (2001) as well as Broms and Gastineau (2006) jointly suggests that 
the Toronto Index Participation (TIPs) which was launched on the Toronto Stock Exchange 
(TSE) in 1989 with an aim to replicate performance of the TSE top 35 and 100 indices is the 
first viable ETF. An ETF is a passive investment product which is a listed index tracking mutual 
fund or unit trust. In this regard, the performance evaluation of ETFs is carried out through the 
computation of the tracking error which is the performance evaluation tool that measures how 
consistent the ETF fund manager replicates the performance of the target benchmark index. As 
clearly defined by Mateus and Rahmani (2014), tracking error in question represents the 
differential between the return of the underlying index and that of the ETF over a particular 
period of time. 
Similarly, Rompotis (2011) describe ETFs as the hybrid of ordinary stocks and open-ended 
mutual funds that aim to gain significant returns by mimicking the movements of a specific 
underlying index. As a result of being hybrid in nature, ETFs have both the market determined 
price and the net asset value (NAV), which ought to be in equilibrium as purported by the law 
of one price. However, arbitrage opportunity arises when these prices are in disequilibrium by 
either trading on a premium when the market price exceeds the NAV or discount when market 
price is trading below the NAV. This proposition is commonly known as the pricing efficiency 
of ETFs. Charteris (2013), describes this proposition as the yardstick of how efficient is the 
creation and redemption process executed by the market makers on a day to day basis.  
The inception of the Canadian TIPs in 1989 is then followed by a robust growth of ETFs which 
led to proliferation of the Standard and Poor Depository Receipt ETF (also commonly known 
as the Spiders) on the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) in 1993. Since the formation of the 
Spiders, ETFs gained traction across different asset classes, assets under management (AUM) 
and also reaching other markets outside the United States (U.S). As a result, 30 November 
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2000, South Africa became the first African country to launch an ETF product called the Satrix 
40. The Satrix 40 ETF is designed to mimic the movements of the most liquid index, FTSE/JSE 
Top 40.  
Just like the ETF industry in the U.S. which is regulated by the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC) under the Investment Company Act of 1940, the local ETFs are regulated 
by the Financial Services Board (FSB) under the Collective Investment Schemes Control (CIS) 
Act no.45 of 2002. Matarutse and Sibanda (2014) reveals that the local ETFs market is 
regulated by the Financial Services Board (FSB) under the Collective Investment Schemes 
Control (CIS) Act no.45 of 2002. In the same vein, Matarutse and Sibanda (2014) also opined 
that, similar to the U.S. regulations, South Africa maintains the use of traditional ETFs 
replication strategy as enforced by the local regulatory authorities. This is the strategy which 
occurs when fund providers create an ETF product out of the securities that have the same 
proportional weighting as that of the underlying index.  
Figure 1.1: Number of ETFs listed on the JSE, 2000-2014 
 
Source: World Federation of Exchange (2015) 
As demonstrated in Figure 1.1 above, the proliferation of ETFs on the JSE commenced with 
the Satrix 40 in year 2000 and grew significantly to 45 listed funds in 2014.1 Most notably, 
these 45 ETFs provide investors an exposure to a full range of asset classes such as the 
domestic, international equity, fixed-income, currencies as well as commodities. As a result, 
investors on the local ETFs market have an advantage of geographical, currency diversification 
                                                          
1  Information adopted from the statistics published by the World Federation of Exchange 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Number of ETF's 1 1 3 4 5 7 9 13 21 24 27 31 38 40 45
1-6 
 
 
as well as the exposure to industries and sectors from the international markets. In order to 
mitigate the effect of survivorship bias, the sample of 19 ETFs under review includes the 
Investec ZGOVI which delisted from the JSE in January 2014 after enormous withdrawal of 
capital by investors. This fund was listed on the JSE in October 2008 with an aim to replicate 
the movements of the Government Bond Index (GOZI). Having seen such a significant and 
sustained growth, JSE listed ETFs merit the investigation of their tracking ability and their 
pricing efficiency.  
1.2 Research motivation and objectives 
The motivation behind this study comes in several ways. First and foremost, to the best 
knowledge of the author in the time of writing, the bulk of prior research on the subject of ETFs 
tracking ability and pricing efficiency have been conducted using data from the developed and 
emerging markets with little attention to the South African ETF market. Elton, Gruber, Comer 
& Li (2002) examines the tracking ability and pricing efficiency of the Spider ETF during the 
period from 1993 to 1998. They demonstrates that the tracking error and discounts of the 
Spiders ETF range between -0.06% and 0.08% as well as 0.18% respectively. Rompotis (2006) 
extended these tests into the international ETF market by examining 73 equity-based iShare 
ETFs from October 2005 to September 2006 and discover tracking errors which range between 
0.12% and 0.45% along with an average annual premium of 0.07%. Evidence from the 
emerging market is documented by Baş and Sarıoğlu (2015) when they discover that 16 ETFs 
listed on the Istanbul Stock Exchange over the period from 2005 to 2013 exhibit significantly 
tracking errors that range between 0.05% and 1.54%. However, no riskless arbitrage 
opportunities is found in the study.   
Bringing these tests into the local ETFs market, prior empirical research have special focus on 
the question of pricing efficiency with little attention to the test of the tracking ability or the 
combination thereof. Charteris (2013) examines the pricing efficiency of four domestic and 
three foreign ETFs listed on the JSE from June 2008 to December 2012. The researcher 
concludes that the funds in question are efficiently priced although five of the seven trade on a 
premium whilst the remaining two funds trade on a discount. In the follow up study, Charteris 
(2014) ran similar research over the same examination period and investigate the pricing 
efficiency of the four domestic ETFs from the Satrix ETF family, namely the Satrix 40, FINI, 
INDI and RESI ETFs. Similarly, her findings reveals that the local ETF market is reasonably 
efficient during the period under review.  
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In lieu of the fact that there is no study that has integrated the tests of tracking ability and 
pricing efficiency in the local ETF market, this research aims to fill this void gap in the body 
of knowledge. With that in mind, the primary objective of this research is to conduct an 
extensive investigation on the tracking ability and pricing efficiency of 19 ETFs listed on the 
JSE over the period from their respective inception date through 30 September 2015. In 
addition to the overall performance-period, similar test are conducted for the period prior the 
2008 global financial crisis, during the crisis and post-crisis phase. According to Faulkner, 
Loewald and Makrelov (2013) South African economy experienced the effect of the 2008 
global financial crisis between 1 September 2008 and 30 June 2009. In this regard, pre-crisis 
phase date from the fund inception date until 29 August 2008 whilst the post-crisis phase span 
from 1 July 2009 through 30 September 2015. For that reason, this exercise aims to demonstrate 
the impact of various market conditions on the tracking ability and pricing efficiency of the 19 
JSE listed ETFs.  
Firstly, this research aims to determine whether the local ETF fund managers successfully 
replicate the performance of their underlying indices over the period under review. This is 
accomplished through the computation of return, risk and tracking errors. The computation of 
the tracking error is followed by identifying factors which explains the level of its magnitude. 
For example, fees incurred by fund managers in the process of replicating the indices are the 
obvious explanatory variable. 
Charteris (2014) recommended future study to investigate pricing efficiency of international 
ETFs that are listed on the JSE. In light of this recommendation, the second objective of this 
study is to examine the pricing efficiency of these 19 JSE listed ETFs which mimics both the 
domestic and international benchmark indices. This is done in order to demonstrate whether 
the local market ETFs trade either on a premium or discounts. In this regard, current research 
is motivated by the fact that prior studies in the local market observed the efficiency of the 
relatively few number of ETFs over a minimal examination period. In response to that, this 
study aims to expand the data sample into 19 JSE listed ETFs over a relatively longer 
examination period. In so doing, academics and investment professionals can make substantive 
conclusion about the efficiency of the local ETF market. In addition to that, conclusion about 
efficiency of the local ETF market can also contribute heavily towards the global debate about 
market efficiency. 
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In addition to that, multilinear regression is used to identify the number of trading days in which 
the mispricing persists before it disappears. The outcome of this test aims prove whether the 
local ETFs market is efficiently priced or not, subsequently reveal if arbitrage opportunities 
exists. Consistent to the work of Lin and Chou (2006), a multilinear regression is employed to 
explore the variables which explains the occurrence of either a premium or discount and their 
persistence level. 
1.3 Research contribution  
The contribution of the current study to the body of knowledge also comes in numerous ways. 
Firstly, to the best knowledge of the author in the time of writing, this is the first empirical 
study to examine the tracking ability of the local ETF managers. It is important to observe such 
a notable gap in the body of knowledge given a significant growth of ETFs on the JSE along 
with the steady increase of their market capitalisation since market inception in November 
2000. Although it is purported that past performance is not a good indication of future 
performance, evaluating the local market ETFs tracking errors contributes to the investment 
practice by enabling retail and institutional investors to observe the historical performance of 
these JSE listed ETFs. For that purpose, the findings of the study can aid financial planners to 
provide reasonable financial advice to investors who wish to include JSE listed ETFs as part 
of their investment portfolios. In addition, evaluating the performance of these 19 ETFs since 
inception through September 2015 demonstrates the entire history pertaining to their tracking 
ability and pricing efficiency.  
Besides presenting the performance of the JSE listed ETFs over the period under review, this 
study also provides insight on the various factors which introduce tracking errors. In their prior 
research, Elton et al. (2002) reveals that tracking error of the Spider from the U.S. market is 
attributable to fees, cash dividend as well as its replication strategy. Therefore, this research 
contribute to the body of knowledge by making investors and academics aware of factors which 
hinders local market ETFs to achieve the objective of mimicking the performance of their target 
benchmark indices.  
Secondly, this research makes important contribution on the subject of ETF pricing efficiency 
which has been thinly investigated using data from the local ETFs market besides the recent 
work of Charteris (2013; 2014). The empirical evidence provided by Charteris (2013; 2014) 
confirm the efficiency of certain JSE listed ETFs during the period from June 2008 to 
December 2012. Further to the prior empirical research, the outcome from the test of the local 
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ETFs market efficiency may not only contribute to the global debate about market efficiency 
but also aid both current and prospective investors to identify arbitrage opportunities which 
they could exploit to earn significant abnormal returns from mispricing. As mentioned earlier, 
multilinear regression is used to identify the number of trading days in which the mispricing 
persists before it disappears. Empirical literature reveals that the inefficiency of the creation 
and redemption process is not the only determinant of causing ETFs to be mispriced. Using 
multilinear regression model, Gozbasi and Erdem (2010) reveals that ETFs premium and 
discount can be attributable to the transaction cost (bid-ask spread), daily volatility and average 
daily trading volume. In this regard, contribution is made by this study as multilinear 
regressions model is utilised to determine if these factors attribute to the local market ETFs 
pricing inefficiency. 
Furthermore, this research provides significant contribution to the body of knowledge as it is 
conducted over a lengthy examination period which covers the critical economic events such 
as the 2008 global financial crisis. This kind of analysis assist subsequent studies on the subject 
of ETFs tracking ability and pricing efficiency to make inference from the findings which are 
representative of different financial market trends.  
1.4 Organisation of the study 
Chapter 2 describes the theoretical background which underpins the research. It includes the 
discussion of the prominent capital market theories such as the MPT, EMH, behavioural 
finance and capital market anomalies. The chapter concludes by presenting the active versus 
passive debate which suggests that the critics of active management have contributed to the 
growth and popularity of index tracking investment products such as index mutual funds and 
ETFs. 
Building upon the conclusion from the active versus passive debate, Chapter 3, provides an 
overview of ETFs as a stand-alone index tracking investment product. This is accomplished by 
documenting the evolution of ETFs, replication strategies and the creation and redemption 
process. Finally, tracking error as well as premiums and discounts along with their explanatory 
variables are thoroughly discussed.  
Chapter 4 provides the abundant empirical evidence on the subject of tracking ability and 
pricing efficiency of ETFs from both the international and local ETFs market. Empirical 
evidence about ETFs tracking ability covers their ability to track their underlying indices as 
well as the comparative analysis between ETFs and index mutual funds. The presentation of 
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the empirical evidence about tracking errors is coupled with the discussion of the various 
factors which introduce tracking errors. This is followed by the demonstration of empirical 
evidence on ETFs pricing efficiency which encompass premiums and discounts along with 
their explanatory variables.  
Chapter 5 presents the data collection process along with the methodology employed to achieve 
the research objectives. This chapter also discusses the various methodological biases that have 
been mitigated in order to ensure that the research findings are robust.  
Chapter 6 and 7 demonstrates the actual empirical findings of the research which covers the 
results about the tracking ability and pricing efficiency of the 19 ETFs listed on the JSE. This 
is illustrated by tables and graphs. Lastly, Chapter 8 concludes the study and provides 
recommendation for future studies. 
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Chapter 2 Theoretical Overview 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the theoretical background which underpins the research. There are five 
sections in this chapter. The introductory section gives a detailed discussion of capital market 
theories and the Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT), which underpin all research in the field of 
finance. The history of capital market theories can be dated back to the to the Modern Portfolio 
Theory (MPT) by Harry Markowitz in 1952, which asserts that investors are better off by 
holding a well-diversified portfolio of assets from different asset classes. Coined by Fama 
(1965; 1970; 1991), the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH), posits that stock market is 
informational efficient such that information is accurately and speedily incorporated in asset 
prices. Therefore, no market participant can consistently earn above risk-adjusted return and 
investors are better off to invest in a buy and hold strategy. Over and above the MPT and the 
EMH, Section 2.2.2 uncovers behavioural finance, the component of capital market theories 
which challenges the main assumptions of market efficiency, particularly the behavioural 
aspect of capital market participants. 
Subsequent to the summary of the capital market theories, Section 2.3 discusses the capital 
market anomalies and their possible explanations. Plaistowe and Knight (1987) describes 
capital market anomalies as the imperfection or counter arguments to the assumptions of the 
notion of market efficiency and the equilibrium asset pricing models. Meanwhile, van 
Rensburg (2001) suggests that investors can develop investment styles to exploit these 
anomalies in a capital market. The discussion of capital market anomalies leads to the endless 
debate of active versus passive management which is covered in Section 2.4. This debate has 
been raging on amongst academics and investment professionals for decades, yet to date there 
is no definite answer of which strategy is superior. The critic of active management on the basis 
of market efficiency, risk, cost and also the manager’s timing and selectivity skills attributed 
to the popularity of passive investing strategies such as index funds and ETFs. Lastly, Section 
2.5 concludes the chapter.  
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2.2 Capital market theories 
This sub-section presents the detailed discussion about the evolution of the prominent theories 
behind the existence of capital market. This begins with the discussion about the concept of 
market efficiency along with the popular modern portfolio theory (MPT). Subsequent to that, 
behavioural finance which discredit the rationality of capital market participants as asserted by 
the proponents of market efficiency is described in full.  
2.2.1 Market efficiency & modern portfolio theory (MPT) 
The art of passive investing have been more prevalent in the stock markets since the inception 
of market efficiency proposition. The advent of capital market efficiency can be dated as early 
as the 1900, but it took half a century for the academics and investment professionals to 
acknowledge this phenomenon. The early works of Markowitz (1952) which led to the 
introduction of Modern Portfolio Theory (MPT), serve as the first viable proposition of 
investment. This ground-breaking theory is currently deemed as the fundamental framework 
of portfolio selection. The main theme of this theory is portfolio diversification, through the 
construction of a portfolio from different asset classes. In its purest sense, MPT is essentially 
about investment return, risk, preferences and opportunities.  
In this regard, Markowitz (1952) further postulates that when investors in an efficient market 
are faced with a choice to invest, they should be averse to risk such that, they pick assets which 
yields the maximum expected return for a given level of risk and shun the one which yields 
low expected return for the given level of risk. This proposition is commonly known as mean-
variance efficiency. The proxy for the risk in question is the standard deviation of the return or 
volatility. In the time of developing the MPT, the notion of market efficiency was less ventured 
even though Markowitz (1952) made his assumptions as if markets were efficient.  
The first viable study in the subject of market efficiency was documented by Maurice Kendall 
in 1953. In his seminal paper titled “The Analysis of Economic Time-Series Part 1: Price”, 
Kendall (1953) reveals that weekly movements of 22 stock and commodity prices are random 
in nature. This imply that they fail to portray any trend or correlation throughout the 51 years 
examination period which span from 1883 to 1934. Subsequently, Kendall (1953) concludes 
that the random nature of stock market prices makes it impossible for the stock market 
participants to predict their future trends.  
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In 1958, James Tobin extended the MPT of Markowitz (1952) by introducing the Separation 
Theorem. He challenges the proposition of investors risk appetite by alluding that some 
investors can be less risk averse compared to others. Therefore, investors should separate the 
choice of their portfolios into two steps namely: identifying the mean-variance efficient risky 
portfolio, known as the market portfolio; and subsequently allocate their capital to a 
combination of risk-free assets and the market portfolio. 
The MPT and the separation theorem are then taken further through the emergence of the 
Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) coined by Sharpe (1964) and Litner (1965). The CAPM 
is the mathematical linear model which relates the expected return of an asset or portfolio to 
its systematic or the market risk that cannot be diversified. As documented by Litner (1965), 
the CAPM is assumed to hold in a competitive capital market where all investors pool their 
funds into the mean-variance efficient portfolio at a zero transaction and taxation cost. Equation 
2.1 below depicts the CAPM model:  
𝐸(𝑅)𝑖 = 𝑅𝑓 +  𝛽𝑖,𝑚  [𝐸(𝑅𝑚 ) − 𝑅𝑓] +  ℯ𝑖       (2.1) 
Where: 𝐸(𝑅)𝑖  is the expected return of asset i; 𝑅𝑓 is the risk-free rate; 𝛽𝑖,𝑚  is the beta 
coefficient of asset i, which measures the sensitivity of asset i‘s return to movements in the 
market risk premium[𝐸(𝑅𝑚 ) − 𝑅𝑓]; 𝐸(𝑅𝑚 )  is the expected return of the market; and ℯ𝑖  
represents the unsystematic risk that has expected value of zero. 
In this regard, Sharpe (1964) and Litner (1965) postulates that the only relevant risk in the 
CAPM framework is the systematic risk, since all the unsystematic risk is fully diversified 
away. Therefore, investors who hold a well-diversified portfolio should be rewarded with high 
expected return for bearing the systematic risk. The early empirical examination of this 
proposition is documented most notably by Mossin (1966), Black, Jensen and Scholes (1972) 
as well as Fama and Macbeth (1973), all confirm the relevance of this proposition. 
The introduction of the CAPM as the market equilibrium asset pricing model have taken place 
parallel with the research of market efficiency based on the random walk theory which was 
popularised by Paul Samuelson in 1965. He posits that in a competitive market, the price 
changes that are expected to occur have already occurred. He allude to the fact that, stock 
market prices fluctuate randomly because the best guess of the future prices occurs in the 
current price as information is already reflected in prices. In line with statistical methodology 
employed by Kendall (1953), Samuelson (1965) made use of the stochastic theorem when 
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examining the stock price movements. Samuelson (1965) discovers the absence of correlation 
between one price movement and the subsequent one, nullifies the use of technical analysis 
when predicting the future prices in attempt to earn abnormal returns.  
In line with the random walk theory of Samuelson (1965), in the same year, Eugene Fama 
(1965) published a seminal paper titled “Random Walks in Stock Market Prices”. The theme 
of this study is to examine the randomness of stock market prices. Notably, he posits that in 
order for the stock market price to be random in nature, the stock market in question should be 
efficient. According to Fama (1965), the stock market is deemed efficient when the prices fully 
and speedily incorporate all the available information due to the rational behaviour of the 
market participants. Therefore, in an efficient market, investors cannot consistently earn 
abnormal return; instead they are better off by investing into the buy and hold strategy.  
Remarkably, Fama (1965) allude to the fact that, due the daily engagement of market 
participants, the stock price instantly absorb all the past, current and the future events. 
Subsequently, the movement of prices can be both random in fashion and also be the best 
estimates of their intrinsic values. In line with the suggestion of Kendall (1953) and Samuelson 
(1965), Fama (1965) concludes by criticising the relevance of technical analysis. He postulates 
that in the presence of the random nature of stock market prices, technical analysis is of no use, 
because the current price already reflects the historical information. In addition to that, he 
asserts that, in an efficient market, the work of fundamental analysis that relies on publicly 
available information has no merit because the current stock price is the best estimate of the 
intrinsic value.   
In 1970 Eugene Fama introduces the ground-breaking theory, the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
(EMH). To date, the EMH is regarded as the fundamental framework which both the academics 
and investment professionals make inference from. This theory posits that stock markets are 
informational efficient such that their prices, at any given point in time accurately reflect all 
the available information. In addition, Fama (1970) also argues that both public and private 
information is freely available to all the market participants such that no participant can 
persistently earn abnormal returns through the use of inside information.  
Fama (1970) further maintains that the EMH cannot hold unilaterally, instead it should always 
be tested bilaterally with the market equilibrium model such as the CAPM. Due their common 
assumptions, tests on the EMH in conjunction of the CAPM are referred to be the joint 
hypothesis. It is under this joint hypothesis proposition which Fama (1970) utilises to divide 
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the testable levels of market efficiency, namely, the weak form, semi-strong and strong form 
EMH. Since the inception of the EMH, this testable levels of market efficiency have been the 
point of reference, as they specify what information can or cannot be useful to beat the market. 
Remarkably, Fama (1970) alludes to the fact that, the capital market have to be efficient of a 
weak form before it can be efficient of a semi-strong form; and efficient of a semi-strong form 
before it is strong form efficient, not vice versa.  In line to that view, Figure 2.1 below presents 
the detailed sequence of these levels of market efficiency as previously denoted by Gilani, 
Nawaz, Shakoor and Asab (2015). 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
Source: figure modified from Gilani, Nawaz, Shakoor and Asab (2015) 
 
Firstly, the weak form EMH dictates that the historical return or prices is meaningless in 
predicting the future price movements. Therefore, technical analysts cannot have a capacity to 
gain abnormal returns consistently. The weak form efficiency proposition is closely related to 
the random walk theory of Samuelson (1965); since it purports that the successive price 
changes are independent of each other at any given point in time.  
Figure 2.1: Levels of market efficiency 
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In an attempt to empirically prove the relevance of weak form EMH, Fama (1970) presents the 
results of the study he conducted in 1965, which reflects the serial correlation between the price 
changes of thirty stocks in the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA). Over the five years 
examination period which spans from 1957 to 1962, price changes reflects no pattern of 
correlation, which is in line with random fashion of stock price movements as revealed by 
Kendall (1953) and Samuelson (1965). The test of the weak form EMH in the South African 
equity market is less exploited, with an exception of Mabhunu (2004) who discovers that the 
JSE is efficient in the weak form over the period from January 1992 through July 2003. 
In testing the weak form EMH, there are two main statistical models which are widely used to 
examine the independence between stock prices at certain period in time. These models include 
the autocorrelation test and the runs test. With respect to the autocorrelation test, the results of 
the test determines whether there is significant correlation between stock price changes in one 
period relative to the subsequent period, if that holds, the stock market is deemed weak-form 
inefficient. In light of that view, Mabhunu (2004) suggests that investors can then use the 
previous prices to predict the future price movements, subsequently earn abnormal returns.  
Similarly, with regard to the runs test, the Augmented Dickey Fuller (1979) (ADF) unit root 
test is commonly used. The results of this runs test determines whether the successive stock 
price changes are random or not. In this case, capital market can be considered to be efficient 
in the weak form if the stock prices are non-stationary and also have a unit root. This implies 
that successive stock price changes are random in fashion, if that holds, investors cannot use 
historical stock prices to predict the future movements.   
As noted earlier, the stock market is deemed efficient of a semi-strong form, when the price 
accurately reflects the publicly available information. The publicly available information in 
question includes newspaper publications, and company press release of their financial reports, 
initial public offerings (IPO) and macroeconomic data release, etc. In the semi-strong form 
EMH, both technical and fundamental analyst fails to identify the mispriced stocks since the 
current stock price is believed to be the best estimate of its intrinsic value.  
Fama (1970) affirm the relevance of the semi-strong form EMH by presenting the findings of 
various studies which support this hypothesis. Notably, he presents the study by Fama, Fisher, 
Jensen and Roll (1969) who examined the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) stock price 
reaction before and after the stock splits announcement over the period from 1927 to 1959. 
Using the sample of 940 stock splits announcement made over the examination period, the 
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results reveals that, 71.5% of the stocks that had the split transaction experienced a significant 
increase in dividends 30 months post the announcement, yet the market did not overreact. 
Furthermore, Fama (1970) posits that the strong form EMH holds when all known information 
is instantly and accurately incorporated in the stock price. The known information in question 
refers to historical information, public and private information which market participants have 
in their disposal. This implies that not even inside information which is prohibited in the formal 
stock exchange, can be useful to generate abnormal returns. With respect to this level of 
efficiency, it is worth noting that Fama (1970) admit that this proposition is implausible to hold 
in reality. In this regard, he cites the study by Niederhoffer and Osborne (1966) who reveals 
that during the year 1964 at the NYSE, a handful of dealers who were responsible for booking 
limit orders had monopolistic access to certain information which enabled them to earn 
abnormal returns.  
However, Fama (1970) further justify the relevance of strong form EMH by pointing to the fact 
that there is a certain cost to be borne by an investor in order to acquire the monopolistic 
information. In this regard, he report the findings of Jensen (1968) who examined the 
performance of U.S. mutual funds over the period 1945 to 1964. The results reveals that after 
accounting for management fees and trading costs, 89 out of the 115 mutual funds fails to 
generate significant risk-adjusted return above the buy and hold strategy. Moreover, taking into 
consideration the fact that company insiders are prohibited in stock trading, the notion of strong 
form efficiency is more plausible.  
In spite of its popularity since the inception in 1970, the EMH suffered from a great deal of 
criticisms which is fully discussed in Section 2.3. In response to that, in 1991 Eugene Fama 
revised the EMH by documenting what he called “second version of market efficiency”. In this 
study, Fama (1991) does not completely renounce the relevance of the EMH; instead, he 
advocated the use of the EMH as the theory which can aid investors to understand the 
behaviours of stock prices at any point in time. Notably, the distinctive factor between this 
study and the preceding findings is mainly the changes he made with regard to the levels of 
market efficiency. With respect to the weak form EMH, he argues that, apart from the historical 
prices, the dividend yield, price earnings ratio as well as the term structure variables cannot be 
useful to predict future prices. Moreover, with regard to the semi-strong and the strong form 
EMH, Fama (1991) posits that over the 20 years period since the inception of the EMH, there 
was voluminous evidence which supports the relevance of these levels of market efficiency. 
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Subsequently, their names changed not their interpretation. In this regard, Fama (1991) changes 
the title, semi-strong form EMH to “Event studies” and strong form to “Test for private 
information.” With all being said, it is worth understanding that since inception, market 
efficiency proposition has played a pivotal role in shaping the investment industry and the field 
of finance at large. As clearly stated earlier, market efficiency proposition has suffered a great 
deal of criticisms amongst the academics and investment society. Section 2.2.2 below discusses 
behavioural finance, the component of capital market theories which challenges the main 
assumptions of the EMH and MPT, particularly the behavioural aspect of investors.  
2.2.2 Behavioural finance 
According to Ricciardi and Simon (2000) behavioural finance is the theory which synthesises 
psychology and sociology sciences into the field of finance with an attempt to explain the 
investment choices of individuals and institutions. In spite the fact that behavioural finance was 
popularised by the Nobel Prize winner Robert Shiller in the early 2000, this proposition can be 
dated back to the 1900s. In support of this view, Shiller (2003) postulates that, although the 
EMH and MPT were the dominant paradigm in the 1970s, during the same time, the field of 
finance also witnessed the advent of behavioural finance (also known as behavioural 
economics). He defines behavioural finance is an arm of capital market theories which is 
embedded upon the assertion of considering capital market participants as mere human beings 
who have limitations in one way or the other. Most importantly, behavioural finance hinges 
upon the fact that capital market participants suffers from mental errors in processing 
information which subsequently results in irrational decision-making.  
Ricciardi and Simon (2000) describes behavioural finance under the following four key 
principles; financial cognitive dissonance, prospect theory, overconfidence and theory of 
regret. It is worthwhile to note that there is vast number of cognitive errors which have been 
discovered to expose the limitations of the decision making process of capital market 
participants, but the abovementioned principles stand out as the prominent principles of 
behavioural finance. 
Financial cognitive dissonance 
Although cognitive dissonance is less popular compared to the prospect theory, literature 
reveals that this psychological bias was coined way before the inception of the prospect theory. 
In the documentation of the evolution of behavioural finance, Sewell (2007) reveals that 
cognitive dissonance was coined by Festinger, Riecken and Schachter in 1956. According to 
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Sewell (2007), cognitive dissonance is the motivation to reduce tensions that you feel when 
your attitude and your behaviour are in conflict with one another. This phenomenon is best 
illustrated when an investors is having two opposing views mostly about either to buy, sell or 
hold a certain stock. In the most cited paper, Goetzmann and Peles (1997) extend the test of 
this cognitive bias to the mutual funds industry with an aim to examine the mutual funds 
investors’ decision to switch between one funds to another. Using questionnaire responses, 
Goetzmann and Peles (1997) discovers that mutual funds investors attempt to reduce the 
tensions they feel about choosing or switching from one mutual fund to another by always 
making inference to the mutual funds past performance.  
It is also worth noting that, cognitive dissonance is one of the mental errors that is widely 
blamed for causing financial crisis. In support of this view, Ricciardi and Simon (2000) 
postulates that cognitive dissonance is one of the key behavioural attribute which led to the 
1999 speculative internet bubble because investors of that time changed their investment styles 
and embarked on the practice of herding behaviour.  
Prospect theory 
The early works of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) which led to the introduction of the prospect 
theory, serve as the revolutionary evidence of behavioural finance. In contravention to the 
dominant paradigm of expected utility theory, prospect theory is the theory which exhibits the 
irrationality of individuals by exposing their choices under the condition of uncertainty. Most 
notably, this ground-breaking theory is best explained by two main themes which reveals how 
individuals violated the dominant paradigm of expected utility theory namely the value and 
weighting function.  
Firstly, the value function posits that whenever individuals are exposed to a condition of 
uncertainty they tend to place more weight to outcomes that have an element of certainty 
relative to probable outcomes. Extending this proposition into the context of personal finance, 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) reveals that individuals tend to be averse to risk in situations 
related to financial gains and contrarily become risk seekers whenever they are faced with 
losses. Figure 2.2 on the next page illustrates this proposition.   
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Source: figure modified from Barbers and Thaler (2003) 
In figure 2.2, the value function is explained in the context of financial gains and losses relative 
to the final assets as purported by the expected utility theorists. The horizontal axis resembles 
wealth or money which an individual has at a given point in time whilst the value of the wealth 
in question is depicted at the vertical axis. Meanwhile, the point where both value and wealth 
converge is described as the reference point, as it resembles the point in which an individual 
estimates gains and losses.  
Notably, the depiction of the S-shaped value function reveals that individuals do not weigh 
financial gains and losses linearly; instead, when there is a financial gain the value function is 
concave and convex for the financial losses. Furthermore, the kink which occurs at the 
reference point resembles that an individual pays full attention even to small changes in their 
financial gains and losses. In this regard, Kahneman and Tversky (1979), describes such 
anomalous behaviour to be a reflection of a cognitive error called loss aversion. This is the 
phenomenon which occurs when individuals deem financial losses more important than their 
prospective gains such that they get more distressed when they incur loss compared to enjoying 
prospective gains. This is prevalent amongst many capital market participants.  
Figure 2.2: Value function 
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Secondly, the weighting function also contradicts the expected utility theory by using the 
decisions weight instead of probability of the expected outcomes. Figure 2.3 below exhibits 
how related is the decision weight to probability outcome whereby the decision weight                       
π (p) on the vertical axis and probability outcomes (p) at the horizontal axis. 
 
Figure 2.3: Weighting function 
Source: figure modified from Barbers and Thaler (2003) 
Kahneman  and Tversky (1979) describes the weighting probability function as the element of 
prospect theory which explains how individuals psychologically perceive probabilities such 
that, they tend to associate small probabilities with high decision weight and contrarily place 
lower decision weight to high probabilities. According to Barbers and Thaler (2003) the solid 
line resembles the nonlinear probability transformation which reflects how placing high 
decision weight to small probabilities affect the way individuals buy lottery tickets and take 
insurance policy. Subsequently, individuals portray risk-seeking behaviour when buying 
lottery ticket and contrarily become risk-averse when buying insurance policy. Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979) concludes by asserting that both the value and weighting function are 
prominent models in explaining the cognitive errors left unexplained by the expected utility 
theorist.   
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Overconfidence 
In contravention to the assumption of investors rationality, behavioural economist appeal that 
investors tend to be overconfident about their investment decisions. This usually occurs when 
investors overestimate their knowledge or skills and subsequently take much more risk. 
Literature further reveals that one of the major manifestations of this mental error is that 
individual investors tend to trade excessively. In support to this view, Wang (2001) examine 
the survival of both the over and under-confident traders and demonstrate that overconfident 
traders have a capability to thrive in spite of high fundamental risk yet the pessimism or under-
confident fails to survive in the long-run. On the other hand, Barber and Odean (2001) observes 
the level of overconfidence of 35 000 U.S. household investors over the period 1991 to 1997 
and discovers that males trade 45% more than their female counterparts but such excessive 
trading result into 2.56% annual losses for males relative to 1.72% for their females 
counterparts.   
It is also worthwhile to note that, towards the end of the 1990s there was drastic introduction 
of theories and models which aimed to explain the relevance of the long-term mean reversion 
and the momentum effect on the basis of overconfidence. Daniel, Hirshleifer, and 
Subrahmanyam (1998) develops a theory which reveals that the long-term mean reversion is 
attributed to investor’s overconfidence whilst the momentum effect is best explained by the 
self-attribution bias. In the same vein, Daniel and Titman (2000) reveals that investors 
overconfidence attributed to significant risk-adjusted performance of the momentum based 
strategies on the NYSE over the period from 1963 to 1997.  
Theory of regret 
Coined by Bell (1982) as well as Loomes and Sugden (1982), the regret theory is described as 
a cognitive shortcoming which occurs when an individual compares a given outcome or state 
of events with a state of foregone choice. Bring this theory into the practical sense of investing, 
the regret theory is often exhibited when investors attempt to repurchase stocks which they had 
previously sold. For example, when the stock which you previously sold for R100 is currently 
trading at R150 six months later, the natural response for an investor is to regret that they could 
have been better off if they did not sell the stock in question. In contrast, investors can be proud 
of their investment decision if the stock price might have dropped to R85.00. In line to this 
view, Odean (1998) revealed that the regret hypothesis tend be the key attribute to the 
disposition effect, a phenomenon which occurs when investors sell winning stocks and hold 
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the losing stocks. Odean (1998) concluded by postulating that investors suffer from disposition 
effect because they postpone the regret of selling for a loss and accelerates the feeling of selling 
for a gain.  
2.3 Capital market anomalies and possible explanations 
As mentioned earlier, capital market anomalies represent the imperfection or counter 
arguments to the assumptions of the market efficiency and the equilibrium asset pricing 
models. Since the inception of the EMH in 1970, numerous anomalies were discovered, but to 
a certain degree some of them faded away because they did not persist to hold across various 
markets and different time period. Malkiel (2003) support this view by arguing that anomalies 
such as the Holiday effect, Weekend effect, Day-of-the-week effect etc., failed to stand the test 
of time. As a result, the value effect, size effect, short-term momentum effect and long-term 
mean reversion (also known as the overreaction hypothesis) stand out as the prominent 
anomalies in the capital markets.  
It is also worthwhile to note that investors can develop investment styles to exploit these 
anomalies in a capital market. This view is supported by Hsieh and Hodnett (2011) who argues 
that the value effect, size effect and momentum effect are investment styles that are widely 
used by active fund managers with an attempt to gain abnormal returns. Section 2.3.1 presents 
the empirical findings of these anomalies in the global and the South African equity market 
respectively. Although, capital market anomalies have been prevalent and robust in various 
markets and time period, their interpretation remains a controversial debate amongst 
academics. Section 2.3.2 documents the three main possible explanations of these anomalies 
as presented by Haugen and Baker (1996) as well as van Rensburg (2001).  
2.3.1 Capital market anomalies 
Value effect  
In contravention of the joint hypothesis, the value effect implies that financial ratios such as 
book to market value, price to earnings; price to cash flow and dividend yield ratios are 
important determinants of cross-sectional equity returns. Inspired by the early works of 
Benjamin Graham, Basu (1977) discovered the value effect after finding positive relationship 
between expected returns and the price-earnings (P/E) ratios of stocks listed on the NYSE over 
the period 1956 to 1971. Most notably, he found that throughout the 15 years examination 
period, two portfolios made up of the lower P/E stocks demonstrate superior performance 
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against their high P/E ratio counterparts with excess average annual return of 4.2% and 6.8% 
respectively. Basu (1977) justify these findings by questioning the relevance of the CAPM 
framework along with the tenet of the semi-strong form EMH.  
Building upon the reputable findings of Basu (1977) who utilised the P/E ratio, numerous 
studies were carried out in the U.S. market to support the value effect through the use of other 
financial ratios. Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) investigates the value effect in the NYSE 
over the period of 1936 to 1977 and affirm the presence of the value premium being attributed 
to the stocks with high dividends yield. Bhandari (1988) studies the value effect on the NYSE 
over the period from 1948 through 1981 and discover that the debt-to-equity ratio act as the 
prominent determinant of the value premium. Using the cash flow to price, earnings to price, 
gross sales and book-to-market ratio of stocks listed on the NYSE and AMEX from 1963 to 
1990, Lakonishok, Shelefer and Vishny (1994) discovers 8.7% value premium throughout the 
examination period.  
Similar tests of the value effect have been conducted in the international equity markets. Chan, 
Hamao and Lakonishok (1991) studied the Japanese market in the period from 1977 to 1988 
and demonstrated that the value premium was associated with the book-to-market and cash 
flow yield ratios. Using the price to book ratio as the proxy for the value effect, Capaul, Rowley 
and Sharpe (1993) reveals significant value premium from the U.K, France, Germany, 
Switzerland, Japan and the U.S. markets between 1981 and 1992. Bauman, Conover and Miller 
(1998) extended the work of Capaul et al. (1993) and provided evidence of statistically 
significant value premium in 21 countries from the Morgan Stanley Capital International 
(MSCI) Europe, Australasia, Far East (EAFE) index and Canada in the period from 1986 to 
1996. This is accomplished by using the P/E ratio, dividend yield, price to cash flow and the 
price to book ratios as key indicators of the value and growth stocks. In parallel, Fama and 
French (1998) affirm the presence of the value premium from both the U.S. and 12 countries 
on the MSCI EAFE region over a 20 years period from 1975 to 1995. Notably, the empirical 
evidence reveals that amongst the four indicators that are similar to those utilised by Bauman 
et al. (1998), book-to-market ratio yielded consistent annual value premium of 7.86% 
throughout the examination period.  
Similarly, Barry, Goldreyer, Lockwood and Rodriguez (2001) reports significant value 
premium associated with the book-to-market ratio from 35 emerging markets in the period 
from 1985 until 2000. Chan and Lakonishok (2004) reviewed all the prior literature of the value 
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effect and provided updated evidence of value premiums in the EAFE market covering the 
period from 1989 to 2001. In an attempt to ascertain whether the value premium is a distinctive 
phenomenon from the developed markets, Beukes (2011) utilises the methodology of 
Lakonishok et al. (1994) to examine the prevalence of the value premium between South 
Africa, the U.S. UK and continental European countries. Notably, she found that, with the use 
of earnings–to-price ratio, South Africa outpaced its counterparts but underperformed them 
when cash-flow-to-price ratio is used as the common indicator for the strategy. In the most 
recent work, Fama and French (2012) finds the value premium to be prevalent in North 
America, Europe, Asia Pacific and Japan during the period from 1989 to 2011.  
Size effect  
The size effect anomaly was coined by Rolf Banz in 1981. In his reputable study titled “The 
relationship between return and market value of common stocks”, Banz (1981) reveals that 
stocks listed on the NYSE with smaller market capitalisation obtained significant alpha 
compared to those with higher market capitalisation. Notably, the results suggests that, over 
the examination period dated from 1936 through 1975, smaller firms outpaced larger firms by 
generating monthly and annualised above average returns of 1.52% and 19.80% respectively. 
Banz (1981) justifies the merit of these findings by dismissing the competence of the beta 
coefficient in the CAPM framework as the only explanatory variable of asset returns. In spite 
of such robust findings, Banz (1981) concludes by casting doubt to the validity of his findings 
as he assumed that there might also be other explanatory variables apart from the size effect.  
In an attempt to ascertain the validity of the size effect from the U.S. market, Keim (1983) finds 
that 50% of the size premiums observed on the NYSE and AMEX equity market during the 
period from 1963 to 1979 is prevalent during the month of January. In a follow up study, Roll 
(1983) as well as Lakonishok and Shapiro (1986) also confirmed the prevalence of the size 
premiums during the month of January. Taking further the recommendation of Banz (1981), 
Lamoureux and Sanger (1989) reveals persistent size premium on the OTC market of National 
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) during the period from 
1973 to 1985. Horowitz, Loughran and Savin (2000) explores the size effect in the NYSE, 
AMEX and NASDAQ during the period 1963 to 1997. Most notably, they discover 13% size 
premium during the period from 1963 through 1981; whilst during the second phase of 
examination, size premiums amounted to -2%. 
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The size effect have been observed in other financial markets apart from the U.S. market. In 
line with the findings of Keim (1983), Kato and Schallheim (1985) also find significant size 
premiums during the month of January and June on the Japanese market over the period from 
1964 through 1980. In studying the London Stock Exchange (LSE) during April 1956 to March 
1985, Levis (1989) find 5.1% annual size premiums that are significantly lower relative to that 
from other developed economies such as the U.S. Australia, Canada and Japan. In line with the 
findings of Horowitz et al. (1999), Barry et al. (2001) explore the size effect from 35 emerging 
markets in the period from 1985 to 2000 and provides evidence of size premiums that are 
relatively less robust compared to those from the developed economies. In the same vein, Fama 
and French (2012) also discover insignificant size premium in 23 countries from North 
America, Europe, Asia Pacific and Japan during the period from 1989 to 2011. 
Long term mean reversion (overreaction hypothesis)  
As the aforementioned anomalies are mainly attributable to the incompleteness of the CAPM 
framework, growing literature reveals that the cognitive biases of certain investors also have 
significant impact in generating alpha. Inspired by the influential findings of Kahneman and 
Tversky (1982), De Bondt and Thaler (1985) discovers the long-term mean reversion on the 
stocks listed on the NYSE during the period 1926 to 1982. This is the phenomenon which 
posits that investors overreact to unexpected news report; subsequently the overreaction gets 
translated into stock prices such that, in the long run, stock prices revert to the mean. In 
contravention to the weak form EMH, De Bondt and Thaler (1985) finds that, in a portfolio of 
last five years, losing stocks tend to be winners in the subsequent five years, whereas portfolio 
of winning stocks in the last five years tend to be losers for the subsequent five years. The 
empirical results reveals that the loser portfolio generated 31.9% excess return relative to the 
winner portfolio throughout 36 months formation period. Similar to the size effect, De Bondt 
and Thaler (1985) reveals that the long-term mean reversion was more prevalent during the 
month of January.  
The existence of the long-term mean reversion from the U.S. market have been further explored 
by De Bondt and Thaler (1987) when they re-examined their prior findings and discover that 
the abnormal returns are attributable to neither systematic risk nor the size effect bias. In a 
follow-up study, Chan (1988) finds significant long-term mean reversion on the NYSE during 
the period from 1930 to 1983. In the same vein, Zarowin (1990) re-examine the findings of De 
Bondt and Thaler (1985) and affirm significant long-term mean reversion. Similarly, Chorpa, 
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Lakonishok and Ritter (1992) discovers 5% to 10% annual long-term mean reversion on the 
NYSE over the period from 1931 to 1982. Although Chan (1988), Zarowin (1990) and Chorpa 
et al. (1992) find persistent long-term mean reversion, they hold the view that the prevalence 
of the long-term mean reversion is influenced by the time-varying risk of loser portfolios along 
with the size effect bias.  
Similar test of the long-term mean reversion have been observed in other financial markets 
other than the U.S. market. Kryzanowski and Zhang (1992) find similar prevalence from the 
Canadian market in the period from 1950 through 1988. This anomaly is extensively examined 
in the European equity market. In a study of the German Stock Market, Stock (1990) affirm 
the presence of long-term mean reversion over the period from 1973 to 1989.  In line with the 
findings of Zarowin (1990), Clare and Thomas (1995) record significant long-term mean 
reversion from the London Stock Exchange (LSE) over the period from 1955 to 1990. Long-
term mean reversion have been found between different countries. Schiereck, De Bondt and 
Weber (1999) examine the Frankfurt Stock Exchange over the period from 1961 to 1991 and 
discover persistent long-term mean reversion. In a study of the Spanish market, Forner and 
Marhuenda (2003) confirms significant long-term mean reversion that is prevalent during the 
36 months holding period.  
Ali, Nassir, Hassan and Abidin (2011), studies the Malaysian Stock market in the period from 
January 1987 to December 2006 and demonstrate that the prevalence of the long-term mean 
reversion that is attributable to the portfolio formation period and time-varying risk. Recent 
research by Hu, Sha, Liu and Chen (2012) confirm this phenomenon from the Shanghai Stock 
Market over the period January 2007 to June 2011. Baytas and Cakici (1999) examines the 
international markets over the period from 1982 to 1991. The seven countries include the U.S., 
Canada, U.K., Japan, Germany, France and Italy. Most notably, Baytas and Cakici (1999) finds 
significant long-term mean reversion in all six countries with an exception of the U.S market, 
mainly due to the bid-ask biases as reported by Conrad and Kaul (1993). 
Momentum effect 
As identified by Jegadeesh and Titman in 1993, the momentum effect refers to a tendency of 
stock price moving to the same direction for short period of time, such that the winners of last 
year tend to be winners for few more months and losers of last year tend to underperform for 
few more months. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) empirically examine this phenomenon on the 
NYSE and the AMEX during the period 1965 to 1989. The results reveals that the strategy 
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which invested in stocks which was bought on the basis of their 6 months performance 
exhibited 12% annual abnormal returns 6 months later. In conclusion, Jegadeesh and Titman 
(1993) postulates that such evidence occurs when the stock prices temporarily move away from 
their intrinsic values due to the short-term under-reaction by investors.  
Several studies are carried out in various markets and time period to ascertain this anomaly. In 
a study of the U.S. market, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1995) reveals that 77% of the 274 
mutual funds that are investing through the momentum-based strategy yield abnormal returns 
throughout the 10 years period from 1974 to 1984. In studying twelve (12) European markets 
over the period from 1980 to 1995, Rouwenhorst (1998) reveals that the winner portfolios 
outpaced the looser portfolio by 1% monthly risk-adjusted returns. In the same vein, Schiereck 
et al. (1999) discover persistent momentum-based profits from the Frankfurt Stock Exchange 
over the period from 1961 to 1991. Chan, Hameed and Tong (2000) examines the profitability 
of the momentum-based strategies in 23 countries from the Asia-Pacific area, Europe, North 
America and South Africa. The results reveals that during examination period dated from 
January 1980 through June 1995, there are significant momentum profit that are attributed to 
the herding behaviour of investors.  
On the other hand, studying the Spanish market, Forner and Marhuenda (2003) finds significant 
momentum profits particularly during the 12 months holding period. In parallel, Hurn and 
Pavlov (2003) reveals that 6 to 12 months momentum-based strategies from the Australian 
market obtained annual abnormal of 4.79% and 7.13% respectively in the period from 1973 to 
1998. Meanwhile, Gunasekarage and Kot (2007) discover significant profitability of the 
momentum-based investment strategies on the New Zealand Stock Market at the period from 
January 1995 through December 2005. In a study of 23 countries from North America, Europe, 
Japan and Asia Pacific, Fama and French (2012) finds significant momentum premiums 
amongst the 22 countries with an exception of Japan.  
Evidence from the South African market 
Plaistowe and Knight (1986) pioneered and confirmed the presence of the value premiums on 
the JSE. In parallel to that test, De Villers, Lowings, Pettit and Affleck-Graves (1986) finds the 
absence of the size premiums throughout the ten years examination period dated from 1973 to 
1982. In a study of both the size and value effect, Page and Palmer (1991) also discover the 
absence of the size premium; meanwhile the value premium appears to be statistically 
significant throughout the examination period. Using the data sample free of survivorship bias, 
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Waelkens and Ward (1997) finds the absence of the value premium on the JSE over the period 
from 1983 through 1993. Most notably, they discovers that growth stocks earn statistically 
significant returns throughout the examination period. Similar to the conclusion of Page et al. 
(1991), Waelkens et al. (1997) concludes by asserting that such anomalous results are 
attributable to inefficiency of the JSE.  
In a follow-up study, Robins, Sandler and Durand (1999) explores the inter-relationship 
between the January effect, size effect and value effect during the period from 1985 to 1994. 
Using the price-to-book ratio as the proxy for the value effect, Robins et al. (1999) finds the 
January effect to be totally unrelated to both the size effect and the value effect. Most notably, 
they discover that the January effect is robust throughout the examination period whilst the size 
and value effect gain insignificant premiums. Auret and Cline (2011) took up Robins et al. 
(1999) methodology and provide further evidence of the absence of size and value premiums 
on the JSE during the period 1988 through 2006. In contrast to the findings of Robins et al. 
(1999), the January effect appears to be statistically insignificant throughout the examination 
period. 
It is worth noting that the beginning of the millennium also marked the emergence of research 
which aimed at exploring the investment styles that are used to exploit the capital market 
anomalies. This work have been spearheaded by Paul van Rensburg in 2001. The series of 
studies by van Rensburg (2001) as well as van Rensburg and Robertson (2003a, 2003b, 2004) 
examines the explanatory power of various firm fundamental style factors. Most notably, they 
consistently discover the presence of the size, value and momentum effect as the main 
investment styles which can be used to gain abnormal returns on the JSE. These findings 
stimulated a handful of research in the area of finance in the South African equity market.  
In an attempt to ascertain the robustness of the findings of van Rensburg and Robertson (2003), 
Auret and Sinclaire (2006) finds that the book-to-market ratio carries significant power in 
explaining the cross-sectional returns during the period from June 1990 through July 2000. 
Furthermore, Auret et al. (2006) reveals that the book-to-market ratio subsumed both the size 
and value risk factors whenever it is incorporated into van Rensburg et al. (2003a) two-factor 
model. In a follow-up study, Basiewicz and Auret (2009) confirm the prevalence of the size 
and value premiums in spite of the returns drag by the trading costs. In line with findings of 
Auret et al. (2006), these results suggests that the book-to-market ratio carries a significant 
explanatory power compared to the price-earnings ratio which appeared to be prevalent in the 
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findings of van Rensburg et al. (2003a). Strugnell, Gilbert and Kruger (2011) also adopts van 
Rensburg et al. (2003) methodology and provide evidence that both the size effect and value 
effect are prevalent on the JSE during the 1994 through 2007. The empirical results reveals two 
main premises; firstly the beta coefficient appears to be inversely related to the expected returns 
and secondly the size effect is more prevalent amongst small stocks.  
Recent research by Hodnett, Hsieh and van Rensburg (2012) also confirm the presence of the 
value, size and momentum effect on the JSE during the period 1997 through 2007. They also 
find that solvency and liquidity attributes fails to explain the cross-sectional returns, which 
could be attributed to the fact that the highly levered companies are unattractive to investors as 
they have high financial risk. In the most recent work, Muller and Ward (2013) uses longer 
examination period of 27 years to ascertain the validity of the aforementioned investment 
styles. The results reveals that 9% and 14% alpha is generated by the momentum effect as well 
as the combination of the momentum effect, return on capital, cash-flow to price and earnings 
yield. Surprisingly, insignificant size premium is found as a result of the segmentation of stocks 
that are used to form the small firm portfolios. 
With respect to the test of long-term mean reversion, a handful of research is conducted in the 
local equity market to validate this anomaly. This work have been pioneered by Page and Way 
(1992) who affirms the robust long-term mean reversion along with slight presence of the 
January effect, during the period from 1974 to 1989. After accounting for survivorship bias 
and employing various optimisation and simulation processes, Muller (1999) confirms the 
presence of long-term mean reversion over the period from 1985 to 1997. Contrary to the 
findings of Muller (1999), Strugnell, Gilbert and Kruger (2011) finds that survivorship bias is 
significantly attributed to the presence of long-term mean reversion on the JSE on the period 
from 1984 through 2007. Hsieh and Hodnett (2011) have taken further the ground work of 
Page et al. (1992) and Muller (1999) and confirm significant long-term mean reversion during 
the examination period dated from January 1993 through March 2009. They assert that the 
robustness of the long-term mean reversion is closely related to the South African business 
cycle.  
With regard to the value and momentum strategies, Fraser and Page (2000) adopts Asness 
(1997) methodology and provides evidence of the value and momentum premiums on the JSE 
industrial stocks during the period from 1973 through 1997. In the most recent research, Page, 
Britten and Auret (2013) confirm the prevalence of both short and medium term momentum 
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effect on the JSE during the period from 1995 through 2010. Their results further suggests that 
the momentum profits is coupled with higher level of liquidity. In addition to that, Page et al. 
(2013) discover that the momentum profits are highly significant during the period from 2005 
through 2010. In line with the prior studies, the authors articulated that the robust performance 
is attributable to investor’s cognitive bias.  
2.3.2 Possible explanations 
This sub-sections provides the brief explanation or interpretation of capital market anomalies 
as clearly articulated by Haugen and Baker (1996) as well as van Rensburg (2001). According 
to the inference made these authors, there are four contrasting views concerning the existence 
of the capital market anomalies. Firstly there are those who holds the view that joint hypothesis 
is at fault and subsequently result into anomaly. Secondly, proponents of market efficiency 
argues that capital market anomalies rises from the incompleteness of the CAPM framework. 
In contrast to the market efficiency proposition, capital market anomalies are perceived to be a 
product of investors’ irrationality. Lastly, capital market anomalies is also deemed to be the 
product of methodological bias which occurs from the research design and the database which 
data sample has been extracted from.  
Joint hypothesis problem 
Even though the aforementioned anomalies have been more prevalent and robust in various 
markets and time period, their interpretation remains an endless debate amongst academics. In 
this regard, literature points to the fact that the joint hypothesis is the root cause of the debate. 
As described by Fama (1970), joint hypothesis posits that the EMH cannot hold unilaterally, 
instead it should always be tested bilaterally with the model of market equilibrium such as the 
CAPM. Therefore, in the context of the joint hypothesis, it is impossible to reject the relevance 
of the CAPM without rejecting the tenet of market efficiency, hence this phenomenon is 
commonly known as the joint hypothesis problem. In support to this view, Fama (1991) argues 
that, evidence of capital market anomalies remains ambiguous since there is no clear distinction 
between market inefficiency and inadequacy of the CAPM framework.  
 Rational proposition 
The rational proposition posits that the tenet of market efficiency still holds, however, alpha 
generated from the capital market anomalies is attributed to the incompleteness of the CAPM 
framework. This proposition have been spelled-out in the series of studies carried out by 
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Eugene Fama and Kenneth French in the decade of the 1990s. In their well-renowned study, 
Fama and French (1992) integrates all the firm fundamentals’ style variables and demonstrates 
that the firm size and the book to market ratio subsumed the price to earnings, debt-to-equity, 
price to cash flow and dividend yield ratio in explaining the cross-sectional returns. As a result, 
Fama and French (1992) dismissed the relevance of the traditional single-factor CAPM 
framework and suggested the use of multiple factor equilibrium asset pricing models.   
Building upon that suggestion, Fama and French (1993) develops a multiple factor equilibrium 
asset pricing model commonly known as the Fama and French three-factor model. This model 
is deemed to be the rational asset pricing model as it augmented the single-factor CAPM 
framework with the dimension of risk from the firm size and the book-to-market ratio. Fama 
and French (1996) examines the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model on the NYSE, 
AMEX and NASDAQ in the period from July 1963 to December 1993 and provides evidence 
that, with an exception of the momentum effect, the three-factor model absorbs the alpha 
generated from the size, value and long-term mean reversion investment styles. Carhart (1997) 
have filled the void gap of explaining the momentum-based premiums by augmenting the three-
factor model with the one year momentum factor, this model is commonly known as the 
Carhart four-factor model. Still on the momentum effect, Conrad and Kaul (1998) as well as 
Bulkley and Nawosah (2009) finds that the prevalence of the momentum effect is attributable 
to the cross-sectional variation of the stocks which form the momentum portfolios. In 
conclusion, Fama and French (1998) vindicate the rational proposition by asserting that the 
long-term mean reversion and momentum effect are a product of chance because they did not 
persist to hold across various markets and different time period. 
Irrational proposition 
The proponents of this argument holds the view that capital market anomalies are attributable 
to the cognitive errors made by the irrational stock market participants. With respect to the 
value effect; Lakonishok et al. (1994) reveals that the value premium is attributable to the 
cognitive errors made by growth investors. Notably, they assert that value investors obtains 
significant alpha because of being contrarian to the “naïve” growth investors. This phenomenon 
is commonly known as the contrarian value strategy. The prevalence of contrarian value 
premiums is affirmed by La Porta (1996) as well as La Porta, Lakonishok, Sheleifer and Vishny 
(1997) who demonstrates that cognitive systematic errors of growth investors result into 
significant contrarian value premium. Haugen (1995) criticise the EMH by postulating that the 
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overreaction hypothesis, momentum effect and the contrarian value strategy adequately 
dismiss the notion of investor’s rationality. 
It is worthwhile to note that amongst all the behavioural based anomalies, the irrational 
explanation of momentum effect have been widely debated. In contrast to the under-reaction 
hypothesis of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), Scott, Stump and Xu (1999) provides empirical 
evidence which reveals that the momentum effect is adequately explained by the 
overconfidence bias. In the same vein, Daniel and Titman (2000) discovers that investor’s 
overconfidence is attributed to significant risk-adjusted performance of the momentum based 
strategies on the NYSE over the period from 1963 to 1997.  
Methodological bias proposition 
The methodological bias proposition asserts that, anomalies exist as a result of methodological 
errors or bias which occurs from the research design as well as the database in which data 
sample have been extracted from. Proponents of this bias take their stance without dismissing 
the relevance of the joint hypothesis; instead they argue that data snooping and survivorship 
bias adequately explains the prevalence of the capital market anomalies. Data snooping bias 
occurs when an excessive use of a certain data series results in predictable patterns or trends. 
The role of data snooping in explaining the prevalence of the size effect appears to be firstly 
documented by Lo and MacKinlay (1990) who utilises Monte Carlo simulation model to 
ascertain this proposition. Black (1993) contends the relevance of the beta coefficient, by 
alluding to the fact that the prevalence of the size effect along with the findings of Fama and 
French (1992) is a product of data snooping. In the same vein, MacKinlay (1995) concurs with 
this view by postulating that the relevance of the three-factor model is a product of data 
snooping. Moreover, Conrad, Cooper and Kaul (2003) reveals that data snooping explains more 
than 50% of the value premiums obtained from the stocks listed on the NYSE, AMEX and 
NASDAQ on the period from 1969 through 1995. Horowitz et al. (1999) postulates that the 
prevalence of the size effect before 1980s is also attributable to data snooping.  
With respect to the survivorship bias, research suffers from this methodological bias when the 
researcher purposefully or accidentally use a universe of data sample which excludes stocks or 
mutual funds that were delisted or experienced poor performance. Kothari, Shaken and Sloan 
(1995) reveals that, the reputable findings of Fama and French (1992) are attributed to the effect 
of survivorship bias. In a South African context, Strugnell, Gilbert and Kruger (2011) discovers 
that survivorship bias significantly explain the presence of long-term mean reversion on the 
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JSE in the period from 1984 through 2007. With all being said, the debate about the existence 
and the interpretation of capital market anomalies subsequently led into endless debate about 
the active versus passive management that is discussed below in Section 2.4.  
2.4 Active versus passive management 
The debate about active versus passive management has received a great deal of attention from 
both the academics and investment professionals since the advent of market efficiency. 
However, it is surprising that, to date there is no definite answer of which investment 
management style is superior to the other. Notably, market efficiency have been the centre of 
attention in this debate, whereby the proponents of active management agrees with the notion 
of beating the market yet passive management proponents contend for investing into buy and 
hold strategies.  
Before engaging into the debate, it is paramount to first observe the definition and the main 
characteristics of these conflicting strategies. In this regard, Beasley, Meade and Chang (2003) 
describes active investment strategy as the practice of buying or picking securities that are 
expected to generate capital gains throughout the holding period. This investment decision 
comes as a result of extensive research of predicting the movements of securities prices through 
technical analysis as well as identifying mispriced securities through the use of fundamental 
analysis. On the other hand, passive investment refers to a strategy whereby fund managers or 
investors buy a diversified portfolio which resembles the market or a particular index. As noted 
earlier, this strategy stems from the notion that, in an efficient market, investors cannot 
consistently earn abnormal returns; instead they are better off by investing into the buy and 
hold strategies which comes in a form of either buying an index mutual fund or an ETF.  
With respect to the main characteristics of these conflicting strategies, Beasley, Meade and 
Chang (2003) presents the fundamental strength and weakness of these strategies. To their 
view, on the upside, actively managed funds have a potential of earning relatively high risk-
adjusted returns, due to the high level of risk inherent in this strategy. Meanwhile their passive 
counterpart enjoys significant risk-adjusted returns during bull trends along with lower fixed 
and minimal trading costs. However, on the downside, due to the frequency of trading involved, 
actively managed funds incur significantly high trading cost over and above the management 
fees. On the other hand, passively managed funds are not protected from bear market trends 
hence they suffer from that repercussions.  
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Firstly, the risk associated with these strategies is one of the fundamental attributes to consider 
when engaging in this debate. In line with this view, El-Hassan and Kofman (2003) argues that 
both actively and passively managed funds are exposed to the unavoidable market risk. 
However, actively managed funds are also exposed to the risk associated with their stock 
selection skills and their market timing ability. Secondly, both fixed and variable costs of 
carrying out these strategies have been one of the points in which the debate is embedded upon. 
In his seminal paper titled “The Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 1945-1964”, 
Jensen (1968), examines the performance of the U.S. mutual funds over the period from 1945 
to 1964. The results reveals that, after accounting for management fees and trading costs, 89 
out of the 115 mutual funds fail to generate significant risk-adjusted returns above the buy and 
hold strategy.  
In the same vein, Sharpe (1991) documents the comparison between actively and passively 
managed funds before and after transaction costs. Most notably, Sharpe (1991) posits that, 
irrespective of the time period, after accounting for transaction cost, passively managed funds 
generated excess returns relative to their active management counterparts. Consequently, 
Sharpe (1991) called the active fund management a “Zero Sum Game before cost”, because 
when accounting for transaction costs, the strategy fails to consistently yield excess returns. In 
a follow-up study, Malkiel (2005) took further the findings of Jensen (1968) and Sharpe (1991) 
and reveals that before accounting for brokerage costs, bid-ask spreads, and market impact 
costs, actively managed funds had a total expense ratio of 1.50% relative to 0.20% of the 
passively managed funds.  
Thirdly, the underlying strategies adopted by the investment managers also have significant 
contribution to this debate. The proponent of active investment strategy posits that they can 
add value to their investors through their securities selection skills along with their ability to 
time the market. As identified by Kon (1983), securities selection occurs when fund managers 
attempt to pick securities through forecasting of individual stocks as well as company-specific 
events. Similarly, market timers attempt to earn significant risk-adjusted returns by predicting 
market movements through technical analysis indicators.  
The test of active fund manager’s ability to time the market can be dated back to the 1960’s. In 
their remarkable paper, Treynor and Mazuy (1966) devised a statistical test to assess active 
fund manager’s ability to time the market. Their results reveals that in a sample of 57 mutual 
funds, only one mutual fund manager possessed significant ability to time the market over the 
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period from 1953 to 1962. The findings of Treynor and Mazuy (1966) is then supported most 
notably by Chang and Lewellen (1984) as well as Oldfield and Page (1997) from the South 
African equity market.  
Sharpe (1975), on the other hand, finds significant potential gain from market timing in the 
U.S. market from 1929 to 1972. He discovers that market timing strategy generated 14.86% 
annual returns compared to 10.64% of the passively managed funds. This is then later 
supported by Kon (1983) who reveals that for the period from January 1960 till June 1976; 6 
out of 37 U.S. mutual funds successfully yields excess returns due to successful market timing 
and securities selection skills.  
With all being said, the critics of active management on the basis of market efficiency, risk, 
cost and manager’s timing and selectivity skills have contributed to the popularity of passive 
investing strategies such as index mutual funds and ETFs. Dellva (2001) concurs with this view 
by arguing that passive investment vehicles have grown rapidly due to three main factors: lower 
cost, lower turnover and superior performance relative to their active management 
counterparts.  
2.5 Conclusion 
Since the establishment of the MPT in 1952, investors tend to look at the risk in conjunction 
with the return of their investments. Soon after that, diversification of assets is introduced as a 
way in which returns can be maximised whilst minimising the level of risk. In this regard, the 
EMH is introduced as it underpins the MPT and diversification because both theories assumed 
to work under the notion of market efficiency. However, just like other theories in the body of 
knowledge, market efficiency is criticised through the rise of behavioural finance. This is the 
theory which exposes the irrationality of market participants when making investment 
decisions. Further to this, the dawn of 1980 witnessed the rise of other arguments which counter 
the assumptions of market efficiency namely, the value, size, long-term mean reversion and 
the momentum effect. As a result, the debate between these totally contrasting schools of 
thoughts gained traction such that they are called the active versus passive management debate. 
In light of the outcome of the debate, ETFs rose in popularity due to their element of 
affordability, transparency and efficiency relative to actively managed investment 
counterparts. In this regard, Chapter 3 below gives an in-depth discussion about ETFs, covering 
their history, growth, replication strategies, and the creation and redemption process and 
performance evaluation measures.  
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Chapter 3 Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs) 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of ETFs as a stand-alone passive investment product. This 
is accomplished firstly by documenting the evolution and growth of ETFs in Section 3.2. The 
summary of the evolution and growth of ETFs is followed by Section 3.3 which thoroughly 
discussed ETFs replication strategies namely; physical/full, partial/sampling and synthetic 
replication strategy. Building upon the replication strategies, Section 3.4 covered the summary 
of the discussion of the creation and redemption process. This is the process which is utilised 
to ensure that ETFs are efficiently priced such that no arbitrage opportunity should arise from 
the mispricing. Section 3.5 looks at the tracking error as well as premiums and discounts along 
with their explanatory variables. Finally, Section 3.6 provides the summary of the chapter and 
concludes.    
3.2 History and growth of ETFs 
The art of passive investing through ETFs can be dated back to the 1970s, yet to some it is 
commonly known as a new phenomenon which started in 1993. According to Gastineau (2001) 
and Deville (2008) the evolution of index trackers funds like ETFs dates back to the late 1970s. 
They both opined that the program trading is the first index tracker fund that have been 
launched in 1970. Thereafter, diverse kinds of these index tracker funds began to be 
proliferated in various stock markets until 1989 when the Toronto Index Participation (TIPs) 
was launched at the Toronto Stock Exchange (hereafter TSE). The role of the TIPs is to 
replicate the performance of the TSE top 35 and 100 indices. In contrast to the common belief 
that the ETFs was incepted in 1993, growing literature reveals that the TIPs are the first formal 
ETFs to be traded. Broms and Gastineau (2006) concurs with this view by asserting that the 
Canadian TIPs should be considered as the first formal ETF funds because they are the tracker 
fund which possess all the traits of an ETF compared to the preceding tracker funds. 
In 1993, the AMEX together with State Street Global Advisors launched the popular Standard 
and Poor Depository Receipt ETF (also commonly known as the Spiders). Since the formation 
of this fund, ETFs exhibits significant growth across different asset classes, assets under 
management (AUM) and also reaching non U.S. markets. As documented by Chu (2011), EFTs 
were then introduced at the Asian market towards the end of 1999. Meanwhile, a year later in 
2000, ETFs reached the European and African equity markets respectively. In the entire 
3-2 
 
 
African continent, South Africa was the first country to launch the ETFs product called the 
Satrix 40, an ETF which is specially designed to mimic the performance of FTSE/JSE Top 40 
index.  
Apart from growing in numbers, ETFs also experienced some invention of new products, 
namely the leverage and inverse ETFs as well as the actively managed ETFs. The leverage and 
inverse ETFs were incepted at the U.S. market in 2006. Unlike the traditional ETFs, the 
leverage and inverse ETFs are regarded as the short-term trading instruments which aims to 
maximise their daily returns through mimicking the leverage and the inverse returns of the 
underlying index. According to Charupat and Miu (2010), the fundamental difference between 
the traditional ETFs and the leveraged and inverse ETFs is the recommended holding period, 
the latter is recommended to be held for less than 15 days. Secondly, in the creation and 
redemption process, leverage and inverse ETFs uses cash instead of the actual stocks of the 
target benchmark index.  
The advent of actively managed ETFs can be traced back to 2008. Just like the actively 
managed mutual funds, these ETFs are also aim to generate excess returns through beating the 
underlying index. Rompotis (2009) reveals that actively managed ETFs investors utilise the 
securities selection and market timing strategies to add value to their portfolios. Having known 
the evolution of ETFs, it is worthwhile to understand the various factors which an investor 
needs to consider when purchasing them. Section 3.2 below, thoroughly discusses the three 
main strategies which an ETF provider can employ to successfully mimic the performance of 
the underlying index. 
3.3 ETF replication strategies 
As opposed to actively managed funds which aim to generate risk-adjusted returns by 
outperforming the market benchmarked by the underlying index, ETFs instead, aims to 
generate excess returns by mimicking that index performance. However, the question becomes 
which strategy should the ETF provider employ to accurately replicate the performance of the 
underlying index. In general there are three main ETF replication strategies namely, 
physical/full replication, partial/sampling replication and synthetic replication strategy.  
3.3.1 Physical/full replication strategy 
The physical replication strategy occurs when the fund provider create an ETF product out of 
the stocks that have the same proportional weighting as that of the underlying index. To the 
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top-end investors, full replication strategy yields a vast number of benefits. As documented by 
Maurer and Williams (2015), physical replication strategy possess high level of transparency 
as it enables investors to know the exact proportion of the constituents that has been used to 
create the fund. However, on the downside, this level of transparency comes at a significant 
rebalancing cost, depending on how often the underlying index rebalances their holdings. The 
severity of the rebalancing cost also depend on the constituents of the underlying index, for 
example, quarterly rebalancing of the FTSE/JSE All-Share index is relatively high compared 
to that of the FTSE/JSE Top 40 index ETF. It is worth noting that the U.S. and the local market 
regulatory authorities endorse the use of the physical replication strategy amongst all ETF 
providers. In the case of the South African ETF market, Matarutse and Sibanda (2014) opined 
that South Africa maintains the use of traditional ETFs structures as enforced by the local 
regulatory authorities. Figure 3.1 below; illustrates the entire process of forming an ETF 
through the use of physical replication strategy as exhibited by Maurer and Williams (2015). 
Figure 3.1: Physical replication structure 
 
Source: figure modified from Maurer and Williams (2015) 
As illustrated above, the physical replication process commences at the primary market 
whereby the ETF sponsor (Fund) and the authorised participants (AP) or fund participants are 
the main players. In this regard, the ETF sponsor serve as an actual provider and the 
administrator of the fund whereas the AP is mainly the investment banks which plays the role 
of the middle-man between the ETF sponsor and the stock market. As clearly depicted above, 
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the AP buys a batch of stocks in the same proportional weight as the constituents of the target 
benchmark index and then delivers the basket of stocks to the sponsor whom in return, delivers 
the creation units of ETF stocks. Ramaswamy (2011) posits that the delivered creation units 
often come in a form of 50 000 stocks or more. Thereafter, in the last stage, the AP then sell 
the ETF stocks to the secondary market which is the stock exchange whereby the ETFs can be 
bought and sold by the retail and institutional investors. As noted earlier, this strategy yields 
investors the benefit of knowing exactly the stocks which comprised the benchmark index. 
Lastly, it is also worth noting that the trade process in the secondary market is facilitated by 
brokers, from the local ETF market, ETFSA is the leading broker firm which serve both 
institutional and retail investors. 
3.2.2 Partial/sampling replication strategy 
ETF providers can also successfully replicate the performance of their target indices through 
partial or sampling replication strategy. This occurs when the fund provider mimics the 
underlying index by choosing a representative sample of stocks through the exclusion of small 
and illiquid stocks. This strategy is effectively used whenever the full replication strategy is 
expensive to implement. As a result, partial replication strategy yields the benefit of incurring 
relatively minimal cost as opposed to the physical replication strategy. However, it is also 
worthwhile to note that the partial replication strategy also has significant drawbacks. In 
support of this view, Beasley et al. (2003) asserts that the drawback of partial replication occurs 
when stocks that has been excluded from the sample performs exceptionally well relative to 
the ones in the sample. With all being said, it is worth understanding that, as opposed to the 
physical and synthetic strategies, partial replication is seldom used in the investment practice.  
3.2.3 Synthetic replication strategy 
ETF providers can also attempt to replicate the performance of their underlying indices through 
synthetic replication strategy. The objective of this strategy is achieved through the use of 
derivative instruments, whereby the ETF provider enters into a swap agreement with the third 
party who promise to pay the return based on the underlying index. Kosev and Williams (2011) 
argues that the benefit of using synthetic replication strategy comes from relatively lower cost, 
ability to gain exposure to diverse kinds of markets, asset classes and relatively lower tracking 
difference. However, the challenge of this strategy is the counterparty risk which could occur 
when the third party fails to honour the swap agreement. Over and above the counterparty risk, 
synthetic replication strategy also faces the challenge of being prohibited in markets such as 
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the U.S. and the local equity market, even though it is permitted in the European market. In 
support to this view, Ramaswamy (2011) reveals that the U.S. regulatory rules passed by the 
U.S. Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) in March 2010, prohibits the use of derivative 
instruments when constructing ETF funds. However, from the European market, Elia (2012) 
note that the European ETFs which synthetically replicate their underlying indices are ordered 
to be capped at 10% of counterparty risk over the Net Asset Value (NAV).  
Moreover, it is worth understanding that the synthetic replication strategy has two sub 
categories namely the funded and unfunded or total return swap strategy. As documented by 
Ramaswamy (2011) and Maurer and Williams (2015), the latter is most preferred and widely 
used in practice due to the promised collateral assets in case of default by the counterparty. To 
fully understand this strategy, Figure 3.2, illustrates the unfunded synthetic total return swap 
replication ETF strategy. Similar to the physical replication strategy, the process of 
synthetically replicating the underlying index through total return swap also takes place in the 
primary market; thereafter the created ETF stocks are distributed to the secondary market 
commonly known as the stock market. 
Figure 3.2: Synthetic (total return swap) replication strategy 
 
Source: figure modified from Maurer and Williams (2015) 
The synthetic replication process also commences with the transaction made by the AP through 
making a cash payment to the sponsor in exchange of ETF shares (creation units). Subsequent 
to that, the sponsor then interacts with the third party, swap counterparty such that, in exchange 
for cash, the sponsor receives a basket of stocks which serves as the collateral assets, in case 
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the counterparty defaults. Lastly, Maurer and Williams (2015), postulates that the sponsor gains 
the full exposure of the underlying index from the counterparty through the total return swap 
transaction which depicted by the dotted lines. 
Moreover, within the process of replication, there is also a significant interaction between the 
primary and the secondary market. This is where the AP as the market maker transfers the ETF 
stocks to the stock exchange. In this regard, the AP performs the role of overseeing the flow of 
ETF stocks in order to ascertain whether there is excess demand and supply of these stocks on 
a daily basis. In its purest sense, this process is called the creation and redemption process. This 
is the mechanism which the AP employs whenever there is either a discount or a premium 
against the NAV. Section 3.3 below provides the detailed discussion of this crucial component 
of ETFs as an investment vehicle of choice.  
3.4 Creation and redemption process 
As it was noted above in Section 3.2.3, the ETF market is segmented into the primary and 
secondary market. In the primary market the AP interacts with the ETF sponsor, whilst buyers 
and sellers interact in the secondary market. Over and above the interaction in the primary 
market the AP also oversees of the creation and redemption process illustrated in Figure 3.3. 
Gastineau (2004) postulates  that the creation process occurs when the AP buys a batch of ETF 
stocks in the same proportional weighting as the constituents of the target benchmark index in 
exchange of ETF stocks. Meanwhile, in the case of synthetic ETFs, the AP creates ETF stocks 
through paying cash to the ETF sponsor. On the contrary, the redemption process is a reverse 
of the creation process. 
Petajisto (2011) asserts that the creation and redemption process occurs “in-kind or in specie” 
which implies that the new ETF stocks are created towards the end of trading day at the NAV 
that have been determined after all the ETF investors have lodged their orders during the formal 
trading hours. As a result, the transaction cost which the AP incurs in this process is fixed 
regardless of the additional transactions. Having explored the process of creation and 
redemption in the primary market, it is worthwhile noting that, this process also has a 
significant impact in the secondary market. This is wherein only cash and ETF shares are used 
as medium of instruction by both the AP from the primary market and stock exchange such as 
the JSE on the secondary market. In this market, retail and institutional investors use cash to 
buy ETF of their choice, however their prices fluctuate due to market forces.  
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Source: figure modified from Kosev and Williams (2011) 
According to the law of one price, both prices should be equal at all times. However, due to 
the demand and supply of ETFs on the exchange, the market prices tend to diverge from the 
NAV, subsequently resulting in arbitrage opportunity. In this regard, the creation and 
redemption mechanism is utilised to ensure that the gap between the market price and the NAV 
is mitigated. Porteba and Shiven (2002) argues that whenever the ETF market price exceeds 
the NAV or trading at a premium, the AP supplies more ETF stocks to ensure that the market 
price converges to the NAV. In contrast, whenever the market price of an ETF is trading below 
the NAV or trading on a discount, the AP sell off ETF stocks in order to bring the market price 
and the NAV to equilibrium. The detailed discussion of factors relating to ETFs pricing 
efficiency are documented in Chapter 4.   
3.5 Tracking error and explanatory variables 
Having known the replication strategies along with the creation/redemption process, the 
outstanding question is how the performance of ETF could be determined. In general the 
performance of ETFs is evaluated by the ETFs tracking error. Firstly, the tracking error is 
obtained by computing absolute difference between the ETFs returns against that of the target 
benchmark index over a particular period of time. Secondly the ETF tracking error is also 
evaluated by using the standard deviation or the volatility of the difference between the ETF 
performances against that of the underlying index. This methodology is widely used in the 
Figure 3.3: Creation and redemption process 
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investment practice because it measures how consistent the ETF fund manager replicates the 
performance of the target benchmark index.  
It is of utmost importance to note that the aim of ETFs is to obtain as minimal tracking error as 
possible; hence the optimal tracking error is zero, which implies that the ETF has the same 
performance as that of the underlying index. This seldom happens due to key explanatory 
variables that are discussed below. The first and most obvious explanatory variable of the 
tracking error is the cost of running the fund. As soon as the ETF provider takes into account 
the cost of running the fund, the fund can potentially underperform the underlying index. The 
cost of running the ETF is called total expense ratio (TER), which is often cited in the ETF 
fund fact sheet.  
Over and above the TER, ETFs also incurs several trading cost such as broker-dealer 
commission, bid-ask spread and stamp duty. Collectively the tracking error is introduced by 
these costs. A similar view is held by Dellva (2001), who suggests that both the trading cost 
and TER form the primary costs of investing in an ETF. Moreover, it is also worthwhile to note 
that the frequent rebalancing is another main source of tracking error, mainly to the physically 
replicated ETFs. As a result, the synthetically replicated ETFs tend to be affordable and possess 
less tracking error. In line with the view, Elia (2012) and Maurer and Williams (2015) also 
affirm that, fund optimisation and frequent rebalancing of physical replicated ETFs severely 
drag their performance relative to the impact of counterparty risk towards the synthetic 
replicated ETFs.  
Apart from the total cost of investing in ETFs, the third variable which explains the tracking 
error is the cash drag or cash holding. This occurs when the ETF provider has to distribute 
some income or rebalancing the fund. These two factors have significant impact on the 
performance because; using cash implies that the ETF provider is not invested in the underlying 
index. In support of this view, Maurer and Wiliams (2015) who opined that, in bull market 
trend, ETF provider with more cash tend to underperform their counterparts; meanwhile in bear 
market trends they outpace them.   
Fourthly, the existence of high tracking error can be explained by the impact of tax treatment 
on dividends of the underlying index. This occurs when the dividends of the underlying index 
is subject to withholding tax. This idea have been empirically investigated by Blitz, Huij and 
Swinkels (2012), who reveals that dividends withholding tax accounted to annual 0.50% and 
1.50% of the underperformance of both the European index mutual funds and ETFs. Having 
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explored the key aspect of tracking error and their explanatory variables, it is also worth 
understanding that there are various factors which also explain the ETF trading volume.  
Since the ETF trade like normal stock in the stock market, their liquidity becomes one of the 
crucial elements to consider when investing in ETFs. Notably, Rompotis (2012) empirically 
examines the average trading volume of the Swiss Stock Exchange. He discovers that the Swiss 
market ETFs average trading volume is adequately explained by the intraday ETF market price 
volatility, average trading frequency and the executed number of orders. 
3.6 Premiums and discounts along with key determinants 
As mentioned earlier, it is the duty of the AP to ensure that the process of creation and 
redemption is efficiently executed in order to minimise the arbitrage opportunity which might 
arise when ETF prices are in disequilibrium by either trading on a premium or discount. 
However, empirical evidence reveals that apart from the inefficiency of creation and 
redemption process, several factors serve as the key determinants of the premiums and 
discounts. Using multilinear regression model, Lin and Chou (2006) discovers that ETFs 
premium and discount are attributable to their volatility and market returns. Delcoure and 
Zhong (2007) finds premiums obtained by 20 iShare ETFs listed on the AMEX to be best 
explained by institutional ownership, bid-ask spread, trading volume, exchange rate volatility, 
political and financial crises. Similar findings are documented from the Turkish market by 
Gozbasi and Erdem (2010) who finds that the premiums of the Dow Jones Islamic Market ETF 
(DJIMTR) are attributable to the institutional ownership ratio, transaction cost, trading volume 
and intraday volatility. On the other hand, Ackert and Tian (2008) reveals that the pricing 
inefficiency of 28 U.S and country-specific ETFs is attributable to the momentum, illiquidity 
and size effect.  
3.7 Conclusion 
Albeit gaining traction after the launch of the Spider in 1993, the evolution of ETFs date back 
to the 1970s. As clearly documented by Gastineau (2001) and Deville (2008), the first ETF like 
product that is called program trading have been launched in the 1970s with an aim to trade all 
the constituents of the S&P 500 index in one single trade. Soon after that, the popular Vanguard 
S&P 500 index tracking mutual fund have been formed, also aiming to replicate the S&P 500. 
However, towards the tail end of 1989, another index tracking fund called the Toronto Index 
Participation (TIPs) is launched in Canada with an aim to replicate the performance of the TSE 
top 35 and 100 indices. Subsequent to that, State Street Global Advisors proliferate the Spiders 
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which to this day is considered to be the first ETFs to be launched. Amongst other factors, 
ETFs as an investment product grew in popularity across all kinds of investors due to their trait 
of low fees, transparency and efficiency. As a result, ETFs reached the Asian, European and 
the African market in the year 1999 and 2000 respectively. In this regard, Satrix 40 which 
replicate the performance of the FTSE/JSE Top 40 index became the first-ever launched ETF 
in the African continent.  
In parallel with such a significant growth beyond the borders of the U.S., different kinds of 
ETFs have been launched. Unlike the traditional vanilla ETFs which aims to add value by 
physically replicating the constituents of the target benchmark indices, leverage and inverse 
ETFs which utilises derivative instruments to replicate the underlying index have been 
launched in 2006 in the U.S. market. Two years later, actively managed ETFs which aim to 
outperform the target benchmark index was also launched in the U.S. market. In spite of these 
innovative products, the manner in which an ETF providers replicate the movement of the 
target benchmark index remains the endless debate amongst investment professionals.  To date, 
ETF providers have three methods in which they could mimic their desired underlying indices 
namely, physical/full replication, partial/sampling replication and also synthetic replication. 
The latter is prohibited locally due to the fact that it uses derivative instruments which are 
perceived to be of risky relative to other asset classes. 
It is these methods of replication which gives rise to tracking error due to management fees, 
cash drag, dividends distribution and also the trading volume impact. Within the process of 
replicating various indices, ETF providers also interact with investment banks which are 
commonly known as authorised participants (AP). The primary role of the AP is ensuring that 
demand of ETF shares does not exceed the supply. However, due to factors such as market 
volatility, institutional ownership, bid-ask spread, trading volume, exchange rate volatility, 
political and financial crises, ETF does get mispriced and either trade on a discount or premium 
to the NAV. In this regard, an ETF is considered to be trading at a discount when the market 
price exceed the NAV, premium when the NAV exceed the market price. This phenomenon is 
called efficiency of ETFs against their NAVs. With all being said, Chapter 4 presents the 
empirical evidence pertaining to the ETFs ability to track their underlying indices and also their 
level of efficiency against the NAV across various markets. 
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Chapter 4 Review of Empirical Studies 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the empirical evidence on the subject of tracking ability and pricing 
efficiency of ETFs from both the developed, international and emerging ETF markets. The 
rationale behind grouping the findings based on the development of the market is to exhibit the 
effect in which advancement of the stock market and regulatory reform had on the question of 
tracking ability and pricing efficiency of ETFs. As mentioned earlier by Matarutse and Sibanda 
(2014), regulation of the local ETFs is relatively the same as that of the U.S. In this regard, 
studies conducted from the developed markets are those from the U.S.A, Europe and Asia-
Pacific since they are pioneers of this ETF industry. On the one hand, empirical evidence from 
the international market covers the studies that have been conducted across various continents. 
Lastly, review of empirical studies done in the emerging markets encompass research done at 
the developing market such as the JSE and the national stock exchange of India.   
Although ETFs gained popularity during the late 1990s, there is abundant evidence about their 
tracking ability and pricing efficiency. There are four sections in this chapter. Section 4.2 
summarise the empirical evidence about ETFs tracking ability covering their ability to replicate 
their underlying benchmark indices as well as the comparative analysis between them and their 
index mutual funds counterparts. The summary of tracking ability results is accompanied by 
the discussion of the various factors which introduces the tracking errors. 
This is followed by the demonstration of the empirical evidence on ETFs pricing efficiency 
which is covered in Section 4.3. In addition, empirical evidence about the extent of the price 
deviation persistence is explored in order to observe if such persistent price deviation have led 
to arbitrage opportunity. Similarly, evidence about ETFs pricing efficiency also incorporate the 
discussion about various explanatory variables of premiums and discounts. Lastly, Section 4.4 
summarises and concludes the chapter. 
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4.2 Tracking error of ETFs and explanatory variables  
This sub-section demonstrates the prior empirical studies which observed the manner in which 
ETFs from the developed, international and emerging markets replicate their target benchmark 
indices. This have been coupled with the examination of the factors which have caused these 
ETFs to exhibit the returns that are not relatively close to that of their target benchmark indices.  
4.2.1 Evidence from the developed markets 
Elton et al. (2002) examined the performance and tracking ability of the popular Spiders ETF 
relative to its target benchmark index namely, the S&P 500 during the period from 1993 to 
1998. According to the results, the S&P 500 outpaced the Spiders as the tracking errors ranged 
between -0.06% and 0.08% on annual basis throughout the period under review. Elton et al. 
(2002) further revealed that the underperformance and the tracking errors were adequately 
explained by the fund total management fees which amounted to 0.18% as well as putting the 
Spider’s dividends into a non-interest-bearing account which equalled to 0.95%.  
In parallel, Porteba and Shiven (2002) again examined the performance of the Spiders against 
the S&P 500 over the period from 1994 to 2000. In line with findings of Elton et al. (2002), 
Spiders underperformed its target benchmark index by an average annual return of 0.23%. 
Porteba and Shiven (2002) further concurred to the findings of Elton et al. (2002) by revealing 
that 0.17% of 0.23% underperformance was attributable to the expense ratios whilst the 
remaining 0.06% was representing the effect of putting the Spider’s dividends into a non-
interest-bearing account.  
Rompotis (2006a) explored the performance and tracking ability of 30 American ETFs listed 
on the American Stock Exchange (AMEX) and National Association of Securities Dealers 
Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) market over a period from March 2001 to July 2002. 
According to the results, the average tracking error was found to be significantly different from 
zero as it equalled to 0.62% over the period under review. Most notably, the Vanguard Total 
Stock Market ETF (VTI) which replicate the movements of the Wilshire 5000 Index was the 
top performer by obtaining a minimal tracking error of a mere 0.17% whilst the State Street 
Global Service Fortune E-50 ETF (FEF) which mimics the performance of the Fortune E-50 
index was the worst performer with 1.54% tracking error. Rompotis (2006a) indicated that the 
level of tracking error were attributable to several factors. Firstly, he alluded to the fact that the 
study was conducted during the period when international financial markets were recovering 
from the internet bubble financial crisis. Lastly and in conclusion, he revealed that management 
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expenses, transaction cost, commission fees as well as the rebalancing fees had significant 
explanatory power of the tracking errors.  
Using the daily returns from October 2005 to September 2006, Rompotis (2006b) investigated 
the tracking ability of 73 iShare equity-based ETFs which were listed on the AMEX. The 
results revealed that the average iShare tracking errors ranged between 0.12% and 0.45% 
throughout the examination period. Extending the tests to the country-specifics, it was revealed 
that the average tracking errors ranged between 0.21% and 0.97%, whereby the international 
iShare ETFs exhibited the highest tracking errors due to higher risk and funds expenses. 
Consistent with the findings of Elton et al. (2002), Rompotis (2006b) discovered that the 
tracking errors were significantly affected by the management expenses which amounted to 
0.73% of the tracking error. This implies that, 1% increase in the expense ratio subsequently 
result into 0.73% increase in the tracking error. Rompotis (2006b) concludes by revealing that 
the iShare tracking errors were positively and negatively correlated to their premiums and 
trading volumes respectively. 
Rompotis (2011) used the Standard and Poor (S&P) 500 Index as the proxy for the market 
return and explored its daily performance against the performance of 50 iShare ETFs listed on 
the AMEX during the period from 2000 through 2007. The research results revealed that ETFs 
outpaced the S&P 500 by obtaining excess but immaterial daily raw returns which amounted 
to 0.0026%. With regard to the risk-adjusted methods, 42 of the 50 funds outpaced the S&P 
500 whereas the remaining 8 funds underperformed it, both on a daily and on an annual basis. 
In terms of the tracking error, Rompotis (2011) demonstrated that the daily tracking errors 
ranged between 0.14% and 0.63% throughout the entire examination period. In line with the 
prior findings, the author also discovered that ETFs management expenses, risk and the age of 
the fund were the key determinants of the tracking errors.   
Using a daily data sample from the January 2006 to December 2008, Qadan and Yagil (2012) 
explored the tracking errors of 42 U.S. ETFs before, during and after the 2008 global financial 
crisis. The authors indicated that these funds exhibited high tracking errors during period of 
crisis as opposed to the period before and after the crisis. Notably, tracking errors were found 
to be robust during the second half of 2008 especially for the ETFs from the real estate as well 
as the banking and finance sectors. These findings are more plausible since the sub-prime crisis 
was induced by collapse of the real estate as well as the banking and finance sectors. Qadan 
and Yagil (2012) concluded by revealing positive correlation between the tracking error and 
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the daily volatility meanwhile, ETFs trading volume was found to have limited effect on the 
magnitude of the tracking error.  
Evidence of the ETFs performance and tracking ability are also documented in other developed 
markets apart from the U.S. market. In the same way, it is valuable to observe whether the 
tracking error’s explanatory variables of other developed markets were similar to those 
reported from the U.S. market. Moreover, growing literature on the subject of ETFs revealed 
that Europe is one of the continents which permit the use of synthetic replication strategies in 
addition to the physical-based replication strategy. In this regard, Milonas and Rompotis (2006) 
explored the tracking errors of 36 ETFs listed on the Swiss Stock Exchange over a 5 years 
period dated from 2001 through 2006. The authors further noted that all the ETFs included in 
the date sample attempted to mimics the performance of their benchmark indices using the 
synthetic replication strategy. The empirical evidence suggested that the Swiss ETFs obtained 
an annual average tracking error of 1.02% over the period under review. In an attempt to 
identify the key determinants of the tracking errors, Milonas and Rompotis (2006) discovered 
that the tracking performance of these ETFs was best explained by the use of synthetic 
replication strategies. Further to this, expense ratio and management fees were also found to 
be prominent determinants of the tracking error as they amounted to an average of 0.35% and 
1.15% respectively. Lastly and in conclusion, the authors discovered positive correlation 
between the fund risk and management fees which equalled to 0.15. This implied that, 1% 
increase in the fund risk resulted in 0.15% increase of management fees.   
The examination of the tracking ability of 48 European ETFs which followed the full and 
synthetic replication strategies during the period from September 2007 to August 2011 was 
carried out by Elia (2012). This study demonstrated that both the full and synthetic replication 
strategies failed to successfully earn the same returns as their target benchmark indices. 
Notably, it was found that the average return difference between the 48 ETFs and their 
respective benchmark indices amounted to -0.39% throughout the entire 4 years examination 
period. However, the synthetic based ETFs exhibited the lowest tracking errors as well as high 
tax efficiency. In this regard, the results revealed that the annualised tracking errors based on 
the absolute mean difference amounted to -0.29% for physical based funds relative to -0.46% 
for synthetic based funds. In addition to that, Elia (2012) revealed that the tracking error of the 
synthetic based funds was statistically significant at 5% level. In conclusion, the author asserted 
that the tracking errors of the synthetic based European ETFs were significant especially for 
funds which attempted to track the performance of the emerging market indices. 
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In a follow-up study, Rompotis (2012) examined the daily performance of 36 ETFs listed in 
the Swiss Stock Market over the period from 2001 to 2006. With respect to the daily average 
returns and risk, the results revealed that the Swiss ETFs underperformed their target indices 
by 0.04% whilst having excess risk which amounted to 0.22%. Rompotis (2012) further 
discovered that the average tracking error amounted to 1.02% throughout the examination 
period. Consistent with the prior findings, the author discovered that the tracking error was 
mainly attributable to the use of synthetic replication strategy, management expense as well as 
the counterparty risk. In the same vein, the Swiss ETFs performances were found to be 
negatively related to their expense ratios whilst the expenses and the risk were found to be 
positively associated. Having discovered the Swiss tracking errors, Rompotis (2012) went on 
and carried out a comparative analysis between 10 Swiss ETFs and 10 U.S. ETFs which track 
similar indices. This is where he discovered that the Swiss ETFs exhibited 1.22% tracking error 
relative to the 0.53% of the U.S. market funds. Similarly, the significance of the Swiss ETFs 
tracking error was best explained by their use of the synthetic replication strategy.   
In parallel, Meinhardt, Mueller and Schoene (2012) studied the tracking ability of 421 ETFs 
that adopts the physical and synthetic replication strategies to mimic the performance of 
equities and fixed-income benchmark indices listed in the Frankfurt Stock Exchange between 
January 2010 and August 2011. The authors noted that, 326 of the 421 ETFs were synthetic-
based whilst the remaining 95 ETFs utilised the physical based replication strategy to mimic 
their underlying benchmark indices. Following the methodology adopted by Milonas and 
Rompotis (2006), they found that the overall daily average returns difference between all the 
421 ETFs and their respective benchmark indices amounted to 0.0055%. Filtering the results 
into the replication strategies, the 326 synthetic based ETFs exhibited the highest daily average 
tracking errors which ranged between 0.0024% and 0.0053% as opposed to 0.0028% and 
0.0056% of their 95 physical based counterparts.  
Further to this, Meinhardt et al. (2012) expanded their test by examining the tracking errors of 
both the equity and fixed income based ETFs. According to the results, 286 equity based ETFs 
obtained substantially high daily tracking errors which ranged between 0.0029% and 0.0066% 
relative to a mere 0.0011% and 0.0038% of their 117 fixed income counterparts. In conclusion, 
Meinhardt et al. (2012) indicated that the explanatory variables of these German ETFs tracking 
errors were the total expense ratio, risk, trading volume as well as dividends withholding taxes 
and bid-ask spread but only to a limited extent.  
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Mateus and Rahmani (2014) examined the tracking errors of 64 equity-based ETFs that are 
listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) which adopted the physical and synthetic 
replication strategies over the period from January 2008 through December 2013. The authors 
indicated that 42 of the 64 ETFs used the physical-based replication strategy whilst the 
remaining 22 utilised the synthetic replication strategy. The results revealed that the overall 
mean daily tracking error with the use of average absolute tracking error as well as the standard 
deviation of tracking errors methodologies amounted to 0.58% and 0.88% respectively. 
Consistent with the prior findings, the synthetic based ETFs exhibited the worst tracking 
performance relative to their physical based counterparts. Mateus and Rahmani (2014) 
attributed this performance of the physical and synthetic ETFs into the impact of their 
respective total expense ratios. Since this study was conducted during the critical period in the 
global financial markets, the authors concluded their study by examining the level of tracking 
error during and after the 2008 global financial crisis. According to their results, the average 
daily tracking error amounted to 1.22% in 2008 during the crisis as opposed to 0.41% post the 
crisis in 2013. 
In the most recent research, Naumenko and Chystiakova (2015) updated the works of Milonas 
and Rompotis (2006) along with Rompotis (2012) and discovered that 35 ETFs listed on the 
Swiss Stock Exchange which adopts the physical and synthetic replication strategy exhibited 
significant tracking errors. According to the results, the overall average daily tracking error 
ranged between 0.48% and 0.70% throughout the 24 months examination period dated from 
August 2012 through August 2014. These tracking errors were found to be substantially high 
compared to those presented by Milonas and Rompotis (2006) as well as Elia (2012). Filtering 
the tracking error results to the replication strategies, Naumenko and Chystiakova (2015) found 
that the synthetic-based ETFs exhibited economically high tracking errors which ranged 
between 0.53% and 0.76% relative to 0.44% and 0.63% of their physical-based counterparts. 
In conclusion, Naumenko and Chystiakova (2015) revealed that the Swiss tracking errors were 
attributable to their expense ratios, number of constituents in the underlying benchmark indices 
as well as the replication strategy that has been adopted to track the underlying index.   
The bulk of research on the subject of ETFs tracking errors were conducted using data from 
the U.S. and European market, meanwhile, research from the developed Asian market has been 
thinly examined with an exception of the studies by Chu (2011; 2013). Using data sample free 
of survivorship bias, Chu (2011) explored the tracking ability of 18 ETFs operating in the Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange during the 5 years period from 2004 to 2008. According to the results, 
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the daily average tracking errors ranged between 0.39% and 3.09%, which were significantly 
higher compared to those from the U.S. market. Consistent with the prior findings, the tracking 
errors were attributable to the use of synthetic replication strategy as well as the fund 
management expenses. In addition to that, Chu (2011) revealed that the level of the tracking 
errors was negatively associated with fund size. He concluded by noting that Hong Kong 
investors should consider ETFs as suitable alternatives investment product to the actively 
managed funds.  
In a follow-up study, Chu (2013) used the daily prices of 21 Hong Kong ETFs in order to 
examine their tracking errors during the period from 2009 to 2011. He found that the Hong 
Kong tracking errors ranged between 0.25% and 3.08% respectively. The results also revealed 
that these tracking errors were relatively high compared to the monthly tracking errors obtained 
in the U.S. which ranged between 0.04% and 0.11% respectively. Chu (2013) posited that the 
Hong Kong tracking errors were attributable to significantly high cost of trading ETFs. 
Consistent to the prior findings of Chu (2011), it was revealed that tracking errors for the ETFs 
which adopted the synthetic replication strategy was statistically significant compared to their 
physical replication counterparts. In addition, Chu (2013) revealed that the tracking errors of 
Hong Kong ETFs which utilise synthetic replication strategy exhibited negative relations 
relative to the fund size and the expense ratios due to economies of scale, since large synthetic-
based ETFs has relatively low management expenses. In conclusion, the author revealed that 
the level of tracking errors were positively associated with the dividend yield, trading volume 
and market risk. 
As mentioned earlier, ETFs provide investors the exposure to the performance of equity, fixed-
income, currencies and commodity benchmark indices. Therefore, it is worthwhile to examine 
the tracking ability of ETFs which aim to mimic the performance fixed-income or bonds related 
benchmark indices. In the same way, it is also important to determine if the explanatory 
variables of the fixed-income ETFs tracking error are similar with those of the equity-based 
ETFs. Drevonak, Uroševic and Jelic (2010) pioneered these tests by examining the tracking 
ability of 31 European fixed-income ETFs that aim to replicate the movements of the Eurozone 
sovereign debt benchmark indices during the period from January 2007 to May 2010. The 
research findings revealed that, on average, the Eurozone sovereign debt ETFs exhibited 
minimal tracking errors, with the worst performing funds obtaining a tracking error which 
ranged between 0.21% and 0.27% respectively. Consistent with the conclusion reached from 
the European studies on tracking ability of the equity-based ETFs, Drevonak et al. (2010) found 
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that transaction cost had a significant explanatory power of the tracking errors. In conclusion, 
the authors asserted that the minimal tracking errors were more prevalent within the funds 
which adopt the physical replication strategy relative to the synthetic based counterparts.  
Houweling (2012) extended the research work of Drevonak et al. (2010) by investigating the 
tracking ability of 129 fixed income based ETFs listed in the U.S. and European ETF market 
between 2002 and 2010. The research results indicated that, after accounting for the ETF total 
expense ratio (TER), Treasury bond ETFs managed to track their underlying indices by 
obtaining a tracking error which amounted to a mere 0.16%. On the other hand, the results of 
the tracking ability of ETFs which mimics the performance of the corporate bonds, illustrated 
that the investment grade and high yield bond ETFs exhibited tracking errors of 0.38% and 
3.37% respectively. Houweling (2012) concluded by asserting that the benchmark indices that 
are composed of illiquid bonds result into significant trading costs which subsequently lead to 
higher tracking errors.  
4.2.2 Evidence from the international markets 
Examining the international ETFs markets, Svetina and Wahal (2008) explored the robustness 
of the tracking errors of 584 ETFs which mimics the domestic, international equity and fixed 
income benchmark indices during period 1993 to December 2007. In line with the prior 
findings from the developed market, the author found that the international and domestic 
equity-based ETFs exhibited substantially high tracking errors which amounted to 0.47% and 
1.13% respectively. In the same way, the domestic and international fixed-income ETFs also 
had significant but minimal tracking errors which ranged 0.17% and 0.57%.  Svetina and Wahal 
(2008) concluded that this level of tracking errors came as a result of high management 
expenses which occurred because a handful of ETFs in the sample followed the physical 
replication strategy which are subjected to the constant rebalancing fees.   
Shin and Soydemir (2010) investigated the tracking ability of 26 iShare MSCI and U.S. market 
equity based ETFs over the 36 months period dated from July 2004 through June 2007. The 
authors noted that 20 of the 26 ETFs were tracking the MSCI Asia, America and European 
benchmark indices, whilst, the remaining 6 funds were replicating the movements of the U.S. 
broad market equity benchmark indices. Firstly, the authors observed that the 26 ETFs 
attempted to successfully replicate their target benchmark indices throughout the period under 
review by obtaining the mean daily returns and standard deviation of 0.001% and 0.014% 
respectively. Secondly, Shin and Soydemir (2010) took up the methodology adopted by 
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Milonas and Rompotis (2006) as well as Gallagher and Segara (2006) and discovered that the 
daily tracking errors of the 26 ETFs were significantly different from zero as they ranged 
0.045% and 0.297% throughout the examination period. In addition, the authors also 
discovered that the Jensen’s Alpha for all the ETFs in the data sample were statistically 
significant at 1% level but negative with an exception of two funds namely, the MSCI Mexico 
Investable Market Index Fund and MSCI Switzerland Index Fund. In conclusion, Shin and 
Soydemir (2010) used regression analysis to identify the key determinants of the tracking 
errors. According to the results, the change in the exchange rate between the currency of the 
ETFs home market and that of the U.S. dollar was found to be the outstanding determinant of 
the tracking errors.  
Blitz and Huij (2012) decided to extend the examination of ETFs tracking ability into the global 
emerging markets (GEM). The authors investigated the tracking ability of ETFs listed in the 
U.S. and European equity markets which track the global emerging markets benchmark indices 
during the period from April 2003 through December 2010. According to the results, the GEM 
ETFs underperformed their target benchmark indices by 0.85% on the annual basis. Further to 
this, Blitz and Huij (2012) observed that, the annual average tracking errors were significantly 
high as they ranged between 3% and 6% respectively. The authors further revealed that these 
tracking errors were significantly high relative to the developed markets ETFs which ranged 
between 0.50% and 0.80%. 
In an attempt to justify this comparative analysis, Blitz and Huij (2012) noted that the GEM 
ETFs underperformed their developed market counterparts due to large cross-sectional 
dispersion of stock returns in the emerging markets. In addition, the authors revealed that the 
synthetic based ETFs were the one’s which exhibited the highest tracking errors compared to 
their full replication based counterparts especially during the period of return dispersion. 
Consistent with the prior findings, Blitz and Huij (2012) asserted that the overall level of the 
tracking errors were adequately explained by the impact of the expense ratios as well as the 
dividends withholding taxes. 
4.2.3 Evidence from the emerging markets 
Lin and Chou (2006) examined the tracking ability of the first listed Taiwan’s ETF, the Taiwan 
Top 50 Tracker Fund (TTT) during the period from June 2003 to March 2005. According to 
the results, the average tracking error of the TTT equalled to 1.21% over the period under 
review. Lin and Chou (2006) argued that the level of tracking error was attributable to three 
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major components. Firstly, consistent with the prior findings, management expenses were 
found to be the main catalyst of the tracking errors. Secondly, the cash dividends associated 
with the TTT was found to be more prevalent during the peak dividends pay-out season. Lastly, 
significant tracking error was confirmed to be high during the days in which the TTT was 
rebalanced.  
Extending the test of ETFs tracking ability into the Indian market, Prasanna (2012) investigated 
the monthly tracking performance between 82 Indian ETFs against the CNX NIFTY Index, 
which is the Indian Stock Market (NSE) equity benchmark underlying index. This was 
accomplished by examining the monthly tracking performance over a 5 year period dated from 
April 2006 through April 2011. According to the results, the 82 Indian ETFs outpaced the CNX 
NIFTY index by obtaining 3% annual excess returns throughout the examination period. 
Prasanna (2012) further noted that 25 of the 82 ETFs which tracks the gold indices exhibited 
the highest performance of 13% excess return and subsequently led them to be popular 
investment vehicle after the 2008 global financial crisis.  
In parallel, Shanmugham and Zabiulla (2012) examined the tracking errors of the Nifty Bees 
ETF during the bullish and bearish market trends which occurred between January 2002 and 
December 2008. The Nifty Bees aim to mimic the movements of the S&P CNX Nifty 
benchmark index which is one of the NSE equity benchmark indices. Following the 
methodology employed by Rompotis (2006), the results demonstrated that the Nifty Bees 
exhibited an insignificant tracking error of 0.11% during the bearish market trend along with a 
mere 0.09% during the bullish market trend. Shanmugham and Zabiulla (2012) concluded by 
asserting that the Nifty Bees can be a suitable investment choice for investors who wish to 
obtain abnormal returns by gaining exposure from the NSE equity benchmark indices.  
Purohit and Malhotra (2015) updated the study by Shanmugham and Zabiulla (2012) and 
discovered that six Indian ETFs which mimics the movements of the broad-market indices 
exhibited significant tracking error before, during and after the global market downturn which 
occurred in 2008. Most notably, their evidence revealed that the level of tracking error ranged 
between 0.15% and 2.17% during the overall period from 2002 and 2013. Meanwhile, the 
results of these segments revealed that the magnitude of the tracking errors was negligible pre 
and post the crisis as they ranged between 0.0003% and 0.0381% pre-crisis (January 2002-
December 2007) and 0.0006% and 0.0314% after the crisis (January 2010- December 2013). 
On the other hand, significant daily tracking errors were as low as 0.01088% and as high as 
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0.0335% during the crisis which occurred between January 2008 and December 2009. 
Following the approach of prior studies, Purohit and Malhotra (2015) explored the variable 
which explains this magnitude and revealed that fund risk, management fees, bid/ask spread as 
well as premiums and discounts carried a significant explanation of these levels of tracking 
errors. 
In the most recent research, Baş and Sarıoğlu (2015) examined the tracking ability of 16 
Turkish ETFs over 8 year’s period from 2005 to 2013. Using the arithmetic mean, absolute 
mean and quadratic tracking error, these authors discovered that the 16 Turkish ETFs failed to 
successfully track their underlying benchmarks indices throughout the examination period. 
Notably, the average daily arithmetic and absolute mean returns of the 16 Turkish ETF against 
their target indices amounted to 0.04% and 0.05% respectively. Turning to the evaluation of 
tracking errors, the results also revealed that the average tracking errors had statistical 
significance and it ranged between 0.05% and 1.54% respectively.  
In an attempt to justify such level of tracking errors, Baş and Sarıoğlu (2015) stated that the 
use of physical replication strategy which requires frequent rebalancing fees as well as high 
price volatility of Turkish ETFs carried significant explanatory power. In conclusion, the 
authors compared the Turkish ETFs tracking errors against those from the developed markets 
and discovered that the Turkish tracking errors were substantially high relative to those from 
their developed market counterparts mainly due to high volatility of the Turkish market.  
4.2.4 Comparative analysis of ETFs and index mutual funds tracking errors 
The debate of how ETFs successfully track their underlying benchmark indices relative to their 
index mutual fund counterparts has received a great deal of interest since the inception of ETFs. 
As a result, a handful of research was conducted to ascertain whether ETFs can serve as either 
the substitute or the complement of their index mutual funds counterparts. In the same vein, 
researchers also devoted themselves in identifying the key determinants of the tracking errors 
for these competitive passive investing financial instruments. Therefore, comparative analysis 
of these alternative passive investing financial instruments merit investigation from the 
developed, international as well as the emerging markets.  
This comparative analysis test was pioneered by Elton et al. (2002) who revealed that the 
popular ETF, Spiders underperformed their counterpart, Vanguard 500 Index Fund by 0.18% 
over the period between 1993 and 1998. The authors stated that the 0.18% shortfall was 
attributable to the fact that the Spiders were subject to high transaction cost relative to the 
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Vanguard 500 Index fund which is traded at the NAV without additional commission fee. In 
parallel, Porteba and Shiven (2002) conducted a similar comparative performance evaluation 
between the Spiders and the Vanguard 500 Index fund between 1994 and 2000. Consistent with 
the findings of Elton et al. (2002), the authors recorded the following two main conclusions. 
Firstly, they demonstrated that the Spiders underperformed the Vanguard 500 Index fund 
counterpart by 0.17% after accounting for tax. Secondly, ETFs transactions cost such as bid-
ask spread and commission fees possessed significant explanatory power of the Spiders’ 
tracking performance.  
Gastinuea (2004) carried out the comparable performance evaluation between index mutual 
funds and ETFs which mimics the movements of the S&P 500 and the Russell 2000 benchmark 
indices over two separate periods. In their first examination period dated between 1994 and 
2002, the Vanguard 500 Index fund outpaced its counterpart, the Spiders by obtaining 1.17% 
excess compounded monthly pre-tax returns. Secondly, Gastinuea (2004) examined the 
tracking performance of the Vanguard Small Cap Investor Shares index fund against the iShare 
Russell 2000 ETF between 2001 and 2002. Similarly, the study results revealed that over the 2 
year’s examination period, the Vanguard Small Cap Investor Shares outpaced the iShare 
Russell 2000 ETF by 1.14% and 0.50% respectively. The authors concluded by asserting that 
the level of ETFs underperformance was attributable to high transaction cost which arise due 
to regular index rebalancing.  
Rompotis (2005), used daily data of 16 matched pairs of ETFs and index mutual funds which 
targets similar underlying indices from the AMEX over the period from March 2001 to July 
2002. He further indicated that the data sample was composed of 16 index mutual funds from 
the Vanguard group meanwhile 12 of the 16 ETFs were sourced from the iShare ETFs family 
and the remaining four were part of the Vanguard group and the State Street Global Services. 
According to the results, both ETFs and index mutual funds were found to underperform their 
underlying benchmark indices but earning similar average returns before accounting for the 
bid-ask returns. However, after accounting for the bid-ask returns, ETFs underperformed their 
index mutual funds counterparts by attaining relatively high average tracking errors of 0.38% 
as opposed to 0.26% of their index mutual funds counterparts. These findings were consistent 
with the findings of Elton et al. (2002), Porteba and Shiven (2002) as well as Gastinuea (2004). 
Although ETFs exhibited high tracking errors, the results further revealed that ETFs possessed 
minimal expense ratio of 0.23% whilst expense ratio for the index mutual funds almost doubled 
as they equalled to 0.42%. Rompotis (2005) concluded that, ETFs investors should be aware 
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of the fact the expense ratios does not disclose all the investment costs since there is additional 
transaction fees and commission fees to be borne.  
Paliwal (2014) expanded the work of Rompotis (2005) and examined the tracking error of 12 
pairs of U.S. ETFs and index mutual funds over the period from 2007 to 2012. He noted that 
the underlying benchmark indices were a representative of large-cap, broad-market, mid-cap 
and small-cap U.S. benchmark indices. The study results demonstrated that, on average, index 
mutual funds outpaced ETFs as they exhibited minimal tracking error of 0.03% compared to 
0.15% for the ETFs. Most notably, the tracking errors of the index mutual funds were found to 
be prevalent for the funds which mimic the movements of the large-cap and broad-market 
indices. Consistent with the findings of Qadan and Yagil (2012) who discovered significantly 
high tracking errors during the 2008 global financial crisis, tracking errors for both ETFs and 
index mutual funds were also found to be significantly high during this period of high volatility.  
Extending this comparative analysis test to the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX), Gallagher 
and Segara (2006) evaluated tracking ability of four ETFs and three corresponding index 
mutual funds which mimics the movements of the S&P ASX equity indices between January 
2002 and December 2003. Consistent with the results presented by Elton et al. (2002) as well 
as Porteba and Shiven (2002), the average tracking errors for ETFs were substantially high as 
they ranged between 0.02% and 0.83% as opposed to a mere 0.03% and 0.17% for their index 
mutual funds counterpart. Most notably, Gallagher and Segara (2006) found that the Index 
Shares Fund (IDX) ETF which replicates the S&P ASX 100 accumulation index was the worst 
performing ETF as it obtained an average tracking error of 0.35%. Consequently, the Index 
Shares Fund (IDX) ETF was delisted in February 2003. In conclusion, the authors justified the 
superior performance of index mutual funds by asserting that ETFs suffer from significant high 
liquidity cost, stringent dividends policies as well as high management expenses. 
Examining the international markets, Harper, Madura and Schnusenberg (2006) investigated 
the tracking ability of 29 ETFs and country-based index mutual funds listed in 14 countries 
over the period from April 1996 to December 2001. Using the MSCI index as the target 
benchmark index, the authors revealed that ETFs displayed superior tracking ability by 
obtaining statistically significant average returns and risk-adjusted returns throughout the 
period under review. Consistent with prior studies, Harper et al. (2006) revealed that ETFs 
superior performance were adequately explained by lower expense ratios as opposed to those 
incurred by index mutual funds. The authors concluded by asserting that the superior tracking 
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ability of ETFs relative to their index mutual funds counterparts proved that ETFs can be 
suitable to be included in an internationally diversified portfolio.  
Evidence of how ETFs successfully tracks their underlying benchmarks indices relative to their 
index mutual funds counterparts was again extended to the international market by Blitz, Huij 
and Swinkels (2012). They examined the tracking ability of 40 European ETFs and index 
mutual funds which aimed to mimic the performance of benchmark indices from the U.S. 
Europe, Japan and emerging markets over a six years period dated from January 2003 through 
December 2008. The empirical evidence revealed that the European index mutual funds and 
ETFs underperformed their respective benchmark indices on an annual basis by 0.50% and 
1.50% throughout the period under review. In an attempt to justify these findings, Blitz et al. 
(2012) posited that the magnitude of underperformance was adequately explained by the 
impact of dividends withholding taxes. In addition to dividends taxes, they further 
demonstrated that the expense ratios also accounted to 0.56% of the overall underperformance. 
Blitz et al. (2012) concluded by asserting that the investors should not view the total expense 
ratio as the only relevant investment cost for ETFs and index mutual funds, instead they should 
also take heed of the significant impact of dividends withholding taxes.  
Aber, Li and Can (2009), conducted a comparative analysis of a pair of four international iShare 
ETFs and Vanguard index mutual funds since their respective inception date till December 
2006. Aber et al. (2009) noted that the underlying index which the iShare ETFs and index 
mutual funds were tracking were the S&P 500, Russell 1000 growth index, MSCI US Small 
Cap index and the MSCI EAFE index. According to the results which were computed through 
the standard deviation tracking error method, the iShare ETFs underperformed both their target 
indices and their index mutual funds counterparts throughout the period under review. 
Consistent with the prior findings, Aber et al. (2009) concluded by asserting that the tracking 
errors were mainly attributable to the rebalancing fees as well as fund management expenses.  
Recent research by Chang, Ragan and Witte (2013) expanded the test of the tracking ability to 
the international market by examining international equity ETFs and index funds over the 
period from January 2003 till December 2012. According to the results, index mutual funds 
exhibited superior average annual returns of 3.74% relative to the ETFs whilst loading 
investors with excess expenses of 0.97%. Similarly, in terms of the Sharpe Ratio and Jensen 
alpha, ETFs underperformed the index mutual funds counterparts by 0.11% and 3.07% 
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respectively. Chang et al. (2013) concluded that investors should shift their attention to the 
index mutual funds as suitable passive investment vehicles. 
Extending this test to the emerging markets, Gozbasi and Erdem (2010) conducted the 
comparative analysis between the ETF and the corresponding index mutual fund which tracks 
the performance of the Dow Jones Islamic Market (DJIM) index listed on the Istanbul Stock 
Exchange between February 2006 and December 2008. This was accomplished by 
investigating the tracking ability of the Bizim Menkul Degerler (DJIMTR) ETF relative to its 
counterpart, the Unicorn Capital Menkul Degerler AS (UNICORNTR) index mutual fund. 
Gozbasi and Erdem (2010) indicated that the DJIMTR is the world’s first ETF to track the 
DJIM index. In line with the prior studies, the results revealed that both the DJIMTR and the 
UNICORNTR underperformed the DJIM index but, the DJIMTR outpaced the UNICORNTR 
by obtaining excess 0.05% Sharpe ratio over the period under review. With respect to tracking 
error, the DJIMTR demonstrated significant tracking ability by obtaining the average tracking 
error which ranged between -0.01% and 0.41% as opposed to -0.08% and 0.73% for its 
UNICORNTR counterpart. Consistent with the evidence provided by Blitz et al. (2012), the 
authors indicated that the level of the tracking errors were attributable to the transaction costs, 
withholding tax on the dividends as well as the rebalancing fees. 
Rompotis (2011) examined the tracking ability of the first listed Greek ETF, the ALPHA ETF 
FTSE ATHEX 20 against the four corresponding index mutual funds over 24 months dating 
from January 2008 to December 2009. The author further noted that, only one out of the four 
index mutual funds was formed to passively replicate the performance of the FTSE 
ATHENS/ASE 20 Index whereas the remaining three were actively managed. The results 
revealed that the average tracking error for the ALPHA ETF FTSE ATHEX 20, the passively 
managed index fund and the three actively managed funds amounted to 0.36%, 0.44% and 
0.76% respectively. Consistent with the findings of Milonas and Rompotis (2010) as well as 
the later work of Rompotis (2011) concluded by asserting that these tracking errors were 
adequately explained by the combination of the funds management fee and risk.  
Garg and Singh (2013) investigated the tracking errors of 5 paired match of ETFs and index 
mutual funds which replicate the movements of the Indian, NSE stock market benchmark 
indices between June 2006 and December 2009. Following the methodology of Gallagher and 
Segara (2006), the authors examined the tracking error using the average absolute NAV returns 
difference methodology. Consistent with the results presented by Gozbasi and Erdem (2010) 
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and Rompotis (2011), ETFs exhibited statistically significant and minimal tracking error of 
0.16% relative to 1.74% for their index mutual funds counterparts. Garg and Singh (2013) 
concluded by alluding to the fact that, ETFs can be suitable for investors who have long-term 
investment view as opposed to those who have a short-term investment horizon.   
In the most recent research, Strydom, Charteris and McCullough (2015) conducted 
comparative analysis of the tracking ability of 3 ETFs and 5 index mutual funds which mimics 
the performance of the FTSE/JSE Top 40 index. Consistent to the prior studies, the results 
revealed that, over the 12 years period dated from 2001 to 2012, both ETFs and index mutual 
underperformed the FTSE/JSE Top 40 index. This was evident when they both exhibited 
average beta estimates of 0.96 and 0.98 as well as negative annual alpha coefficients which 
equalled to -0.20 and -0.26 respectively. Further to this, when examining the tracking errors 
through the standard deviation tracking error method, ETFs exhibited superior tracking ability 
relative to their index mutual funds counterparts. Most notably, ETFs obtained minimal annual 
tracking errors which ranged between 0.81% and 1.44% relative to 1.17% and 4.18% of the 
index mutual funds. In conclusion, Strydom et al. (2015) recommended ETFs as the viable 
passive investment vehicle for an investor who wishes to generate significant returns from 
mimicking the performance of the FTSE/JSE Top 40 index.  
4.3 Pricing efficiency of ETFs and their explanatory variables 
In tandem with the approach of Section 4.2, this sub-section illustrates the findings of pricing 
efficiency from the developed, international and emerging markets. Similarly, factors which 
attributed to the efficiency of the ETFs are also identified.  
4.3.1 Evidence from the developed markets 
Growing literature concerning the tracking ability of ETFs has always been coupled with the 
test of ETFs pricing efficiency. As mentioned earlier, these are tests that aim to determine 
whether arbitrage opportunities exist due to the mispricing between ETFs market price and 
their respective NAVs. Literature further reveals that the inefficiency of the creation and 
redemption process is the key explanatory variable of the ETFs mispricing.   
Similarly, pricing efficiency tests can be dated back to the dawn of Millennium through the 
empirical work of Ackert and Tian (2000). Their results indicated that, over the 60 months 
examination period dated from January 1993 through December 1997, the Spider traded on a 
daily discount that were as low as -0.22% and as high as 0.07%. Meanwhile, extending these 
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tests to the MidCap Spider fund which targets the performance of the S&P MidCap 400 index, 
average daily discounts was statistically significant and ranged between 1.04% and 1.32% 
respectively. In conclusion, Ackert and Tian (2000) asserted that the statistically significant 
discounts for the MidCap Spider were attributable to the higher cost of executing the creation 
and redemption process as a result of higher fundamental risk along with lower dividends 
yields.  
In their seminal paper, Elton et al. (2002) studied the pricing efficiency of the Spider ETF and 
found that it exhibited daily average discount of 0.18% and 1.44 U.S Dollars over the period 
under review. Furthermore, they employed regression analysis to examine the persistence of 
the price deviation and discovered that the mispricing seldom persist for more than one trading 
day. In conclusion, Elton et al. (2002) justified these findings by indicating that the efficient 
execution of the creation and redemption process played a prominent role in ensuring that the 
mispricing was as minimal as possible.  
Rompotis (2006a) studied the daily premiums and discounts of 30 U.S. ETFs that are listed on 
the AMEX and the NASDAQ over 16 months period dated between March 2001 and July 
2002. Most notably, the FFF-Fortune 500 as well as the IJH-S&P Mid 400 fund was efficiently 
priced with statistically insignificant price deviation throughout the examination period. 
However, 20 of the 30 ETFs were trading at a daily average premium which equalled to 0.99% 
whilst the remaining 8 funds exhibited 0.18% daily average discounts. In line with the findings 
by Ackert and Tian (2000) as well as Elton et al. (2002), Rompotis (2006a) attributed these 
minimal price deviations to the efficient execution of the creation and redemption process by 
the AMEX and the NASDAQ authorised participants.  
Consistent with the prior studies, Ackert and Tian (2008) examined the pricing efficiency of 
28 U.S and country based ETFs between June 2002 and January 2005. They discovered that 
19 of the 28 traded at an average premium whilst the remaining nine exhibited the discount. 
This is where the highest premium of 9.46% was booked by the Swedish ETFs whilst the 
highest discount of 8.50% was earned by the Taiwanese ETFs. However, as anticipated, the 
U.S based ETFs exhibited a 0.0154% discount. In contrast to the normal expectation, ETFs 
which replicates emerging market indices obtained minimal average premiums of 0.0135% as 
opposed 0.1689% for the developed market indices. In an attempt to examine the explanatory 
variable of this mispricing, Ackert and Tian (2008) utilised linear regression and discovered 
that the level of mispricing was best explained by momentum, illiquidity and the size effect. 
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Elton et al. (2002) suggested that the deviation between ETFs’ market price and NAVs can 
either be cost or arbitrage opportunity for the ETF investors. Building upon that deduction,  
DeFusco, Ivanov and Karels (2009) examined the pricing efficiency of the most famous and 
liquid ETFs namely the Spider, Diamonds and the Cubes over 8 years examination period 
spanning from January 1999 to December 2006. As noted earlier, the Spider ETF is created to 
mimics the movements of the S&P 500 index meanwhile the Diamonds targets the performance 
of the Dow Jones Industrial average index (DJIA). On the other hand, the Cubes, replicate the 
overall performance of the NASDAQ 100 index. According to the results, the Spider and the 
Diamonds traded at a premium which was denoted by absolute price deviation of 29 and 8 
cents respectively. In contrast, the Cubes exhibited an average discount of 25 cents absolute 
price deviation. DeFusco et al. (2009) concluded by interpreting the mispricing of these ETFs 
as additional cost to the ETFs investors.   
In the most recent research, DuVal and Harbert (2015) extended the pricing efficiency test into 
the ETFs which mimics the performance of the fixed-income benchmark indices. This was 
accomplished by exploring the daily price deviation of 107 fixed-income ETFs listed on the 
U.S. market between January 2002 and December 2012. According to the results, the daily 
average premiums for all the ETFs excluding the U.S. Treasury ETF equalled to 0.64%. This 
was found to be statistically insignificant relative to the average premiums for the investment 
grade corporate and high yield bond ETFs which equalled to 1.51% and 2.00% respectively. 
In conclusion, DuVal and Harbert (2015) indicated that such premiums were best explained by 
transaction cost, illiquidity, fund flow, momentum, volatility as well as the market sentiment.  
Extending these tests to other developed markets, Gallagher and Segara (2006) investigated the 
pricing efficiency of four ETFs listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) between 
January 2002 and December 2003. Their results revealed that, the average price deviations 
were statistically insignificant as they were as low as -0.0349% and as high as 0.0635%. 
Consistent with the early work of Elton et al. (2002), Gallagher and Segara (2006) employed 
regression analysis to explore the extent of price deviation and demonstrated that the price 
deviation failed to persist for more than two trading days. As a result of these findings, the 
authors reached a conclusion that the Australian ETFs were efficiently priced over the period 
under review.  
4.3.2 Evidence from the international markets 
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As noted earlier, the process of creation and redemption play a prominent role in ensuring that 
the deviation between the EFT’s market price and the NAV does not occur. Based on that 
deduction, Hughen (2003) investigated the pricing efficiency of the iShare Malaysia Fund 
between March 1996 and July 1999. The author noted that the iShare Malaysia Fund was listed 
at the AMEX but aims to track the movements of the MSCI Malaysia index. According to the 
results, the iShare Malaysian Fund traded at a premium which ranged between -0.37% and 
2.24% prior the Asian financial crisis that occurred between July 1997 and August 1998. 
Hughen (2003) revealed that, in response to the repercussion of the financial crisis, the 
Malaysian government opted to suspend the creation and redemption process with an effect of 
the 1st September 1998. Consequently, as from September 1998 through July 1999, the iShare 
Malaysian Fund price deviations were extremely volatile as they were as low as -30% and as 
high as 37%. The author concluded by asserting that, in the absence of creation and redemption 
process, ETFs tend to suffer from significant price deviation.  
A handful of research which examined the pricing efficiency of ETFs that mimics the 
performance of foreign benchmark indices revealed that the time-zone difference between the 
home market and the foreign market have a significant effect on the price efficiency. In this 
regard, Jares and Lavin (2004) examined the pricing efficiency of Japan and Hong Kong iShare 
ETFs listed on the AMEX between March 1996 and December 2001. According to the results, 
Japan and Hong Kong iShare ETFs traded on an average annual discount which equalled to 
0.34% and 0.21% respectively. Following the methodology of Elton et al. (2002), the authors 
utilised regression analysis to identify the key determinants of the mispricing and discovered 
that pricing inefficiency of the Hong Kong and Japanese iShare ETFs were best explained by 
two major attributes. Firstly, they found that the 12 hour lag between Asian and U.S. markets 
trading hours carried a significant impact. Secondly, they noted that the predictability of iShare 
future returns from the prior day’s discounts also had a significant explanatory power.  
Building upon the second attribute, Jares and Lavin (2004) formed a trading strategy to exploit 
the positive relations between the prior day discount and the future returns. In contravention to 
the tenet of weak-form market efficiency, the trading strategy exhibited superior performance 
against the buy and hold strategy for both the Japanese and Hong Kong iShares throughout the 
examination period. Notably, the findings revealed that, after accounting for transaction cost, 
the trading strategy daily cumulative returns for the Japanese and Hong Kong iShares equalled 
to 542.25%  and 12.12% as opposed to -41.79% and -12.24% for the buy and hold strategy. In 
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conclusion, Jares and Lavin (2004) revealed that the superior performance of the trading 
strategies were accompanied by smaller standard deviation throughout the period under review.  
Engle and Sakar (2006) studied the pricing efficiency of 37 U.S. ETFs of which 21 replicate 
the movements of domestic indices whilst the remaining 16 target the performance of 
international indices. Their results demonstrated that all 37 ETFs traded on a daily average 
premium since the inception date of each fund until September 2000. Notably, it was found 
that international funds exhibited the highest end-of-the-day average premiums which equalled 
to 0.35% relative to a mere 0.01% for the domestic funds. Engle and Sakar (2006) concluded 
by indicating that the international funds premiums persisted for several trading days 
attributing to higher cost and risk of executing the creation and redemption process.  
Rompotis (2006b) explored the pricing efficiency of 73 international equity-based iShare ETFs 
from October 2005 to September 2006. This was accomplished by computing the price 
deviation test using the following two methods; the percentage deviation of last trading price 
(LTP) from the NAV as well as the divergence of the mid-point between the highest bid and 
the lowest offer price (MID) from the NAV. According to the results based on the two methods, 
all the 73 iShare ETFs traded at a daily premium of 0.07% and 0.09% respectively. These 
findings were relatively lower than those presented by Jares and Lavin (2004) on the pricing 
efficiency test of Hong Kong and Japanese iShare ETFs. Further to this, Rompotis (2006b) 
used cross-sectional regression analysis to examine whether the lagged premium or discounts 
for the iShares had a significant predictive power for the future returns. In contrast to the prior 
findings presented by Jares and Lavin (2004), the regression analysis revealed that the 
correlation coefficient equalled to -0.64. This implied that the lagged premium for the iShares 
ETFs were conversely related to their future returns such that 1% increase in the lagged 
premium result into 0.64% decrease in future returns. In conclusion, the author noted that the 
trading volume of the iShares was also negatively associated to the lagged premium and future 
returns.  
Delcoure and Zhong (2007) investigated the daily pricing efficiency of 20 international equity-
based iShare ETFs listed on the AMEX with an aim to replicate the movements of the 
corresponding 20 MSCI country specific benchmark indices during the period from March 
1996 to October 2002. The authors observed that, on average, the 20 international equity-based 
iShare ETFs exhibited significant price deviation by trading at a premium to their NAVs for 
the 10 to 15% of the period under review. Further to this, Delcoure and Zhong (2007) made 
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use of co-integration test to examine the number of trading days in which the iShare premiums 
took before they disappear. Their results revealed that the price deviation of the iShare ETFs 
converged within the space of two trading days. Consistent with prior findings, Delcoure and 
Zhong (2007) also utilised regression analysis to explore the key explanatory variables of the 
iShare’s premiums. Unlike a handful of prior studies, they noted that iShare premiums were 
attributable to the institutional ownership, bid-ask spread, trading volume, exchange rate 
volatility, political and financial crises along with the correlation between the U.S. market and 
the market where the underlying index were traded. In conclusion, Delcoure and Zhong (2007) 
indicated that behavioural aspects might also had significant explanatory power of the iShare 
premiums.  
Shin and Soydemir (2010) examined the pricing efficiency of 26 iShare MSCI and U.S. market 
equity based ETFs over the 36 months period dated from July 2004 through June 2007. 
Consistent to prior studies, they discovered that the premiums and discounts that were 
measured through serial correlation were statistically significant for the Asian ETFs as opposed 
to those from the U.S. market. To be specific, Asian price difference were persistent for an 
average of 5.6 trading days, 4.7 days for the European ETFs and a mere 1.4 days for the U.S. 
market.  In line with the results of Delcoure and Zhong (2007) regression analysis, the results 
revealed that the difference between bid and ask rate, natural logarithm of daily trading volume, 
momentum of the NAVs and the natural logarithm of the ETFs market capitalisation carried 
significant explanation of the magnitude of premiums and discounts. In light of these findings, 
Shin and Soydemir (2010) concluded that actively investing in Asian ETFs could yield positive 
investment results through the exploitation of the arbitrage opportunity from the persistent 
deviation.    
4.3.3 Evidence from emerging markets 
The pricing efficiency test of the emerging market ETFs were pioneered by Lin, Chan and Hsu 
(2005) when investigating the Taiwan Top 50 Tracker Fund (TTT) for 12 months period dated 
from June 2003 through June 2004. The authors discovered that the TTT exhibited a 
statistically insignificant premium of 0.04% over the period under review. In the same vein, 
Lin et al. (2005) affirmed the efficiency of the TTT by discovering that the correlation 
coefficient between its NAV and the market price amounted to 0.9997 over the period under 
review. In conclusion, the authors indicated that, after accounting for arbitrage costs, arbitrage 
profits were found to be immaterial to exploit the 0.04% premium. In a follow-up study, Lin 
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and Chou (2006) expanded the work of Lin et al. (2005) and examined the pricing efficiency 
of the TTT over a lengthy examination period dated from June 2003 to March 2005. Similarly, 
they discovered that the TTT’s premiums and discounts were statistically insignificant but 
closely related to the TTT’s volatility and the market return.  
Studies by Kayali (2007a) and Kayali (2007b) examined the pricing efficiency of the Turkish 
market first-ever launched ETF, the Dow Jones Istanbul 20 ETF (DJIST) over the period from 
14 January 2005 to 30 December 2005. Empirical evidence presented by Kayali (2007a) 
revealed that, over the 241 trading days, the average discount of the DJIST were economically 
immaterial when converted into the Turkish currency, Turkish Lira. In line with the prior 
studies from the developed economies, the author utilised regression analysis to explore the 
extent of the price deviation and discovered that the DJIST premiums and discount persisted 
for additional two trading days after the day they were detected.  
In the same way, the findings of Kayali (2007b) revealed that the daily price deviation of the 
DJIST were as low as -0.99% and as high as 0.91%, but, on average the DJIST was found to 
be trading at a daily discount of 0.11% over the period under review. In contrast to the prior 
findings of Kayali (2007a), this evidence was found to be statistically significant at 1% level. 
Further to this, Kayali (2007b) investigated the extent of price deviation during bullish and 
bearish market trends which occurred during the period under review. According to the results, 
the DJIST was found to be trading at a discount during both trends but relatively high during 
the bullish trend by trading at an average daily discount of 0.16% as opposed to 0.03% during 
the bearish market trend. In conclusion, Kayali (2007b) alluded to the fact that the DJIST 
volatility played a prominent role in explaining the deviation between its market price and the 
NAV.  
Gozbasi and Erdem (2010) took up the methodology of Delcoure and Zhong (2007) and 
examined the robustness of the pricing efficiency of the Turkish DJIMTR ETF over the period 
dated from February 2006 to December 2008. Their results revealed that the DJIMTR exhibited 
daily average premium of 0.33% whilst the overall daily average price deviation ranged 
between 0.01% and 0.32% throughout the period under review. In line with the findings of 
Delcoure and Zhong (2007), the authors discovered that the mispricing were adequately 
explained by the trading volume, transaction costs, intraday price volatility and the institutional 
ownership ratio. Gozbasi and Erdem (2010) concluded by arguing that the DJIMTR was 
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efficiently priced over the examination period, attributing to the efficient execution of the 
creation and redemption process by the Istanbul Stock Exchange authorised participants. 
Consistent to the prior work of Lin and Chou (2006) from the Taiwanese market, Baş and 
Sarıoğlu (2015) discovered that the Turkish ETF market was efficiently priced over the period 
from 2005 to 2013. Notably, their results revealed that the price deviation were economically 
insignificant as the daily average discounts and premiums equalled to 0.003% and 0.004% 
respectively. In line with the prior studies, Baş and Sarıoğlu (2015) concluded by alluding to 
that the fact that the pricing efficiency of the Turkish ETFs market were attributable to the 
effectiveness of their creation and redemption process.  
Jiang, Feng and Tianjian (2010) studied the premium and discount of the Chinese first-ever 
listed ETF, the Shanghai 50 Index ETF (SSE 50 ETF) over the period from February 2005 to 
September 2006. Their results revealed that, on average, the SSE 50 ETF traded at statistically 
insignificant daily premium of 0.02% throughout the period under review. These results were 
in line with evidence presented from the Taiwanese ETF market by Lin et al. (2006). In an 
attempt to investigate the extent of the mispricing of the SSE 50 ETF, Jiang et al. (2010) 
employed the generalised autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) framework 
and demonstrated that the SSE 50 ETF price deviation persisted for three trading days. In spite 
of such level of persistent mispricing, the authors concluded by asserting that the SSE 50 ETF 
was efficiently priced attributing such efficiency to the effective execution of the creation and 
redemption process. 
Extending these test to the Indian ETF market, Shanmugham and Zabiulla (2012) studied the 
pricing efficiency of Nifty Bees ETF during the bullish and bearish market trend that occurred 
between January 2002 and December 2008. According to the results, the Nifty Bees exhibited 
significantly high and volatile premiums that amounted to 1.29% during the bearish trends and 
the reverse was observed during the bullish trends as the Nifty Bees traded on a daily discount 
that equalled to 1.11%. This evidence was inconsistent to the findings of Kayali (2007b) who 
demonstrated that the Dow Jones Istanbul 20 ETF exhibited significant discounts during the 
bullish market trend. In line with the prior studies, Shanmugham and Zabiulla (2012) utilised 
regression analysis to explore the persistence of the mispricing and observed that the price 
deviation the Nifty Bees converged after three trading days. This was found to be consistent to 
the findings of Jiang et al. (2010) but inconsistent with the studies from the U.S. and Australian 
market.  
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In the most recent research, Swathy (2015) used daily prices and NAVs to investigate the 
pricing efficiency of five equity-based ETFs listed on the Indian National Stock Exchange 
(NSE) market during the period from March 2010 through February 2015. The author revealed 
that, four of the five ETFs managed to successfully trade at their respective NAVs throughout 
the period under review, with an exception of the Islamic Shari’ah ETF that traded on a 
discount. Following the methodology of prior studies, Swathy (2015) utilised regression 
analysis to examine if whether the price deviation persist for more than one trading day and 
demonstrated that the beta coefficients were economically insignificant which implied that the 
mispricing failed to persist for more than one trading day. Swathy (2015) concluded by 
attributing the pricing efficiency of these Indian ETFs to the successful execution of the 
creation and redemption process by the NSE’s authorised participants.  
Soon after the work of Swathy (2015), Purohit and Malhotra (2015) examined the price 
efficiency and the persistence of six equity-based ETFs which replicates the broad-market 
indices of the NSE before, during and after the global financial crisis of 2008. Consistent with 
the prior studies, their findings were presented in terms of the currency and the percentage 
deviation. In contrast to the findings of Kayali (2007b) and Shanmugham and Zabiulla (2012), 
significant price deviation was observed prior to the crisis whereby the Rupee and percentage 
price deviation ranged between -32.82 and 172.73 as well as -0.90% and 2.54% respectively. 
This was followed by the crisis results which revealed the Rupee and percentage price deviation 
that amounted to the following range: -50.27 and 54.47 as well as -0.19% and 0.16%. Lastly, 
the findings for the post-crisis period exhibited the minimum and maximum Rupee deviation 
of 15.50 and 46.099 as well as the negligible minimum and maximum percentage deviation of 
0.08% and 0.23% respectively.  
Although the price deviations were reasonably minimal, Purohit and Malhotra (2015) went on 
to examine the number of days in which the deviation converges to equilibrium. According to 
their results for the pre-crisis phase, all the fund’s prices converged within two trading days 
whilst the popular Nifty Bees ETF was an outlier by exhibiting four trading days persistence. 
Consistent with the results presented by Shanmugham and Zabiulla (2012), the price deviation 
persistence during the crisis for the Nifty Bees and Kotak Sensex ETF disappeared after three 
trading days, whilst the other three funds portrayed similar results to that of the pre-crisis 
period. Meanwhile, the Quantum ETF price deviation lasted for four trading days. In the last 
segment of the examination period, the ICICI Spice ETF and the Nifty Bees were having the 
least price lag of three days, followed by Kotak Nifty ETF, Quantum ETF and Nifty Junior 
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ETF which exhibited four days price deviation lag. Surprisingly, the AP’s were ineffective as 
the price deviation of the Kotak Sensex ETF reached the maximum five trading days. Profit 
and Malhotra (2015) concluded by asserting that such mispricing is a sign of an ineffective 
creation and redemption process by the AP’s. 
Bringing these tests into the local ETF market, the pricing efficiency of the JSE listed ETFs 
has been thinly investigated with an exception of the studies by Charteris (2013; 2014). 
Charteris (2013) examined the pricing efficiency of four domestic and three foreign ETFs listed 
on the JSE during the period from June 2008 to December 2012. The four domestic ETFs in 
question were from the Satrix ETF family, namely the Satrix 40, FINI, INDI and RESI. 
Meanwhile, the foreign ETFs were from the Deutsche Bank (DBX) ETF family, namely the 
DBX MSCI JAPAN, U.K. and MSCI World.  
The results suggested that four of the seven funds traded on a premium whilst the remaining 
three funds traded on a discount. Most notably, the results revealed that the Satrix 40, FINI and 
INDI traded at an average daily discount which ranged between 0.04% and 0.09% respectively. 
On the other hand, the daily average premiums for the remaining four funds ranged between 
0.03% and 1.07%, with the Satrix RESI being the only domestic ETF trading at 0.03% premium 
and the DBX UK obtaining the highest premium of 1.07%. In line with the prior studies in both 
the developed and emerging ETFs markets, the premiums for the Satrix RESI and the DBX 
funds persisted for two trading days whilst the rest of the Satrix funds had one trading day price 
convergence. In light of these findings, Charteris (2013) indicated that the persistent price 
deviation for the foreign ETFs were attributable to the overlapping trading hours between the 
JSE and the home market for the target indices.  
In an attempt to validate the proposition made by Kayali (2007) as well as Delcoure and Zhong 
(2007), Charteris (2013) revealed that the ETFs mispricing carried significant information to 
exploit the arbitrage opportunities. Following the methodology of Jares and Lavin (2004), 
Chateris (2013) employed a trading strategy to exploit the mispricing which was also compared 
to the performance of the buy and hold strategy. According to the net results after accounting 
for the bid and ask spread cost, the trading strategy exhibited superior performance against the 
buy and hold strategy particularly for the Satrix RESI and all the DBX funds which exceeded 
1000% daily cumulative returns. Chateris (2013) concluded by asserting that, investors who 
wish to include ETFs in their portfolios should be aware of the significant mispricing which 
could exist when the funds trade at a premium or discount.  
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Charteris (2014) ran similar study over the same examination period and investigated the long-
run equilibrium relationship between the NAVs and the market price of the four domestic 
ETFs. In the same way, these funds were from the Satrix ETF family, namely the Satrix 40, 
FINI, INDI and RESI ETFs. In line with her prior findings, Charteris (2014) discovered that 
the Satrix 40, FINI and INDI traded at a daily discount to their respective NAVs whilst Satrix 
RESI portrayed resilience by continuing to trade at a premium. Following the strategy adopted 
by Delcoure and Zhong (2007), the author employed the Johansen’s co-integration test to 
examine the presence of long-run relationship between the NAVs and the market price. The 
results demonstrated that the long-run relationship or law of one price was evident for three 
funds with an exception of Satrix FINI. Charteris (2014) concluded that the local ETF market 
was reasonably efficient during the period under review attributing such performance to the 
efficiency of the JSE creation and redemption process. 
Recent research by Charteris, Chau, Gavriilidis and Kallinterakis (2014) explored the pricing 
efficiency of the first-ever listed ETFs in the four emerging markets namely, South Africa, 
India, South Korea and Brazil. The authors noted that the ETFs in question were the South 
African Satrix 40, Indian Nifty Bees, South Korean Kosef 200 and the Brazilian PIBB IBRX-
50 index fund. The results indicated that, all the ETFs prices diverted from their respective 
fundamental values by trading at a discount since their respective inception date till December 
2012. Most notably, the empirical results illustrated that the Brazilian PIBB IBRX-50 index 
fund exhibited the highest average daily discount of 0.87% as opposed to a mere 0.09% 
discount obtained by the South African Satrix 40. Meanwhile, the South Korean Kosef 200 and 
the Indian Nifty Bees traded at the reasonable average daily discounts which amounted to 
0.25% and 0.11% respectively.  
Having discovered the discounts, Charteris et al. (2014) went on to explore the extent in which 
these discount persisted throughout the period under review. In the same way, they found that 
the Brazilian discounts existed 85% of the total trading days followed by 74% of the South 
Korean, whilst, the South African and Indian discounts occurred for 61% and 59% respectively. 
Charteris et al. (2014) concluded by asserting that these findings were in line with results 
presented by Jares and Lavin (2004) who examined the premiums and discounts of the Japanese 
and Hong Kong ETFs.  
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4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter presented the empirical evidence of the performance and tracking ability of ETFs 
along with their index mutual funds counterparts documented from the developed, international 
and emerging markets. Section 4.2 documented that, on average, ETFs across all the markets 
failed to successfully replicate their respective benchmark indices. However, the tracking error 
of the emerging and international markets was found to be relatively high as opposed to those 
from the developed ETF markets attributing to the trading hours overlap. Extending these tests 
to the replication strategies, ETFs which adopts the physical replication strategy were found to 
be the best tracker funds as opposed to the synthetic counterparts which suffer from 
counterparty risk. This was found to be more prevalent in European ETF markets since this 
strategy is highly used in these markets. Moreover, equity-based ETFs tracking errors were 
statistically significant as opposed to fixed-income ETFs across all the markets. The 
significance of the tracking errors documented in Section 4.2 were found to attributable to the 
impact of management fees, dividend tax treatment as well as the replication strategy. 
Meanwhile, when comparing the tracking error of ETFs against their index mutual funds 
counterparts, the results were mixed in spite the fact that both funds loaded their investors with 
high risk and expenses.  
In the same way, Section 4.3 confirmed that ETFs from all these three main markets were 
inefficiently priced particularly those from the international and emerging markets which are 
subjective of trading hours overlap. Surprisingly, there was no study which compared the 
pricing efficiency of ETFs that adopts the physical and synthetic replication strategies. In 
contrast to the findings about the tracking error, fixed-income ETFs price deviation was slightly 
higher than their equity based counterparts, especially for the corporate bonds which mimics 
illiquid and risky benchmark indices. In addition to the inefficiency of the creation and 
redemption process, bid-ask spread, trading volume, exchange rate volatility as well as the 
trading hours overlap between the foreign market and the market in which the ETF is traded 
were identified as the key determinants of the price deviation. Furthermore, numeral studies 
used regression analysis to examine the number of trading days in which the price deviation 
converges and revealed that the mispricing persisted for an average of two trading days.  
In response to those persisted mispricing, several studies noted that trading strategies were 
formed to exploit such persistent pricing inefficiency. Consequently, the trading strategies 
outpaced their buy and hold counterparts in terms of average risk and return. In spite of such a 
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vast amount of empirical evidence, the joint test of tracking ability and pricing efficiency of 
the JSE listed ETFs has been thinly investigated hence this research is conducted. In so doing, 
the next chapter presents the data collection process along with the methodological procedure 
that is employed to achieve the research objectives.  
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Chapter 5 Data Collection and Research Methodology 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the sample of data that is analysed in the subsequent chapters along with 
the methodological procedure that is adopted to accomplish the objectives of the study. 
Following the introductory section, Section 5.2 provides an overview of the data collection 
process which entails the description of the data providers along with the actual sample that is 
used in achieving the objectives of the study. This is followed by Section 5.3 which gives a 
brief discussion of various methodological biases that need to be mitigated in order to ensure 
that the findings of the study are credible and robust. Building upon the methodology adopted 
by prior studies presented in Chapter 4, Section 5.4 presents the overview of the 
methodological procedure employed to examine the tracking ability and pricing efficiency of 
the 19 JSE listed ETFs. The summary and conclusion of the chapter is documented at Section 
5.5. 
5.2 Data collection process 
This section of the chapter presents the data attributes that are utilised in the current study 
covering the universe of the data set as well as the list of financial data services in which the 
attributes has been extracted from. According to the May 2015 publication of Exchange Traded 
Funds South Africa (ETFSA), the local ETFs market constituted of 45 ETFs which provides 
investors with an exposure to asset classes such as the domestic, international equity, fixed-
income, currencies as well as commodities. Out of that universe, this research aims to examine 
19 of the 45 ETFs including the Investec ZGOVI fund which was delisted on the 21st January 
2014.  
These 19 ETFs consist of 1 fixed-income index tracker, 5 equity based funds which mimics the 
movements of the international benchmark indices and the remainder mimics various styles. 
The rationale behind examining this mixture of ETFs comes in several ways. Firstly, currency 
and commodity ETFs are omitted from the sample because they face less interest from the retail 
and institutional investors. Secondly, the fund benchmark composition is also vital to consider 
since there are certain funds which have benchmark indices composition that are different from 
that of the FTSE/JSE. Lastly, 3 years or 36 months of fund existence is considered to be the 
minimum period in which a fund should exist before it is included in the sample. However, it 
is important to note that the Absa Capital NewFunds SWIX and GOVI meet all the above 
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mentioned criteria but is excluded from the sample due to the unavailability of their data 
attributes since their inception dates. 
As noted earlier, in an effort to avoid the impact of survivorship bias, the delisted Investec 
ZGOVI fund is examined until the 21 January 2014, its last trading day. Following the approach 
of Purohit and Malhotra (2015), the total performance period consist of 4 main sub-period 
namely, full examination period, pre-financial crisis ( between the inception date of each fund 
and 29 August 2008), global financial crisis phase (1 September 2008 to 30 June 2009) and the 
post-crisis phase (1 July 2009 through 30 September 2015). The rationale behind this 
segmentation of the performance period is to gain considerable insight of how JSE listed ETFs 
track their underlying indices during various market conditions. In the same vein, considerable 
inference can be made after observing the efficiency of these ETFs during bullish and bearish 
market condition.  
This study makes use of the following attributes extracted from Sharenet financial database: 
daily low and high closing prices as well as trading volume of the 19 ETFs and their 
corresponding benchmark indices. This have been merged with the total expense ratio 
(hereafter TER), dividends and NAVs that are obtained from the ETF providers’ website and 
Morningstar financial database. In this regard, it is assumed that the TER have been constant 
throughout the examination period. One of the limitation in this research is the unavailability 
of the bid and ask spreads from the aforementioned data sources, for the purpose of this 
research, TER is used as the proxy for the weighted average difference between the bid and 
ask spreads.  
Information pertaining to the fund’s manager, investment objectives, underlying investment, 
TER and the period under review is presented below in Table 5.1. When dissecting this table, 
it is worth noting that Satrix fund managers stand out as the dominant and leading provider of 
ETFs in the local market. As mentioned earlier, Satrix fund managers are the captains of this 
industry dated back to November 2000 when they launch the first South African ETF, Satrix 
40. 
Furthermore, the FTSE/JSE Top 40 index is the most replicated index within this data sample. 
In contrast, the domestic styled, fundamentals and property related indices have few funds that 
are replicating their performance. Meanwhile observing the TER’s, the RMB Top 40 exhibits 
the lowest TER as opposed to the DBX funds which mirrors the movement of international 
indices. This observation is consistent with the findings of Rompotis (2012) who suggests that 
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ETFs listed at the Swiss market but tracking the international underlying indices possess 
relatively high TER as opposed to that which replicate local indices. The final column denotes 
the period under review whereby the RMB Mid Cap fund possess the least number of years 
under examination as opposed to the Satrix 40 which is examined for approximately 15 years. 
Table 5.1: Summary of the ETFs under review 
No. Fund Name ETF 
Manager 
Target 
benchmark index 
Underlying Investment (Exposure) TER 
(%) 
Launch 
Date 
1 Satrix 40 Satrix FTSE/JSE Top 40 Domestic Equities (broad-market access) 0,45 27-11-00 
2 Satrix SWIX 
Top 40 
Satrix 
FTSE/JSE SWIX 
Top 40 
Domestic Equities (broad-market access) 0,45 11-04-06 
3 
Satrix FINI Satrix 
FTSE/JSE Financial 
15 
Domestic Equities (sector exposure) 0,45 15-02-02 
4 
Satrix INDI Satrix 
FTSE/JSE Industrial 
25 
Domestic Equities (sector exposure) 0,45 15-02-02 
5 
Satrix RESI Satrix 
FTSE/JSE 
Resources 20 
Domestic Equities (sector exposure) 0,45 11-04-06 
6 Satrix DIVI 
Plus 
Satrix 
FTSE/JSE Dividend 
Plus 
Domestic Equities (style) 0,45 30-08-07 
7 
Satrix Rafi 40 Satrix 
FTSE/JSE RAFI 40 
Total Return 
Domestic Equities (Fundamentals) 0,45 16-10-08 
8 RMB Top 40 RMB FTSE/JSE Top 40 Domestic Equities (broad-market access) 0,16 15-10-08 
9 RMB Mid 
Cap 
RMB FTSE/JSE Mid-Cap Domestic Equities (sector exposure) 0,67 15-08-12 
10 Stanlib Top 
40 
Stanlib FTSE/JSE Top 40 Domestic Equities (broad-market access) 0,23 18-10-10 
11 Stanlib SWIX 
40 
Stanlib 
FTSE/JSE SWIX 
Top 40 
Domestic Equities (broad-market access) 0,34 18-10-10 
12 Newfunds 
Shari’ah 
Top40 
Absa 
Capital 
FTSE/JSE Shari’ah 
Top 40 
Domestic Equities (style) 0,31 06-04-09 
13 Coreshares 
PropTrax 
SAPY 
Grindrod 
Bank 
FTSE/JSE South 
African Property 
Domestic Equities (listed-property) 0,58 25-09-07 
14 Investec 
ZGOVI ETF 
Investec FTSE/JSE GOVI Domestic Fixed-income 0,34 21-10-08 
15 DBX  
EuroStoxx50 
Deutsche 
Bank 
EuroStoxx50 International Equities (broad-market access) 0,85 10-10-05 
16 
DBX UK 
Deutsche 
Bank 
FTSE 100 International Equities (broad-market access) 0,85 10-10-05 
17 
DBX JAPAN 
Deutsche 
Bank 
MSCI Japan Equity International Equities (broad-market access) 0,85 01-04-08 
18 
DBX USA 
Deutsche 
Bank 
MSCI US Equity International Equities (broad-market access) 0,85 01-04-08 
19 
DBX World 
Deutsche 
Bank 
MSCI World Equity International Equities (broad-market access) 0,68 01-04-08 
 
5.3 Methodological biases and possible remedial actions 
Whenever an empirical research is conducted, there are always methodological errors which 
occurs either from the research design or the data sample which is being utilised to achieve the 
research objectives. In this regard, it is the responsibility of the researcher to take certain action 
or initiative to mitigate the effect of the potential bias. Within the investment industry, data 
snooping, survivorship and look-ahead bias stand out as one of the most crucial biases which 
researchers should always mitigate so that their findings are credible and robust. According to 
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Lo and MacKinlay (1990), data snooping bias occurs when an excessive use of a certain data 
series results in predictable patterns or trends. In the case of this empirical research, data 
snooping cannot prevail because the universe of the ETFs listed on the JSE are examined since 
their respective inception dates.  
On the other hand, Strugnell, Gilbert and Kruger (2011) suggests that empirical research suffers 
from survivorship bias when the researcher purposefully or accidentally use a universe of data 
which excludes stocks or mutual funds that are delisted or experienced sluggish investment 
performance. In most cases, researchers purposefully neglect to curb survivorship bias in order 
to have results which suits their own interests and ambitions. In an attempt to mitigate the effect 
of this methodological error, the full sample of 19 ETFs under review includes the Investec 
ZGOVI fund which was launched in October 2008 and delisted in January 2014. In this regard, 
the Investec ZGOVI fund is examined till the last trading date.  
Meanwhile, according to Conrad, Cooper and Kaul (2003), the effect of look-ahead bias occurs 
when the researcher utilises data attributes that are not yet made publicly available during the 
period when the study is being undertaken. For example, research exhibits this bias when the 
researcher utilise data attributes such as the company earnings value which are publicly 
available to investors at a particular future date. In the current study, the effect of look-ahead 
bias is alleviated because the data attributes which are being utilised are not due to be published 
at particular future date but rather made publicly available on a daily basis.  
5.4 Research methodology   
The primary objective of this thesis is to determine whether the empirical work by Baş and 
Sarıoğlu (2015) from the Turkish market as well as Purohit and Malhotra (2015) from the 
Indian market could hold in the JSE. As a result, their methodological procedure have been 
adopted in the current study with a slight alteration. With that being said, this section presents 
the methodological procedure that is employed to achieve the research objectives which are 
articulated in Chapter 1. In order to clearly demonstrate the methodological procedure, this 
section is segmented into two main sub-section namely the tracking ability and pricing 
efficiency tests which are presented in Section 5.4.1 and 5.4.2 respectively. These sub-sections 
address issues pertaining to the South African ETFs such as the return and risk characteristics, 
tracking errors, tracking errors explanatory variables, pricing efficiency test and regression 
analysis that explains the magnitude of the price deviation. It is also noteworthy to mention 
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that all the tests are conducted across four main performance period namely, full-examination, 
pre-crisis, during global financial crisis and post-crisis period.  
5.4.1 Tracking ability tests 
This test aims to answer the first objective of this study which addresses the ability in which 
ETFs successfully mimics the performance of their target benchmark indices. Following the 
approach of prior studies, tracking ability test adopted in the current study includes both the 
observation of the return and risk performance as well as observing the magnitude of the 
tracking errors along with their explanatory variables.  
5.4.1.1 Measurement of return and risk (risk and return characteristics) 
To explore the tracking ability of the 19 JSE listed ETFs, this study employs two common 
methods. The first tracking ability test conducted in this research is the return and risk 
characteristics for the ETFs against their target benchmark indices. Following the approach 
adopted by prior studies, this research uses the popular return and risk estimation which are 
denoted by Equation 5.1 and Equation 5.2. Equation 5.1 below, denotes the ETFs and its target 
benchmark indices daily returns. 
R𝑖,𝑡 = 
𝐶𝑃𝑡  − 𝐶𝑃𝑡 −1
𝐶𝑃𝑡 −1
 𝑥 100         (5. 1) 
Where  𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the percentage return of an ETF or underlying index on day t; CPt  is the closing 
price of an ETF or underlying index on day t; and CPt-1 is the closing price of ETF or underlying 
index on prior day from day t. Meanwhile, Equation 5.2 illustrates the risk of the ETF and 
underlying index as the standard deviation of returns in the following manner: 
𝜎𝑖 = √
∑ (Rt−R̅  )^2
N
t=1
𝓃−1
                      (5.2) 
Where 𝜎𝑖 refers to the standard deviation of both the ETF and the underlying is index; ?̅?  is the 
average return of an ETF or underlying index; and 𝓃 is the number of trading days. Having 
examined the average daily return and risk characteristics, attention is now turned to the 
quantification of the tracking error along with their key explanatory variables.  
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5.4.1.2 Tracking error and key explanatory variables 
The performance of active fund managers is evaluated by how much they outpace certain 
underlying index (commonly known as generating alpha). In direct contrast to that, the way an 
ETF add value to the investor is measured by how much it have mimicked the performance of 
a particular benchmark index. In this regard, whenever the ETF returns are higher or lower than 
those of the underlying index the fund is deemed to have a tracking error. Theoretically, an 
ETF should not possess alpha but rather have an optimal tracking error of zero. However, 
among others factors, fund expenses, replication strategy, dividends, tax and cash treatment 
tend to be the main attributes of a tracking error. With that being said, this study compute the 
tracking error through the adoption of the three tracking error methodological procedure 
employed by Rompotis (2012). Firstly, regression analysis denoted by Equation 5.3 is 
employed to explore the relationship between the local market ETFs and their respective target 
benchmark indices. This is where the daily raw returns of ETFs are regressed against the daily 
returns of their target underlying index.  
R𝐸𝑇𝐹,𝑡= α𝑖+b𝑖 R𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥,𝑡+ 𝜀𝑡         (5.3) 
Where 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝐹,𝑡 is the raw return of an ETF on day t; 𝛼𝑖 is the alpha coefficient which reflect the 
average return which an ETF investor obtains above the target benchmark index; 𝑏𝑖 is the 
coefficient to the target benchmark index returns which resemble the ETFs sensitivity to the 
movements of its target benchmark index; 𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥,𝑡 is the return of the underlying index 
portfolios on day t; and 𝜀𝑡 is the standard error term of the linear regression that was not 
accounted for. Therefore, the expectation from this regression is that the independent variables 
exhibit the following attribute:  𝛼𝑖 should be statistically insignificant since ETFs are passive 
investment vehicles, 𝑏𝑖 should equate to one because ETFs follows full-replication strategy and 
𝜀𝑡 should be close to zero. In line to that view, the standard error is used as the proxy for the 
first tracking error𝑇𝐸1. 
In addition to the standard error of Equation 5.3, this research quantify the tracking error 
through the computation of the mean absolute difference (MAD) between ETF daily returns 
and that of its target benchmark index. This is denoted below in Equation 5.4.  
TE2= ∑ |R𝐸𝑇𝐹,𝑡 - 𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥,𝑡|
n
t=1 𝑁⁄           (5.4) 
Where 𝑇𝐸2 represent the mean absolute difference tracking error on day t; |𝑅𝑡
𝐸𝑇𝐹 − 𝑅𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 | is 
the daily absolute return difference between the ETF and its underlying index; and 𝑁 is the 
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number of the observation. Although the MAD have been extensively adopted by prior studies, 
it have suffered major criticisms because the positive and negative returns tend to offset each 
other. Subsequent to the MAD tracking error, the last and most preferred measure of the 
tracking error is the standard deviation of return differences between the ETF and its target 
benchmark index. This is expressed in Equation 5.5 below. 
TE3=
√ 
∑ (R t
ETF-Rt
 Index- (Rt
ETF- Rt
 Index)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅
)2nt=1
N -1
      (5.5) 
Where 𝑇𝐸3 is the standard deviation of return differences the ETF and its target benchmark 
index; 𝑅𝑡
𝐸𝑇𝐹 − 𝑅𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 is the daily return difference between the ETF and its underlying index 
on day t; and 𝑅𝑡
𝐸𝑇𝐹 −  𝑅𝑡
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ is the mean daily return differences the ETF and its underlying 
index over 𝑁 number of days. 
The empirical findings documented in Chapter 4 reveals that there are several factors which 
play a significant role in causing ETFs to possess substantial amount of tracking error. 
Undeniably, the cost in which the ETF provider incur in the process of mimicking the 
underlying benchmark index serve as the most prominent attribute of the tracking error. In 
addition to cost, this research expand its horizon by exploring the influence of other potential 
factors. This is accomplished through the computation of Equation 5.6 which is adopted from 
Shin et al. (2010).  
𝑇𝐸𝑗,𝑡 =  𝑎1 + 𝑎2. 𝑇𝐸𝑅t+a3.𝐷𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦t+a4 .𝑙𝑛𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒t+a5.𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑t+𝑒t     (5.6) 
Where 𝑇𝐸𝑗,𝑡 is the tracking error on day t in terms of the three main methods; 𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑡 is the total 
expense ratio or cost in which the ETF provider incurs over and above the brokerage fees; 
𝐷𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 is the volatility of the daily market price for the ETF on day t; 𝑙𝑛𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑡 is the 
natural logarithm of the ETF trading volume on day t; 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 is the average of the annual 
dividends paid to the fund; and 𝑒𝑡 is the residual of the regression. In addition to the tracking 
ability test which has been thoroughly explained in Section 5.4.1, this research also examines 
whether the 19 funds are efficiently priced relative to their underlying values over the period 
under review. Section 5.4.2 below specify the procedure in which the pricing efficiency test is 
carried out.  
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5.4.2 Pricing efficiency 
Growing literature concerning the tracking ability of ETFs have always been coupled with the 
pricing efficiency test. This is dated back to the seminal work of Elton et al. (2002) who 
conducted these twin tests when evaluating the Spider ETF during the period from 1993 to 
1998. In the most recent work, Baş and Sarıoğlu (2015) as well as Purohit and Malhotra (2015) 
adopts similar tests on the Turkish and Indian stock market respectively. As noted earlier, 
pricing efficiency test aim to determine whether arbitrage opportunity exist due to the 
mispricing which occur when the ETF market price and its underlying value (commonly known 
as the NAV) are in disequilibrium. In this regard, an ETF is deemed to be efficiently priced 
when the market price and the NAV are in equilibrium. In contrast to that, whenever the price 
difference is positive, an ETF is regarded to be trading at a premium, discount is booked when 
negative price difference is recorded. As demonstrated below by Equation 5.7 and Equation 
5.8, pricing efficiency test is quantified in terms of the South African Rand (ZAR) and 
percentage terms respectively.  
𝑃𝐷𝑡(𝑍𝐴𝑅) = 𝑃𝑡 − 𝑁𝐴𝑉𝑡        (5. 7) 
𝑃𝐷𝑡(%) = (𝑃𝑡 − 𝑁𝐴𝑉𝑡)/𝑁𝐴𝑉𝑡 × 100      (5.8) 
Where 𝑃𝐷𝑡(𝑍𝐴𝑅) illustrate the rand value premium or discount on day t; 𝑃𝑡 is the ETF closing 
price on day t; 𝑁𝐴𝑉𝑡 is the ETF net asset value (NAV) on day t; and 𝑃𝐷𝑡(%) is the percentage 
premium or discount on day t. In addition to this traditional price efficiency tests, this research 
adopts the approach followed by Charteris (2014) and employ the Student’s t-test to determine 
the significance level of the mispricing. In its purest sense, the results of the t-test clarify 
whether the rand value and percentage price difference of the 19 ETFs under review equate to 
zero. This is computed through Equation 5.9 below:  
𝑇 − 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑠 =  𝑃𝐷𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ /
𝑆
√𝑁
             (5.9) 
Where 𝑃𝐷𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ is the average rand and percentage value price deviation on day t; 𝑆 is the standard 
deviation of 𝑃𝐷𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  ; and 𝑁 𝑖𝑠 𝑡ℎ𝑒 number of the observation.  
Having observed the price differences results, attention is now turned to the estimation of the 
magnitude of these price deviations. Theoretically, effectiveness of the creation and redemption 
process conducted by the authorised participants should cause any price deviation (premium or 
discount) to disappear at least after one trading day. With that being said, it is worth examining 
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the number of trading days in which the price difference persist before they disappear. This test 
is executed through Equation 5.10 below which denotes the relationship between the Rand 
value premium or discount on day t and the one-day lagged value of the Rand value premium 
or discount.  
𝑃𝐷𝑡(𝑍𝐴𝑅)  =  𝛼 +  𝛽𝑃𝐷𝑡−1 +  𝜀𝑡                                                    (5.10) 
Where 𝑃𝐷𝑡 (ZAR) is the proxy for the Rand value premium or discount on day t; α is the 
regression intercept term; 𝛽 is the regression coefficient term; 𝛽𝑃𝐷𝑡−1 is the one-day lagged 
value of the Rand value premium or discount on day t; and 𝜀𝑡 is the standard error term of the 
regression. The output of Equation 5.10 also inform this research about price deviation which 
exceeded the one trading day convergence period. This implies that, over and above the 
inefficient execution of the creation and process, several factors could potentially explain the 
persistent price deviation. In light of that view, prior literature brings to our attention that 
similar to the tracking errors, magnitude of the price deviation can be adequately explained by 
the level of daily trading volume, transaction costs and the intraday price volatility. With that 
in mind, Equation 11 below, regress the premium or discount against the cost of investing 
which is denoted by TER, daily volatility and natural logarithm of the trading volumes.   
𝑃𝐷𝑡 =  b0  + b1TERt+ b2 𝐷𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦t+ b3𝑙𝑛𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒t + et                  (5.11) 
Where,  𝑃𝐷𝑡  denotes both the rand value and the percentage premium or discount of the ETF 
on day t; 𝑏0 is the intercept of the regression; and 𝑒𝑡 is the standard error term of the regression. 
It is worthwhile to reiterate that the TER in equation serves as the proxy for the weighted 
average bid-ask spread which were unobtainable from our databases. Prior findings which are 
documented in Chapter 4 reveals that ETFs that are traded in foreign markets from the one’s 
in which their underlying indices are listed tend to exhibit wide price deviation mainly due to 
trading hours overlap. In this regard, over and above these aforementioned factors, this critical 
element of trading hours overlap could possibly yield substantial explanation of the persistent 
price deviation especially for the DBX funds.  
5.5 Conclusion 
Consistent with the two main objectives of the study, this chapter demonstrates the detailed the 
procedure that have been followed to undertake the tracking ability and pricing efficiency tests. 
It is worthwhile noting that many measures are used to effectively measure these critical test, 
however, this research adopts the approach of Baş and Sarıoğlu (2015) as well as Purohit and 
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Malhotra (2015). Mimicking these prior studies did not only apply to the methodological 
procedure but also informed the type of data attributes that have to be extracted. With regards 
to the tracking ability test, this began with the test which compares the nominal risk and return 
of the ETFs against those of their corresponding underlying indices. In addition to that, 
standard error of the linear regression analysis, mean-absolute deviation between the return of 
the ETF versus that of the benchmark index (MAD) and the standard deviation of the returns 
difference are clearly specified as the three main measures of the tracking error. This is coupled 
with the multilinear regression that examines whether the TER, daily volatility, dividends and 
average daily trading volume had a significant impact in explaining the tracking error.  
Considering the pricing efficiency test, both the rand and percentage premium and discounts 
measures are fully disclosed. In line with the tracking error test, a regression analysis is also 
adopted to observe if the TER, daily volatility and average daily trading volume induced the 
premiums and discounts. Further to this, another multilinear regression is depicted to exhibit 
the number of trading days in which the premium and discounts persists until they disappear 
when the authorised participants execute the creation and redemption process. Having known 
these research methodological procedures, Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 captures the empirical 
findings of the tracking ability and pricing efficiency respectively.
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Chapter 6 Tracking Ability Results and Analysis  
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 gives the detailed description of the data attributes and the methodological procedure 
that is followed in examining the tracking ability as well as the pricing efficiency of the 19 JSE 
listed ETFs. Building upon that, this chapter; first and foremost, presents the overall period of 
examination tracking ability results of these 19 ETFs which stems from their respective 
inception date until 30 September 2015. According to Faulkner et al. (2013), the South African 
economy experienced the effect of the sub-prime financial crisis between 1 September 2008 
and 30 June 2009. With that in mind, this research is characterised by other three sub-periods 
which aims to observe the tracking ability of fund managers before, during and post the 2008 
global financial crisis.  
In this regard, the pre-crisis period is considered to be between the launch dates of each of the 
12 ETFs and 29 August 2008. On the one hand, during the crisis period which is specified 
above, the tracking ability of 16 ETFs is be examined so that the impact of the global financial 
crisis is fully examined. Lastly, as of 1 July 2009 to 30 September 2015, the full sample of 19 
ETFs is examined in order to ascertain whether the recovery effect of the financial market have 
a positive or negative effect towards the tracking ability of these ETFs. However, in order to 
mitigate the negative effect of survivorship bias, the Investec ZGOVI ETF which was delisted 
from the JSE by the 21 January 2014 is examined till this date.  
Section 6.2 provides the discussion and interpretation of the tracking ability results of the 19 
funds during their overall examination period. Section 6.3 demonstrates how 12 of the 19 funds 
mimicked the performance of their target indices before the local equity market was hit by the 
2008 global financial crisis. Subsequently, Section 6.4 illustrates the ability of 16 fund 
managers in replicating the movements of their underlying benchmark indices during the 
turbulent moment of the financial crisis which lasted for 10 months between 1 September 2008 
and 30 June 2009.  
Lastly, the tracking ability results of the overall sample of 19 funds during the recovery period 
is summarised in Section 6.5 whilst, Section 6.6 sets out the consolidated summary of the 
research findings as well as the conclusion of the chapter. In order to draw insightful inference 
about the tracking ability of these JSE listed ETFs, the analysis of these findings includes the 
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observation of the similarities and the differences with prior empirical studies that are 
conducted both locally and internationally during the respective sub-period. 
6.2 Overall examination period results: (between launch date and 30 September 2015) 
This section of the chapter illustrates the tracking ability results and the analysis of the 19 JSE 
listed ETFs during the overall period of evaluation. The first component of this section is the 
observation of the return and risk (standard deviation) characteristics of these ETFs. This aims 
to establish whether the daily return of ETFs mimics their target benchmark indices. As 
furnished in Table 6.1 in the next page, these 19 ETFs are classified into the following seven 
categories which resembles the kind of index they replicate: domestic broad-market, sector, 
style, fundamental, listed-property, fixed income and international broad-market. According to 
the results, the average daily return and risk of the ETFs are 0.04% and 1.68% whilst those of 
their target indices are 0.04% and 1.26% respectively. This implies that, on average; ETFs 
exhibits daily returns that closely resemble those of their target benchmark indices but with 
relatively high level of risk. By comparison, these findings contradict with the evidence 
provided by Milanos and Rompotis (2006) from the Swiss market, Shin et al. (2010) of the 
international market as well as the most recent work from Turkey conducted by Baş and 
Sarıoğlu (2015) when they discovered that the mean daily return of their ETFs are different 
from that of their target benchmark indices. 
Considering the tracking ability of individual funds, the RMB Mid Cap displays the highest 
daily return difference of -0.08% versus 0.03% of the FTSE/JSE Mid-Cap. At the same time it 
also exhibits much higher standard deviation of 3.40% compared to a mere 0.68% of its target 
benchmark index. On the positive side, it is evident that the RMB Top 40, Satrix RESI and also 
the DBX UK FTSE 100 display daily returns which replicate those of their target benchmark 
indices with relative less amount of risk. Additionally, Satrix 40, Satrix INDI, Satrix DIVI Plus 
and the CoreShares Proptrax SAPY also demonstrates daily returns that closely resemble that 
of their target indices but with relatively high level of risk. In the case of the 11 remaining 
funds, the return difference between the ETFs and their respective target benchmark indices 
appears to be either one or two basis points even though ETFs risk levels are higher than those 
of their underlying indices. 
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Table 6.1: Daily percentage return and risk of ETFs and the corresponding target 
indices 
 
This table presents the average, minimum, maximum daily percentage return and standard deviation (risk) of the 19 ETFs and 
their corresponding benchmark indices from their respective inception date till 30 September 2015. The last column exhibit 
the number of days in which each of the sample ETF have been examined from their respective launch date until 30 September 
2015. 
 
Underlying 
Investment 
(Exposure) 
ETF Name 
Target benchmark 
index 
Return (%) 
Standard 
Deviation (%) 
Number of 
Observation 
(days) ETF Index ETF Index 
Domestic 
broad-market 
Satrix 40 ** FTSE/JSE Top 40 0.06 0.06 1.40 1.35 3704 
Satrix SWIX Top 40 + 
FTSE/JSE SWIX Top 
40 
0.05 0.04 1.60 1.38 2363 
RMB Top 40 * FTSE/JSE Top 40 0.06 0.06 1.33 1.35 1735 
Stanlib Top 40 + FTSE/JSE Top 40 0.05 0.06 1.58 1.35 1234 
Stanlib SWIX 40 + 
FTSE/JSE SWIX Top 
40 
0.06 0.04 1.40 1.38 1234 
Sector 
Satrix FINI + FTSE/JSE Financial 15 0.06 0.05 1.57 1.32 3400 
Satrix INDI ** FTSE/JSE Industrial 25 0.07 0.07 1.23 1.17 3400 
Satrix RESI * FTSE/JSE Resources 20 0.01 0.01 1.96 2.04 2363 
RMB Mid Cap + FTSE/JSE Mid-Cap -0.08 0.03 3.40 0.68 777 
Style 
Satrix DIVI Plus ** 
FTSE/JSE Dividend 
Plus 
0.03 0.03 1.44 1.17 2017 
Newfunds Shari’ah Top 
40 + 
FTSE/JSE Shari’ah Top 
40 
0.06 0.04 3.02 1.31 1616 
Fundamentals Satrix Rafi 40 + 
FTSE/JSE RAFI 40 
Total Return 
0.06 0.07 1.26 1.33 1734 
Listed-
property 
CoreShares Proptrax 
SAPY ** 
FTSE/JSE South 
African Property 
0.04 0.04 1.03 0.85 2000 
Fixed-income Investec ZGOVI + FTSE/JSE GOVI 0.01 0.04 0.55 0.44 1312 
International 
broad-market 
DBX EuroStoxx 50 + EuroStoxx50 0.04 0.03 1.99 1.47 2489 
DBX UK FTSE 100 * FTSE 100 0.04 0.04 1.27 1.28 2489 
DBX MSCI JAPAN + MSCI Japan Equity 0.05 0.04 2.24 1.90 1871 
DBX MSCI USA + MSCI US Equity 0.06 0.05 1.57 1.17 1871 
DBX MSCI World  + MSCI World Equity 0.05 0.04 2.08 1.03 1871 
 
Average 0.04 0.04 1.68 1.26 2078 
Minimum -0.08 0.01 0.55 0.44 777 
Maximum 0.07 0.07 3.40 2.04 3704 
Note: Investec ZGOVI is examined from its launch date till 21 January 2014 when it was delisted on the JSE. * denotes 
replicated return and lower risk.  ** denotes replicated return and higher risk. *** denotes replicated return and risk. + denotes 
different return and risk. 
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The inference from the above mentioned results is that ETFs which provide investors with an 
exposure towards domestic broad-market and sector indices replicates their target benchmark 
indices better than other underlying investment more especially those which mimics 
international broad-market indices. This is in line with the conclusion reached by Maister, 
Schorr, Perlman and Minar (2010) along with Buetow and Henderson (2012) when they find 
that ETFs which replicates most liquid indices tend to track better than those that mimics 
illiquid ones. With respect to the last column, the average trading days over this period of 
evaluation amount to 2078. In addition, it is also noticeable that the RMB Mid Cap is examined 
for the shortest period of 777 trading days. On the other hand, the Satrix 40 is evaluated for the 
longest period of 3704 trading days as it is the first listed ETF in South Africa. 
Unlike the Satrix 40 that have been listed on the JSE in November 2000, the RMB Mid Cap is 
only launched 12 years later in August 2012, this motivates this research to observe the tracking 
ability of these 19 JSE listed ETFs in different phases of the economic cycle. Having observed 
these return and risk characteristics results, Table 6.2 demonstrates the tracking ability results 
that are obtained from the linear regression equation that have been adopted from Milanos and 
Rompotis (2006) and widely used by other prior empirical studies.  
 
The alpha coefficient (αi) in Table 6.2 resembles the average daily return which an ETF 
investor obtains either below or above its target benchmark index. As articulated in Chapter 5, 
this attribute is expected to be zero and statistically insignificant since ETFs do not seek to 
outpace a particular index but rather aim to match its movements as accurately as possible. On 
the other hand, the coefficient to the target benchmark index mean returns commonly known 
as beta (𝑏i) possesses two meaningful explanations. Firstly, it represents the amount of 
systematic risk an ETF have towards its target benchmark index. Secondly, this coefficient is 
also used as a proxy for the replication strategy in which fund managers adopts in replicating 
their desired underlying index. In this regard, this coefficient should be equal to unity and also 
statistically significant if fund managers buys and sells the constituent stocks at the same 
proportional weight as that of their target benchmark index. However, in reality, that seldom 
happens due to the effect of management fees and the cash reserve. The R-Squared denotes the 
percentage of the variation in the target benchmark index mean return that explains the 
variation in the ETF mean returns. Since ETFs aim to replicate the movements of their target 
indices as accurately as possible, the R-Squared is also expected to be statistically significant. 
Lastly, the regression error term (𝜀𝑡) serves as a proxy for tracking error.  
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Table 6.2: Regression results of tracking ability 
 
This table provides the tracking ability performance results obtained from the following linear regression equation adopted 
from Milanos and Rompotis (2006): 
𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑭,𝒕 =  𝛂𝐢 + 𝒃𝐢 𝑹𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒙,𝒕 + 𝜺𝒕  
 
This regression equation denotes the linear relationship between the ETF return on day t (𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑭,𝒕) as the dependent variable 
against the daily return of its target benchmark index (𝑹𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒙,𝒕) on day t as the independent variable. 
 
Underlying Investment 
(Exposure) 
ETF Name Alpha(𝛂𝐢) Beta(𝒃𝐢) 
R-Squared 
(%) 
Domestic broad-market 
Satrix 40 0.00 0.95*** 83% 
Satrix SWIX Top 40 0.00 0.76*** 43% 
RMB Top 40 0.00 0.97*** 92% 
Stanlib Top 40 0.00 0.56* 14% 
Stanlib SWIX 40 0.00 0.65** 23% 
Sector 
Satrix FINI 0.00 0.86*** 53% 
Satrix INDI 0.00 0.85*** 65% 
Satrix RESI 0.00 0.88*** 71% 
RMB Mid Cap -0.00 0.95* 14% 
Style 
Satrix DIVI Plus 0.00 0.82** 44% 
Newfunds  Shari’ah  Top 40 0.00 0.62*** 11% 
Fundamentals Satrix Rafi 40 0.00 0.69** 53% 
Listed-property CoreShares Proptrax SAPY 0.00 0.63** 27% 
Fixed-income Investec ZGOVI 0.00 -0.02* 0% 
International broad-
market 
DBX  EuroStoxx50 0.00 -0.39* 9% 
DBX UK FTSE 100 0.00 0.51* 25% 
DBX MSCI JAPAN 0.00 0.43* 13% 
DBX MSCI USA 0.00 0.24* 3% 
DBX MSCI World 0.00 0.15* 9% 
 Average 0.00 0.58 34% 
Note: * statistically significant at a 10% level, ** statistically significant at a 5% level, *** statistically significant at 1% 
level 
 
As illustrated in Table 6.2, on average, alpha coefficient is close to zero and also statistically 
insignificant at the 5% significance level. Considering the individual ETFs, all the funds under 
review also meet the expectation as they obtained the alpha coefficients that are statistically 
insignificant. With specific focus on the beta coefficient, the mean estimate of 0.58 is far from 
being close to unity but statistically significant at the 5% level. On relative basis, this average 
beta coefficient is lower compared to 0.88 from the Swiss market as presented by Milanos and 
Rompotis (2006) and also 0.84 from the LSE which is documented by Mateus and Rahmani 
(2014).  
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Prior empirical literature suggests that the diversity of the target benchmark index plays an 
integral role when it comes to the fund manager’s tracking ability. For example, international 
broad-market ETFs which mimics multi-country indices tend to exhibit beta coefficients that 
are statistically insignificant and far from unity compared to those that replicate domestic 
indices. At the same time, these international broad-market ETFs also exhibit statistically 
insignificant R-Squared as opposed to their domestic counterparts. In addition to the diversity 
of their indices, this is also attributable to the trading hours overlap in various regions of the 
world wherein the underlying stocks are listed.  
 
Taking a closer look at the individual ETFs beta coefficients and R-Squared, this assertion is 
confirmed as the RMB Top 40 portrays 5% significance level beta coefficient and R-Squared 
that amount to 0.97 and 92% respectively. On the other hand, the lowest beta coefficient and 
R-Squared estimates of -0.39 and 9% are obtained by the DBX EuroStoxx 50 which replicates 
the movements of top 50 Euro-zone companies. Similarly, the DBX MSCI World which 
replicate an index constituted of 1643 stocks from 23 countries which have sizeable trading 
hours overlap also exhibits beta coefficients and R-Squared which amount to 0.15 and 9% 
respectively. Taking a closer look at the domestic funds, the Investec ZGOVI which replicate 
risk-free proxy in South Africa (FTSE/JSE GOVI) index obtains -0.02 beta coefficients and 
0% R-Squared estimates. This is expected because the correlation with a risk-free asset such 
as the constituents of the FTSE/JSE GOVI should be zero.  
 
On the contrary, the majority of the domestic broad-market and sectorial based ETFs have beta 
coefficients that are closer to one and also statistically significant at a 1% significance level. 
This affirms why most of the domestic broad-market and sectorial-based ETFs obtained daily 
returns that closely resemble that of their target benchmark indices as illustrated in Table 6.1. 
Having known the variation of the ETF return that is explained by the return of the target 
benchmark index, Table 6.3 focuses on what the index returns failed to explain, which is 
defined as the tracking error. Following the approach of prior studies particularly that of 
Rompotis (2012), Table 6.3 illustrates the estimates of the three kinds of tracking errors 
measures. These are namely the error term of the regression depicted in Table 6.2, the mean of 
the absolute difference between the return of the fund and the return of target benchmark index 
(MAD), and the standard deviation of the return difference. Unlike the return and risk 
characteristics presented earlier, academics and investment professionals hold in high regard 
these three measures of tracking errors. However, other scholars have levelled criticism against 
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TE2 or MAD by arguing that it is not standardised as it only considers the absolute return 
deviation. With that being said, in the table above; an ETF is considered to be the worst or best 
tracker if it exhibits the tracking errors estimate that is above or below their mean level. 
 
Table 6.3: Tracking errors statistics (percentage) 
 
Following the methodology proposed by Rompotis (2012), Table 6.3 reports the summary of the average, minimum and 
maximum percentage tracking errors for all the 19 ETFs over the period of evaluation. TE1 denotes the error term of the 
tracking ability regression 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝐹,𝑡 =  αi + 𝑏i 𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑡 , TE2 expresses the mean absolute difference (MAD) between 
ETFs daily returns and that of its target benchmark index. TE3 is obtained through the quantification of the standard 
deviation of return differences the ETF and its corresponding target benchmark index. 
 
Underlying 
Investment 
(Exposure) 
ETF Name 
Standard Errors 
of Regression 
(ΤΕ1) 
Mean Absolute 
Return Difference 
(MAD) 
(TE2) 
Standard 
Deviation of 
Returns 
Difference (TE3) 
Domestic 
broad-market 
Satrix 40 0.58 0.37 0.58 
Satrix SWIX Top 40 1.21 0.70 1.25 
RMB Top 40 0.39 1.37 1.89 
Stanlib Top 40 1.46 0.58 1.53 
Stanlib SWIX 40 1.21 0.70 1.25 
Sector 
Satrix FINI 1.07 0.71 1.09 
Satrix INDI 0.73 0.48 0.75 
Satrix RESI 1.09 0.66 1.12 
RMB Mid Cap 3.34 0.36 3.34 
Style 
Satrix DIVI Plus 1.08 0.70 1.10 
Newfunds Shari’ah Top 40 2.91 1.21 2.95 
Fundamentals Satrix Rafi 40 0.87 0.57 0.96 
Listed-property CoreShares Proptrax SAPY 0.88 0.61 0.93 
Fixed-income Investec ZGOVI 0.55 0.47 0.71 
International 
broad-market 
DBX  EuroStoxx50 1.78 0.97 1.87 
DBX UK FTSE 100 1.10 0.86 1.27 
DBX MSCI JAPAN 2.09 1.60 2.36 
DBX MSCI USA 1.55 1.11 1.78 
DBX MSCI World 0.98 1.01 2.01 
 
Average 1.31 0.79 1.51 
Minimum 0.39 0.36 0.58 
Maximum 3.34 1.60 3.34 
Note: Estimates highlighted in bold represent values that are larger than the mean. 
 
According to the results of the third column, it is evident that the average ΤΕ1 equates to 1.31%. 
In line with the results from Table 6.2, the RMB Top 40 also stand out as it enjoys the lowest 
tracking error of 0.39% as opposed to its peer, RMB Mid Cap which suffers from the highest 
daily tracking error of 3.34%. This kind of tracking ability variation between these two funds 
could possibly be attributable to the time horizon as the RMB Mid Cap is only examined for a 
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maximum of 777 days compared to 1735 of the RMB Top 40. In the case of the RMB Mid 
Cap, such minimal period might have been characterised by noise and volatility in the market 
hence such level of tracking error. A closer look at the above and below average tracker funds, 
Stanlib Top 40, RMB Mid Cap, Newfunds Shari’ah Top 40, DBX EuroStoxx50, DBX MSCI 
JAPAN and DBX MSCI USA possess tracking errors that are above the mean whilst the 
opposite is true for all the remaining funds.  
Considering the magnitude of ΤΕ2 estimates, the average of the MAD equates to 0.79% whilst 
the RMB Mid Cap and the DBX MSCI JAPAN reveals the lowest and highest MAD of 0.36% 
and 1.60% respectively. In terms of the best and worst tracker funds, all the international broad-
market funds, Newfunds Shari’ah Top 40 and the RMB Top 40 exhibit estimates that are above 
the average of the MAD. In the case of the remaining funds, the majority of them possess MAD 
that is way below the mean, this could be attributable to the liquidity of the index they track 
since most of them provide investors with an exposure to domestic broad market and sector 
indices.  
Lastly, taking a closer look at the ΤΕ3 estimates, Table 6.3 reveals the average daily tracking 
error of 1.51%. With respect to the funds that have attained minimum and maximum tracking 
errors, Satrix 40 possess the lowest estimate of 0.58% as opposed to 3.34% daily estimate of 
the RMB Mid Cap. In addition to the Satrix 40, below average tracking errors are associated 
to its peers; the Satrix SWIX Top 40, Satrix FINI, Satrix INDI, Satrix RESI, Satrix DIVI Plus 
and Satrix Rafi 40, CoreShares Proptrax SAPY, Investec ZGOVI as well as the DBX UK FTSE 
100. One thing worth noting amongst the best tracking funds is that majority of them replicates 
sectorial and domestic broad-market indices which are considered to be the most liquid indices 
on the JSE. Contrarily, trading hour difference and the diversity of the underlying benchmark 
indices might have caused the DBX EuroStoxx50, DBX MSCI JAPAN, DBX MSCI USA and 
DBX MSCI World to obtain above average tracking errors.  
In terms of the consistency of the three tracking error methods, it is evident that there is a trend 
between ΤΕ1 and TE3 such that the difference between the two estimates is either one or two 
basis points. This finding concurs with the argument of Pope and Yadav (1994) when they 
assert that, if the beta coefficients of the linear regression presented in Table 6.2 are close to 
unity, ΤΕ1 and TE3 estimates should closely resemble each other. In this instance, ΤΕ1 and TE3 
estimates of Satrix 40 and RMB Mid Cap amount to 0.58% and 3.34% as they possess beta 
coefficients of 0.95 respectively. On the one hand, the trend between ΤΕ1 and TE3 is also 
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evident when it comes to the worst and best tracker funds. In this regard, the worst trackers are 
predominately international broad-market ETFs whilst the best trackers are a combination of 
domestic broad-market and sectorial based ETFs. When it comes to the performance of the 
DBX EuroStoxx50 and the DBX UK FTSE 100, the European debt crisis which occurred in 
2011 might have also contributed significantly towards the volatility of these funds underlying 
indices. 
When it comes to the comparable empirical studies, current results are in line to that of 
Rompotis (2006a), Shin et al. (2010), Rompotis (2012) as well as Chu (2013). These studies 
discovered consistency between ΤΕ1 and TE3 and also mentioned that domestic ETFs exhibit 
minimal tracking errors compared to their international counterparts. In terms of the of the 
tracking ability attribution, they also conclude that the diversity of the international broad-
market based ETFs target indices along with the time difference between different stock 
markets plays an integral role in causing sizeable tracking errors. With all that in mind, Table 
6.4 below provides the results of three main rational factors which explains the magnitude of 
the tracking errors documented above. 
 
A closer look at the independent variables, it is evident that all the tracking errors are positively 
associated with the TER and the volatility of the ETFs daily market price at a 10% significance 
level. Contrarily, the effect of dividend distribution and average daily trading volume appears 
to have negligible and insignificant influence towards the tracking error. Prior empirical work 
done by Meinhardt et al. (2012) as well as the most recent study of Naumenko and Chystiakova 
(2015) reveals that there is positive correlation between the TER which is a proxy of 
management fees and the amount of tracking error. As exhibited in the table below, current 
estimates of the TER concur to that argument. This further confirms why none of the individual 
ETFs beta coefficients exhibited in Table 6.2 was close to unity. 
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Table 6.4: Tracking error determinative factors 
 
Following the approach of Shin et al. (2010), Table 6.4 presents the summary from the cross-sectional linear regression 
with the average tracking error of the three methods as the dependant variable.  
 
𝑇𝐸𝑗,𝑡 =  𝑎1 + 𝑎2. 𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑡 + 𝑎3. 𝐷𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 + 𝑎4 . 𝑙𝑛𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝑎5. 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡 
 
The independent or explanatory variables are as follows: Total Expense Ratio (TER), daily volatility, the natural logarithm 
of the average daily trading volume and the return on dividends. The last row depicts the R-Squared which represents the 
relevance of the regression analysis.  
 
Variables TE1 TE2 TE3 
Intercept 0.044*** 0.012** 0.044*** 
𝐚𝟐. 𝐓𝐄𝐑𝐭 0.980* 0.421* 0.786* 
𝐚𝟑. 𝐃𝐕𝐨𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐲𝐭 0.160* 0.080* 0.173* 
𝐚𝟒 . 𝐥𝐧𝐕𝐨𝐥𝐮𝐦𝐞𝐭 -0.003*** -0.001* -0.003*** 
𝐚𝟓. 𝐃𝐢𝐯𝐢𝐝𝐞𝐧𝐝𝐭 -0.008*** -0.001* -0.007*** 
R-Squared (%) 74%*** 21%* 64%*** 
Note: * statistically significant at a 10% level, ** statistically significant at a 5% level, *** statistically significant at 1% 
level 
 
As with the daily volatility, positive and statistically significant coefficients indicates that the 
more the ETFs market price becomes volatile the more it diverges away from its target 
benchmark index. These findings contradict to the results of Shin et al. (2010) who concludes 
that the daily market price volatility are only statistically significant in relation to TE2. 
Considering the negative effect of the ETFs trading volume which is the proxy of the fund 
liquidity also concurs with the recent findings of Naumenko and Chystiakova (2015) from the 
Swiss market who concludes that high liquidity induces lower tracking error because of greater 
cash flows. Lastly, in terms of the impact of the dividends distribution, negative and 
insignificant coefficients suggest that cash-flow drag that occurs due to the fact that dividends 
are not re-invested also induce lower tracking error. Similarly, these findings support those of 
Meinhardt et al. (2012) but contrast with those of Chu (2013) from the Hong Kong ETFs 
market. For example, Chu (2013) finds that dividends yield are positively correlated to the 
tracking error mainly because of the delay between the ex-dividend day and the actual day 
when the fund managers received the cash as well as the non-reinvestment effect. 
Finally, with an exception of TE2, the R-Squared for the remaining tracking errors are 
statistically significant at a 1% significance level. This variation between these methods once 
again affirms the consistent pattern discovered between TE1 and TE3 as documented in Table 
6.3. Therefore, the logical inference which one could make from these overall findings is that 
all the four factors that have been incorporated in the regression analysis yield better 
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explanation of the tracking error either positive or negative effect. Having witnessed such 
tracking ability results during this period of examination, Section 6.3 provides the tracking 
ability results of the 12 ETFs that have been listed on the JSE prior the 2008 global financial 
crisis. 
 
6.3 Pre-global financial crisis results: (between launch date and 29 August 2008) 
In line with the pattern followed in the preceding section, Table 6.5 below provides the return 
and risk characteristics results of the 12 ETFs according to their underlying asset class 
categories. Considering the average return and risk from the table above, both the ETFs and 
the target benchmark indices exhibits mean daily returns of one basis point (0.01%) although 
ETFs appears to be more volatile as they obtain the standard deviation of 1.72% and compared 
to 1.37% of the underlying benchmark indices.  
 
This concurs with the findings in the prior section in spite the fact that the current estimates are 
relatively lower. With regard to the tracking ability of individual funds, the DBX MSCI JAPAN 
exhibit the highest return and risk estimates of -0.12% and 2.87% as opposed to -0.06% and 
1.78% of the MSCI Japan Equity index. Similarly, Satrix SWIX Top 40, Satrix FINI, Satrix 
RESI, DBX MSCI USA and DBX MSCI World demonstrate return and risk that is way higher 
than that of their target benchmark indices. Contrarily, Satrix 40, Satrix INDI, Satrix DIVI 
Plus, DBX EuroStoxx50 and DBX UK FTSE 100 possess daily returns that closely resemble 
that of their target indices but at relatively high level of risk. 
 
Finally, the last column in Table 6.5 reveals that the average number of observations or trading 
days amounted to 720 with the DBX MSCI JAPAN, DBX MSCI USA and DBX MSCI World 
exhibite the lowest trading days of 104 whilst Satrix 40 is examined for the longest duration of 
1938 days. In this regard, it is noticeable that ETFs that are examined for relatively shorter 
period namely Satrix DIVI Plus, CoreShares Proptrax SAPY, DBX MSCI JAPAN, DBX MSCI 
USA and DBX MSCI World demonstrates negative daily returns. These negative returns could 
potentially be attributable to both the shorter period of evaluation and also being the signal of 
the financial market crisis that was already affecting international markets. 
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Table 6.5: Daily percentage return and risk of ETFs and the corresponding target 
indices 
 
This table illustrates the average, minimum and maximum daily percentage return and standard deviation (risk) of the 12 ETFs 
and their corresponding benchmark indices from their respective inception date through the 29 August 2008. The last column 
exhibit number of trading days in which each of the ETF under review have been traded from their respective launch date until 
29 August 2008. 
 
Underlying 
Investment 
(Exposure) 
ETF Name 
Target benchmark 
index 
Return (%) 
Standard 
Deviation (%) 
Number of 
Observation 
(days) ETF Index ETF Index 
Domestic broad-
market 
Satrix 40 ** FTSE/JSE Top 40 0.07 0.07 1.38 1.31 1938 
Satrix SWIX Top 40 + 
FTSE/JSE SWIX Top 
40 
0.06 0.03 1.83 1.56 596 
Sector 
Satrix FINI + FTSE/JSE Financial 15 0.06 0.05 1.68 1.30 1633 
Satrix INDI ** FTSE/JSE Industrial 25 0.07 0.07 1.24 1.15 1633 
Satrix RESI + 
FTSE/JSE Resources 
20 
0.10 0.09 2.19 1.99 596 
Style Satrix DIVI Plus ** 
FTSE/JSE Dividend 
Plus 
-0.03 -0.03 1.88 1.38 250 
Listed-property 
CoreShares Proptrax 
SAPY + 
FTSE/JSE South 
African Property 
-0.05 -0.06 1.50 1.10 233 
International 
broad-market 
DBX  EuroStoxx50 ** EuroStoxx50 0.06 0.06 1.37 1.17 722 
DBX UK FTSE 100 ** FTSE 100 0.04 0.04 1.20 1.17 722 
DBX MSCI JAPAN + MSCI Japan Equity -0.12 -0.06 2.87 1.78 104 
DBX MSCI USA + MSCI US Equity -0.07 -0.08 1.30 1.42 104 
DBX MSCI World + MSCI World Equity -0.10 -0.11 2.16 1.11 104 
 
Average 0.01 0.01 1.72 1.37 720 
Minimum -0.12 -0.11 1.20 1.10 104 
Maximum 0.10 0.09 2.87 1.99 1938 
Note: *denotes replicated return and lower risk.  ** denotes replicated return and higher risk. *** denotes replicated return and 
risk. + denotes different return and risk. 
 
While the characteristics of return and risk reveals that ETFs fails to accurately mimic the 
movements of their target benchmark indices, Table 6.6 in the next page shed more light by 
demonstrating the tracking ability results from the single factor linear regression. The results 
from this linear regression aims to prove whether there is positive correlation between the mean 
return of the ETFs against that of their respective target benchmarks indices. Consistent with 
the results of the prior section, the average alpha coefficient is close to zero and statistically 
insignificant at the 5% level. Similarly, all the 12 ETFs under review also exhibit insignificant 
alpha coefficients that are close to zero. Practically, this implies that the fund managers have 
successfully mimicked the movements of their target benchmark indices.  
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As stated earlier, the beta coefficient and the R-Squared estimates are expected to be 
statistically significant if the ETFs under review holds the stocks at the same proportional 
weight as that of their target benchmark indices. Unlike the mean beta coefficient and R-
Squared of 0.58 and 34% observed in Section 6.2, the current results have improved as they 
are equivalent to 0.72 and 36% respectively. However, beta coefficients and R-Squared 
estimates of the individual funds have slightly declined but remain statistically significant. In 
this regard, Satrix 40 exhibit the highest level of beta coefficient and R-Squared of 0.94 and 
79% that are statistically significant at a 1% level. On the contrary, DBX UK FTSE 100 reveals 
10% significance level beta coefficient and R-Squared estimates of 0.37 and 13% respectively. 
This variation between Satrix 40 and the DBX UK FTSE 100 could potentially be attributable 
to the diversity of their underlying index. As with the DBX MSCI World, this argument fails 
to hold because it possess a beta coefficient and R-Squared estimates that amount to 0.91 and 
22% respectively. 
Table 6.6: Regression results of tracking ability 
 
This table provides the tracking ability performance results obtained from the following linear regression equation adopted 
from Milanos and Rompotis (2006): 
𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑭,𝒕 =  𝛂𝐢 + 𝒃𝐢 𝑹𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒙,𝒕 + 𝜺𝒕  
This regression equation denotes the linear relationship between the ETF return on day t (𝑹𝑬𝑻𝑭,𝒕) as the dependent variable 
against the daily return of its target benchmark index (𝑹𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒆𝒙,𝒕) on day t as the independent variable.  
 
Underlying Investment 
(Exposure) 
ETF Name 
Alpha(𝛂𝐢) Beta(𝒃𝐢) R-Squared 
(%) 
Domestic broad-market 
Satrix 40 0.00 0.94*** 79% 
Satrix SWIX Top 40 0.00 0.65* 31% 
Sector 
Satrix FINI 0.00 0.84* 42% 
Satrix INDI 0.00 0.81* 57% 
Satrix RESI 0.00 0.79* 52% 
Style Satrix DIVI Plus -0.00 0.82* 36% 
Listed-property CoreShares Proptrax SAPY 0.00 0.89 42% 
International broad-market 
DBX  EuroStoxx50 0.00 0.53* 21% 
DBX UK FTSE 100 0.00 0.37* 13% 
DBX MSCI JAPAN -0.00 0.65* 16% 
DBX MSCI USA -0.00 0.38*** 17% 
DBX MSCI World  0.00 0.91* 22% 
 Average 0.00 0.72 36% 
Note: * statistically significant at a 10% level, ** statistically significant at a 5% level, *** statistically significant at 1% 
level 
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Overall, the observed tracking ability results in Table 6.6 reveals that the mean returns of the 
12 ETFs are not fully correlated to that of their target benchmark indices, which implies that 
tracking error exists. In order to confirm this inference, Table 6.7 on the next page illustrates 
the summary of the average, minimum and maximum percentage of three tracking errors of the 
12 ETFs during this period of evaluation. 
When examining the results of TE1, it is clear that the average tracking error slightly increased 
from 1.31% in the prior section to 1.37% of the current examination period. In the similar vein, 
the minimum and maximum estimates also declined as shown by those of the current period 
which are equivalent to 0.64% and 2.64% against 0.39% and 3.34% reported in Section 6.2. 
During this period, Satrix 40 enjoys the lowest tracking error estimate of 0.64% relative 2.64% 
of the DBX MSCI JAPAN. Similar to the conclusion made earlier, the diversity of these ETF 
underlying indices might have contributed to such levels of tracking errors. In addition to that, 
this could potentially be attributable to the length of the examination period since Satrix 40 
have been examined for 1938 trading days as opposed to a mere 104 trading days in the case 
of DBX MSCI JAPAN.  
On the question of the best and worst tracker funds, the variation have changed relative to that 
of the prior section. During this period Satrix SWIX Top 40, Satrix RESI, Satrix DIVI Plus, 
DBX MSCI JAPAN and DBX MSCI World falls within the category of worst tracker funds as 
they possess TE1 estimates that are more than the mean of 1.37%. By contrast, Satrix 40, Satrix 
FINI, Satrix INDI, CoreShares Proptrax SAPY, DBX EuroStoxx50, DBX UK FTSE 100 and 
the DBX MSCI USA are within the category of the best tracking funds. In this regard, it is 
evident that the Satrix 40 and Satrix INDI exhibit tracking error estimates that are way below 
the mean. With respect to the tracking ability according to the investment style, DBX 
EuroStoxx50, DBX UK FTSE 100 and DBX MSCI USA which forms part of the international 
broad-market have improved their tracking performance as they obtained below average 
tracking errors which are even lower than those of their domestic and sectorial based 
counterparts. 
From the MAD or TE2 perspective, the average estimates have risen to 1.02% compared to 
0.79% documented in Table 6.3 in the preceding section. As with the minimum and maximum 
tracking errors, the trend is similar to that of TE1 as the Satrix 40 exhibits the lowest MAD of 
0.43% whilst DBX MSCI JAPAN possess the highest level of MAD that amount to 2.08%. By 
comparison, this range of TE2 estimates have widened compared to that of the prior 
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examination period which range between 0.36% and 1.60% respectively. When observing the 
best and worst trackers, the composition have changed slightly. The DBX MSCI JAPAN, DBX 
MSCI USA, DBX MSCI World, Satrix SWIX Top 40 and Satrix DIVI Plus falls under the 
category of the worst trackers as they exhibit MAD which exceed the average estimate. On the 
contrary, the remaining 6 ETFs which mostly provides investors with an exposure towards 
domestic broad-market, sectorial and listed property indices possess MAD that are lower than 
the mean on relative basis. As previously mentioned, the tracking efficiency of these domestic 
based ETFs is attributable to the liquidity of their underlying target benchmark indices. 
Table 6.7: Tracking error statistics (percentage) 
 
Table 6.7 reports the summary of the average, minimum and maximum percentage tracking errors for all the 12 ETFs over the 
period of evaluation. This have been achieved through the adoption Rompotis (2012) methodology of computing tracking errors 
which are as follows: TE1 denotes the error term of the tracking ability regression 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝐹,𝑡 =  αi + 𝑏i 𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥,𝑡 +  𝜀𝑡 , TE2 
expresses the mean absolute difference (MAD) between ETFs daily returns and that of its target benchmark index. TE3 is 
obtained through the quantification of the standard deviation of return differences the ETF and its corresponding target 
benchmark index.  
 
Underlying 
Investment 
(Exposure) 
ETF Name 
Standard 
Errors 
of Regression 
(ΤΕ1) 
Mean Absolute 
Return Difference 
(MAD) 
(TE2) 
Standard 
 Deviation of Returns 
Difference  
(TE3) 
Domestic 
broad-market 
Satrix 40 0.64 0.43 0.64 
Satrix SWIX Top 40 1.52 1.03 1.62 
Sector 
Satrix FINI 1.28 0.89 1.30 
Satrix INDI 0.81 0.61 0.84 
Satrix RESI 1.52 0.97 1.58 
Style Satrix DIVI Plus 1.50 1.15 1.52 
Listed-property CoreShares Proptrax SAPY 1.14 0.79 1.15 
International 
broad-market 
DBX  EuroStoxx50 1.22 0.97 1.34 
DBX UK FTSE 100 1.12 0.95 1.34 
DBX MSCI JAPAN 2.64 2.08 2.70 
DBX MSCI USA 1.19 1.16 1.47 
DBX MSCI World 1.91 1.22 1.91 
 Average 1.37 1.02 1.45 
Minimum 0.64 0.43 0.64 
Maximum 2.64 2.08 2.70 
Note: Estimates highlighted in bold represent values that are larger than the mean. 
 
While the average TE1 and TE2 have increased relative to that reported in Table 6.3, the mean 
of TE3 estimates have declined as it amount to 1.45% compared to 1.51% from the prior 
examination period. This decline might be attributable to the fact that the current period of 
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examination is relatively less compared to that of the prior section which covers various market 
conditions. In addition to the mean estimate, the range have also narrowed as that of previous 
section falls between 0.58% and 3.34% compared to 0.64% and 2.70% of the current period. 
In this instance, Satrix 40 once again exhibit the lowest tracking error of 0.64% whilst the DBX 
MSCI JAPAN suffers from the highest level of tracking error that amount to 2.70%. When 
observing other individual funds in terms of the best and worst average trackers, Satrix 40, 
Satrix FINI, Satrix INDI, CoreShares Proptrax SAPY, DBX  EuroStoxx50 and the DBX UK 
FTSE 100 falls under the category of the best trackers as they exhibit below average tracking 
error. Contrarily, Satrix SWIX Top 40, Satrix RESI, Satrix Divi Plus, DBX MSCI USA, DBX 
MSCI JAPAN and DBX MSCI World obtains TE3 that are relatively higher than the mean.  
On the question of the consistency of the three methods, the observed results provides evidence 
that TE1 and TE3 estimates closely resemble one another with few exception. For example, TE1 
and TE3 estimates of Satrix 40 and DBX MSCI World resemble one another because their beta 
coefficients which are illustrated in Table 6.6 are close to unity. This comes in agreement with 
the assertion of Pope and Yadav (1994) along with other prior empirical studies which suggests 
that whenever beta coefficient equate to unity, TE1 and TE3 estimates should resemble one 
another. As previously discussed, TE2 estimates are different from the other methods of 
evaluation mainly because MAD is not standardised. In sum, it is evident that irrespective of 
which method of tracking error estimation, Satrix 40 that replicates the FTSE/JSE Top 40 index 
is the best tracker fund across all observation. By contrast, the DBX MSCI JAPAN which 
mimics 318 constituents of the MSCI Japan equity index is the worst tracker fund.  
In terms of the tracking ability attribution, the liquidity of the FTSE/JSE Top 40 index might 
have contributed to the Satrix 40 being the best tracker whilst both the trading hours overlap 
between the JSE and Tokyo Stock Exchange along with the diversity of the MSCI Japan equity 
index influenced the DBX MSCI JAPAN to suffer from such magnitude of tracking error. 
When comparing the current results to those demonstrated by empirical studies that are 
conducted in other ETFs market prior the 2008 global financial crisis, it is evident that the 
current results are higher on relative basis. For instance, Gallagher and Segara (2005) reveals 
that the daily tracking error of 3 Australian ETFs range between 0.02% and 0.83% over the 
period dated 2 January 2002 to 31 December 2003. In the most recent work, Purohit and 
Maholtra (2015) reveals that the mean daily tracking errors of 5 Indian ETFs are as low as 
0.00% and as high as 0.04%. With that in mind, Table 6.8 below demonstrates the summary of 
the key determinates of these tracking errors namely, management fees (TER), volatility of the 
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ETFs daily market price, the natural logarithm of the average daily trading volume and return 
on dividends distribution.  
Table 6.8: Tracking error determinative factors 
  
Following the approach of Shin et al. (2010), Table 6.8 presents the summary from the cross-sectional linear regression with 
the average tracking error of the three methods as the dependant variable.  
 
𝑇𝐸𝑗,𝑡 =  𝑎1 + 𝑎2. 𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑡 + 𝑎3. 𝐷𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 + 𝑎4 . 𝑙𝑛𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝑎5. 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡 
 
The independent or explanatory variables are as follows: Total Expense Ratio (TER), daily volatility, the natural logarithm 
of the average daily trading volume and the return on dividends. The last row depicts the R-Squared which represents the 
relevance of the regression analysis.  
Variables TE1 TE2 TE3 
Intercept 0.061* 0.022** 0.025* 
𝐚𝟐. 𝐓𝐄𝐑𝐭 1.089** 0.277** 0.883** 
𝐚𝟑. 𝐃𝐕𝐨𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐲𝐭 0.715** 0.171** 0.340** 
𝐚𝟒 . 𝐥𝐧𝐕𝐨𝐥𝐮𝐦𝐞𝐭 -0.004* -0.002** -0.002* 
𝐚𝟓. 𝐃𝐢𝐯𝐢𝐝𝐞𝐧𝐝𝐭 -0.005** -0.003** -0.003** 
R-Squared (%) 59%** 61%** 61%** 
Note: * statistically significant at a 10% level, ** statistically significant at a 5% level, *** statistically significant at 1% level 
 
According to the results, all the tracking errors are positively influenced by the management 
fees (TER) and the daily volatility at the 5% statistical significance level. Contrarily, dividend 
distribution along with the liquidity of ETFs have insignificant influence towards the 
magnitude of the tracking errors. With regard to the TER, these results further affirms that 
management fees plays an integral role causing ETFs to possess tracking error, hence beta 
coefficients demonstrated in Table 6.6 did not equate to unity. Considering prior comparative 
studies, these results are in agreement with the findings of Rompotis (2011) when he finds that 
the level of tracking errors obtained by 50 iShare ETFs between 2 January 2002 and 31 
December 2007 are highly attributable to their expenses. On the one hand, significant influence 
of daily market price volatility could possibly be attributable to the reaction of market 
participants since the global financial market crisis have already affected most of the 
international markets. Pertaining to the trading volume, these results concurs to those of 
Naumenko and Chystiakova (2015) when they find that the trading volume have no impact 
towards the level of tracking errors of 35 Swiss ETFs. Lastly, statistically insignificant effect 
of dividend distribution is expected because the examination period is relatively short in such 
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a way that some of the ETFs might not have distributed dividends during the period under 
review.  
Considering the last row of Table 6.8, the R-Squared estimates of all the three methods are 
statically significant at the 5% level. This imply that more than 50% variability of the tracking 
errors are explained by these four rational factors. Practically, this suggests that there are other 
rational and irrational factors omitted from the regression that might yield further explanation 
of the tracking errors. In summary, the clear observation is that these 12 ETFs under review 
have failed to successfully imitate the movements of their target benchmark indices due the 
impact of management fees as well as the volatility of the daily market prices. With that being 
said, attention is shifted towards analysing the tracking ability of 16 ETFs that have been listed 
on the JSE during the turbulent market condition of the 2008 global financial crisis.  
 
6.4 Global financial crisis results: (between 1 September 2008 and 30 June 2009) 
As observed in Chapter 3, proponents of active investment management criticize passively 
managed investment products such as ETFs and index mutual funds by arguing that these 
investment vehicles thrive during the bullish market trend and plummet during the bearish 
market trend. This critique is based on the assumption that the performance of these passive 
investment vehicles is dependent on the movements of the target benchmark indices which they 
aim to replicate. Therefore, whenever the target benchmark index plummet in bearish market 
condition so is the ETF or index mutual fund, vice versa. Motivated by this argument, this 
segment of the chapter displays the tracking ability results of the 16 ETFs that have been listed 
on the JSE during the 2008 global financial crisis which lasted for 10 months between 1 
September 2008 and 30 June 2009.  
In Table 6.9 on the next page, the mean daily return of both the ETFs and their target benchmark 
indices amount to -0.04% respectively. These negative daily returns comes not as a surprise 
because during the period of financial market crisis most of the underlying benchmark indices 
plummeted severely. When it comes to the aspect of risk or volatility, ETFs appears to be more 
volatile than their target benchmark indices as they exhibit standard deviation of 2.75% 
compared to 2.37% for their target benchmark indices. By comparison, these standard deviation 
estimates of both ETFs and target benchmark indices are relatively higher compared to those 
reported in Section 6.2 and Section 6.3, which confirms the suggestion made earlier that the 
2008 global financial crisis caused significant volatility of the underlying benchmark indices. 
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Table 6.9: Daily percentage return and risk of ETFs and the corresponding target 
indices 
 
This table depicts the average, minimum and maximum daily percentage return and standard deviation (risk) of the 16 ETFs 
and their corresponding benchmark indices between the 01st September 2008 and the 30th June 2009. The last column exhibit 
the number of trading days in which each of the 16 ETFs have been traded during the crisis period.  
 
Underlying 
Investment 
(Exposure) 
ETF Name 
Target benchmark 
index 
Return (%) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(%) 
Number of 
Observation 
(days) 
ETF Index ETF Index 
Domestic 
broad-market 
Satrix 40 + FTSE/JSE Top 40 -0.09 -0.08 2.83 2.79 206 
Satrix SWIX Top 40 + FTSE/JSE SWIX Top 
40 
-0.06 -0.07 3.07 2.55 206 
RMB Top 40 + FTSE/JSE Top 40 0.06 0.07 2.64 2.64 174 
Sector 
Satrix FINI ** FTSE/JSE Financial 15 -0.04 -0.04 2.76 2.59 206 
Satrix INDI ** FTSE/JSE Industrial 25 -0.04 -0.04 2.22 2.06 206 
Satrix RESI + FTSE/JSE Resources 20 -0.11 -0.10 3.86 3.92 206 
Style 
Satrix DIVI Plus + FTSE/JSE Dividend 
Plus 
0.04 0.03 2.34 2.25 206 
Newfunds  Shari’ah  
Top 40 + 
FTSE/JSE Shari’ah Top 
40 
0.06 0.09 2.86 2.13 55 
Fundamentals 
Satrix Rafi 40 ** FTSE/JSE RAFI 40 
Total Return 
0.10 0.10 2.46 2.31 173 
Listed-
property 
CoreShares Proptrax 
SAPY + 
FTSE/JSE South 
African Property 
-0.05 -0.06 1.50 1.10 188 
Fixed-income Investec ZGOVI + FTSE/JSE GOVI 0.02 0.05 0.73 0.55 170 
International 
broad-market 
DBX  EuroStoxx50 + EuroStoxx50 -0.16 -0.15 2.45 2.61 206 
DBX UK FTSE 100 + FTSE 100 -0.16 -0.15 2.26 2.52 206 
DBX MSCI JAPAN + MSCI Japan Equity -0.02 -0.03 3.95 3.73 206 
DBX MSCI USA + MSCI US Equity -0.12 -0.14 3.05 2.25 206 
DBX MSCI World + MSCI World Equity -0.03 -0.14 5.06 1.86 206 
 Average -0.04 -0.04 2.75 2.37 189 
Minimum -0.16 -0.15 0.73 0.55 55 
Maximum 0.10 0.10 5.06 3.92 206 
*denotes replicated return and lower risk.  ** denotes replicated return and higher risk. *** denotes replicated return and 
risk. + denotes different return and risk. 
 
In terms of the tracking ability of individual funds, Satrix FINI, Satrix INDI and Satrix Rafi 40 
managed to obtain daily returns which closely replicate that of their target benchmark indices 
but at a relatively high level of risk. On the contrary, all the remaining 13 funds display daily 
returns and risk estimates that are different from that of their target benchmark indices. 
Considering the number of observations that are depicted in the last column, it is evident that 
the financial crisis lasted for an average of 189 trading days. In this instance, Newfunds 
Shari’ah Top 40 is examined for the lowest period of trading 55 days. Contrarily, Satrix 40, 
Satrix SWIX Top 40, Satrix FINI, Satrix INDI, Satrix RESI, Satrix DIVI Plus, DBX  
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EuroStoxx50, DBX UK FTSE 100, DBX MSCI JAPAN, DBX MSCI USA and DBX MSCI 
World are examined for the highest trading days of 206. One thing worth noting amongst the 
above mentioned 11 ETFs that are examined for 206 trading days is that all of them exhibit 
negative daily returns. In tandem with the argument made in the beginning of this section, 
negative daily returns of the 11 ETFs comes not as the surprise because their respective target 
benchmark indices also depicts negative returns. On the one hand, the Newfunds Shari’ah Top 
40, RMB Top 40, Satrix DIVI Plus, Satrix Rafi 40, CoreShares Proptrax SAPY and the Investec 
ZGOVI have relatively minimal trading days along with positive returns. The positive returns 
might have been attributable to the fact that these funds are examined at the tail end of the crisis 
period. With that in mind, the attention is now diverted on the tracking ability results that comes 
from the single-factor linear regression which is depicted in Table 6.10 below. 
In tandem with evidence from the preceding sections, both the mean and individual fund alpha 
coefficients are close to zero and statistically insignificant at the 5% level. This suggests that, 
in spite of the financial crisis, the 16 fund managers have a common goal of replicating the 
movements of their target benchmark indices instead of outperforming them. In order to 
achieve the goal of passively tracking the indices, fund managers should adopt the replication 
strategy wherein they buy and sell the constituent stocks at the same proportional weight as 
that of their target benchmark indices. In this regard, beta coefficients which are depicted on 
the fourth column of Table 6.10 should be equal to unity and also statistically significant. In 
addition to that, the R-Squared which measures the variability of the regression dependent 
variable that is explained by the independent variable is also expected to be statistically 
significant.  
According to the results, it is evident that the mean beta coefficient and R-Squared amounts to 
0.65 and 45% respectively. Expanding the analysis towards the performance of the individual 
funds, Satrix 40 exhibit the highest beta coefficient and R-Squared estimates of 0.96 and 91% 
which are statistically significant at the 10% level. In this instance, both the liquidity and less 
diversity of the FTSE/JSE Top 40 index might have caused such positive level of correlation. 
By contrast, the DBX MSCI USA possess the lowest beta coefficient and R-Squared estimates 
of -0.04 and 0.00% respectively. This could also be attributable to the diversity of the index 
since this fund replicates the top 600 U.S. stocks that have experienced high level of volatility 
since the financial crisis erupted there in the beginning of 2008. 
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Table 6.10: Regression results of tracking ability 
 
This table provides the tracking ability performance results obtained from the following linear regression equation 
adopted from Milanos and Rompotis (2006): 
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝐹,𝑡 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝑏𝑖  𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡  
This regression equation denotes the linear relationship between the ETF return on day t (𝑅𝐸𝑇𝐹,𝑡) as the dependent variable 
against the daily return of its target benchmark index (𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥,𝑡) on day t as the independent variable.  
 
Underlying Investment 
(Exposure) 
ETF Name Alpha(𝛂𝐢) Beta(𝒃𝐢) R-Squared 
(%) 
Domestic broad-market 
Satrix 40 -0.00 0.96* 91% 
Satrix SWIX Top 40 0.00 0.79* 43% 
RMB Top 40 -0.00 0.93** 86% 
Sector 
Satrix FINI -0.00 0.94* 77% 
Satrix INDI -0.00 0.81* 57% 
Satrix RESI -0.00 0.88** 80% 
Style 
Satrix DIVI Plus 0.00 0.80* 60% 
Newfunds  Shari’ah  Top40 0.00 0.66*** 24% 
Fundamentals Satrix Rafi 40 0.00 0.86* 65% 
Listed-property CoreShares Proptrax SAPY -0.00 0.72* 54% 
Fixed-income Investec ZGOVI 0.00 0.09* 1% 
International broad-
market 
DBX  EuroStoxx50 -0.00 0.52* 30% 
DBX UK FTSE 100 -0.00 0.50* 31% 
DBX MSCI JAPAN -0.00 0.39* 14% 
DBX MSCI USA -0.00 -0.04* 0% 
DBX MSCI World  0.00 0.55*** 4% 
 Average 0.00 0.65 45% 
Note: * statistically significant at a 10% level, ** statistically significant at a 5% level, *** statistically significant at 1% 
level 
 
In terms of replication ability by the underlying investment category, funds which provides 
investors with an exposure towards domestic-broad market, sector, style, fundamentals and 
listed property indices appears to have beta coefficients and R-Squared estimates that are 
statistically significant. Contrarily, DBX funds which provides investors with an exposure 
towards international broad-market equity indices possess relatively lower beta coefficient and 
R-Squared estimates due to the diversity of their underlying indices as well as the trading hours 
overlap. On the one hand, 0.09 and 1% beta and R-Squared estimates obtained by Investec 
ZGOVI are in line with the expectation since the correlation with the risk-free assets is expected 
to be zero. In essence, the observation in Table 6.10 highlight that all the 16 ETFs under review 
suffer from tracking error since none of them exhibit absolute correlation between their mean 
return and that of their target benchmark index.  
With that being said, Table 6.11 on the next page reports the summary of the actual average, 
minimum and maximum percentage tracking error for the 16 ETFs during the crisis period. As 
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the third column of Table 6.11 depicts, the average TE1 amount to 1.97%. Comparatively, this 
is the highest level of mean tracking error relative to 1.31% and 1.37% demonstrated in Section 
6.2 and Section 6.3 respectively. Similarly, the minimum and maximum percentage tracking 
errors of 0.73% and 4.97% are relatively high compared to those reported in the prior sections. 
In this particular period, the Investec ZGOVI is the best tracker as it exhibit the lowest TE1 
estimate of 0.73% whilst the DBX MSCI World performed poorly as it obtains the highest 
estimate of 4.97%.  
 
As for the other best and worst tracker funds, the trend is relatively similar to that in Table 6.7. 
In this regard, Satrix SWIX Top 40, Newfunds Shari’ah Top 40, DBX EuroStoxx50, DBX 
MSCI JAPAN, DBX MSCI USA and DBX MSCI World exhibits TE1 estimates that lies above 
the mean. On the contrary, all the remaining 11 funds falls under the category of the best 
trackers as they possess tracking error estimates that are below the average. On the same note, 
it is also noticeable that the best trackers are mostly the ETFs which provide investors with the 
exposure of domestic based underlying indices, unlike their international counterparts.  
 
On relative basis, the average TE2 or MAD have also surged up to 1.47% compared to 0.79% 
and 1.02% that are reported for the overall and pre-crisis period. The CoreShares Proptrax 
SAPY displays the lowest MAD of 0.60% whilst the DBX MSCI JAPAN appears to be the 
worst tracker by exhibiting the maximum MAD of 3.10%. With respect to the performance of 
other individual funds, all the international broad-market ETFs and the Newfunds Shari’ah Top 
40 are found to be the worst trackers as they obtained MAD estimates which are higher than 
the average. Contrarily, the remaining 11 funds have MAD estimates that are below the 
average. In the case of ΤΕ3, all the estimates appeared to have more than double those depicted 
in Section 6.2 and Section 6.3. The average tracking error amounts to 2.13% whilst the 
CoreShares Proptrax SAPY and DBX MSCI World possess the lowest and highest estimates 
of 0.85% and 5.03% respectively. 
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Table 6.11: Tracking error statistics (percentage) 
 
Table 6.11 reports the summary of the average, minimum and maximum percentage tracking errors for the 16 ETFs over 
the period of evaluation. This have been achieved through the adoption Rompotis (2012) methodology of computing 
tracking errors which are as follows: TE1 denotes the error term of the tracking ability regression 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝐹,𝑡 =  αi +
𝑏i 𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 , TE2 expresses the mean absolute difference (MAD) between ETFs daily returns and that of its target 
benchmark index. TE3 is obtained through the quantification of the standard deviation of return differences the ETF and its 
corresponding target benchmark index.  
 
Underlying Investment 
(Exposure) 
ETF Name 
Standard 
Errors 
of  
Regression 
(ΤΕ1) 
Mean Absolute 
Return 
Difference 
(TE2) 
Standard 
Deviation of 
Returns 
Difference 
(TE3) 
Domestic broad-market 
Satrix 40 0.87 0.65 0.87 
Satrix SWIX Top 40 2.31 1.46 2.36 
RMB Top 40 0.98 0.61 0.99 
Sector 
Satrix FINI 1.32 1.04 1.32 
Satrix INDI 1.45 0.90 1.50 
Satrix RESI 1.74 1.27 1.79 
Style 
Satrix DIVI Plus 1.50 1.21 1.57 
Newfunds  Shari’ah  Top 40 2.51 2.13 2.59 
Fundamentals Satrix Rafi 40 1.47 0.96 1.50 
Listed-property CoreShares Proptrax SAPY 0.78 0.60 0.85 
Fixed-income Investec ZGOVI 0.73 0.61 0.88 
International broad-
market 
DBX EuroStoxx50 2.05 1.78 2.40 
DBX UK FTSE 100 1.89 1.73 2.27 
DBX MSCI JAPAN 3.68 3.10 4.32 
DBX MSCI USA 3.05 2.71 3.84 
DBX MSCI World  4.97 2.70 5.03 
 Average 1.96 1.47 2.13 
Minimum 0.73 0.60 0.85 
Maximum 4.97 3.10 5.03 
Note: Estimates highlighted in bold represent values that are larger than the mean. 
 
In terms of the best and worst tracker funds, the composition is relatively the same as that of 
TE1, whereby Satrix SWIX Top 40, Newfunds Shari’ah Top 40, DBX EuroStoxx50, UK FTSE 
100, DBX MSCI JAPAN, DBX MSCI USA and DBX MSCI World have tracking errors that 
are above the mean. By contrast, all the remaining 9 domestic funds have TE3 estimates that 
are below the mean.  
Having witnessed such sizeable tracking error estimates from these three diverse methods, it is 
noticeable that there is a similar trend between TE1 and TE3.  As mentioned earlier, this comes 
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not as a surprise because none of the beta coefficients reported in Table 6.10 equal to unity. On 
the one hand, the fact that all the international based ETFs have above average estimates 
consistently is also expected because of the diversity of their underlying indices as well as the 
trading hours overlap between their markets and the JSE. For example, sizeable amount of 
tracking error obtained by the DBX MSCI World which replicates the portfolio of 1643 
worldwide stocks is also expected because this financial crisis was a global phenomenon.  
In terms of comparable studies, tracking errors results depicted in Table 6.11 are relatively high 
compared to that of Maister et al. (2010) who noted that the U.S. listed ETFs obtained the daily 
average and weighted average tracking errors of 1.25% and 1.13% during the crisis period. 
Further to this, these authors also reveals that the average and weighted average tracking errors 
for funds which replicate international indices range between 1.94% and 2.32% during the 
period of the financial crisis as opposed to 0.65% and 0.92% prior the crisis. Moreover, 
exceptional tracking ability of the CoreShares Proptrax SAPY which mimics the performance 
of the property index contradicts to the findings documented by Qadan and Yagil (2012). These 
authors finds that tracking errors for the U.S. ETFs that mimics the real estate indices are 
significantly high during the 2008 financial crisis. From the London Stock Exchange, Mateus 
and Rahmani (2014) also reveals sizeable amount of tracking errors during the crisis period. 
With respect to the performance attribution analysis, all these comparative studies cited that 
such sizeable amount of tracking errors are induced by management fees, volatile exchange 
rate, wide bid and ask spread and also small trading volumes. With that in mind, Table 6.12 
demonstrates the impact of other possible explanatory factors of the tracking errors.  
During this period of market upheaval, the tracking errors of the 16 ETFs under review appears 
to be influenced by the effect of management fees as well as the volatility of the daily market 
prices. On the other hand, trading volume and dividends distribution possess statistically 
insignificant effect in explaining the occurrence of the tracking errors. Taking a closer look at 
the TER, it is noticeable that all the coefficients have more than double compared to those 
documented in Section 6.2 and Section 6.3. This agrees to prior empirical literature which 
alludes to the fact that the fees in which fund managers incur when replicating and also 
rebalancing their portfolios tend to give rise to the tracking errors. Similarly, these results 
confirms why none of the beta coefficients demonstrated in Table 6.10 are not precisely equal 
to unity. 
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Table 6.12: Tracking error determinative factors 
 
Following the approach of Shin et al. (2010), Table 6.12 presents the summary from the cross-sectional linear regression 
with the average tracking error of the three methods as the dependant variable.  
 
𝑇𝐸𝑗,𝑡 =  𝑎1 + 𝑎2. 𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑡 + 𝑎3. 𝐷𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 + 𝑎4 . 𝑙𝑛𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝑎5. 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡 
 
The independent or explanatory variables are as follows: Total Expense Ratio (TER), daily volatility, the natural logarithm 
of the average daily trading volume and the return on dividends. The last row depicts the R-Squared which represents the 
relevance of the regression analysis.  
 
Variables TE1 TE2 TE3 
Intercept 0.023* 0.021** 0.023* 
𝐚𝟐. 𝐓𝐄𝐑𝐭 2.384** 2.100*** 3.286** 
𝐚𝟑. 𝐃𝐕𝐨𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐲𝐭 0.230* 0.060* 0.146* 
𝐚𝟒 . 𝐥𝐧𝐕𝐨𝐥𝐮𝐦𝐞𝐭 -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001* 
𝐚𝟓. 𝐃𝐢𝐯𝐢𝐝𝐞𝐧𝐝𝐭 -0.010* -0.008*** -0.011** 
R-Squared (%) 61%** 78%*** 68%*** 
Note: * statistically significant at a 10% level, ** statistically significant at a 5% level, *** statistically significant at 1% 
level 
 
On the one hand, daily volatility coefficients appears to have positive contribution towards the 
tracking errors at the 10% significance level. This suggests that the volatility of the underlying 
indices due to the market upheavals is translated to the ETFs daily market prices. In this 
instance, the combination between TER and the daily volatility of ETFs market price in 
inducing tracking errors is expected since the financial crisis causes high level volatility of the 
underlying indices which result into wider spread between the biding and the selling prices.  
Considering the influence of the trading volume and dividends distribution, it is evident that 
both variables have insignificant contribution towards the levels of tracking errors during this 
period of examination. In the case of trading volume, the very fact that ETFs market price were 
extremely volatile could partly explain why liquidity did not induce tracking errors. On the 
other hand, since the crisis period lasted for the maximum of 206 trading days, insignificant 
effect of this variable is expected because some of the funds might not have distributed 
dividends over this period of evaluation. Comparatively, the results from Table 6.12 concurs  
with the evidence presented by both Qadan and Yagil (2012) as well as Mateus and Rahmani 
(2014) when they note that significant tracking errors during the financial crisis are highly 
associated with the trading cost and the price volatility. 
With respect to the regression fit, the R-Squared indicates that the TER, daily volatility, trading 
volume and dividends distribution explaine 61%, 78% and 68% of the three methods of 
tracking errors. Thus proves that other factors that are not included in the regression could also 
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yield better explanation of these tracking errors. Overall, insightful inference that can be drawn 
from the results of this section is that 16 ETFs under review battled to fulfil their investment 
mandate of successfully mimicking their target benchmark indices. This agrees to arguments 
made by the proponents of active investment management when they asserted that ETFs suffer 
from high level of tracking errors during the period of market upheavals because the underlying 
indices tend to plummet severely. Having critically analysed the ability of fund managers to 
track their target benchmark indices during turbulent times in the capital markets, Section 6.5 
exhibits the tracking ability of the 19 ETFs during the recovery phase.  
 
6.5 Post-global financial crisis results: (between 1 July 2009 and 30 September 2015) 
As discussed earlier, ETFs are one of the index tracking investment vehicle which yields 
positive returns whenever its target benchmark index records positive returns, vice versa. In an 
attempt to prove the validity of this inference, this section of the chapter aims to establish 
whether the 19 JSE listed ETFs have recovered from the 2008 global financial crisis. This is 
also done in order to make a comparative analysis with all the prior sections along with the 
findings documented by empirical studies that are conducted in various market particularly 
during this period of market recovery. In this regard, Table 6.13 on the next page illustrates the 
raw return and risk results of all the ETFs under review according to their respective underlying 
investment strategies.  
When evaluating the average estimates, it is noticeable that the daily return and risk of the 
ETFs amounted to 0.05% and 1.47% whilst that of their target benchmark indices equate to 
0.05% and 1.04% respectively. This suggests that ETFs are more volatile than their target 
benchmark indices in spite of the fact that the markets are experiencing a recovery phase. It is 
also evident that the volatility of the ETFs is relatively less as opposed to those reported before 
and during the 2008 global financial crisis. Taking a closer look at the tracking ability of 
individual funds, it is evident that the pattern is relatively similar to that reported in Table 6.1 
when exhibiting the overall examination period results. For instance, the RMB Mid Cap display 
the highest daily return and risk difference of -0.08% versus 0.03% of the FTSE/JSE Mid-Cap 
along with the standard deviation of 3.40% and 0.68% respectively. 
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Table 6.13: Daily percentage return and risk of ETFs and the corresponding target 
indices 
 
Table 6.13 presents the average, minimum and maximum daily percentage return and standard deviation (risk) of the 19 
ETFs and their corresponding benchmark indices post the 2008 global financial crisis The last column exhibit number of 
days in which each of the 19 ETFs under review have been traded between the 1July 2009 and 30 September 2015.  
 
 
Underlying 
Investment 
(Exposure) 
ETF Name 
Target benchmark 
index 
Return (%) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(%) 
Number of 
Observation 
(days) 
ETF Index ETF Index 
Domestic 
broad-market 
Satrix 40 ** FTSE/JSE Top 40 0.06 0.06 1.11 1.08 1561 
Satrix SWIX Top 40 ** FTSE/JSE SWIX Top 40 0.06 0.06 1.17 1.05 1561 
RMB Top 40 ** FTSE/JSE Top 40 0.06 0.06 1.09 1.08 1561 
Stanlib Top 40 ** FTSE/JSE Top 40 0.05 0.05 1.58 1.04 1234 
Stanlib SWIX 40 + FTSE/JSE SWIX Top 40 0.06 0.05 1.40 1.03 1234 
Sector 
Satrix FINI ** FTSE/JSE Financial 15 0.07 0.07 1.17 1.08 1561 
Satrix INDI *** FTSE/JSE Industrial 25 0.09 0.09 1.01 1.01 1561 
Satrix RESI ** FTSE/JSE Resources 20 0.00 0.00 1.59 1.51 1561 
RMB Mid Cap + FTSE/JSE Mid-Cap -0.08 0.03 3.40 0.68 777 
Style 
Satrix DIVI Plus ** FTSE/JSE Dividend Plus 0.04 0.04 1.19 0.90 1561 
Newfunds Shari’ah Top 
40+ 
FTSE/JSE Shari’ah Top 
40 
0.06 0.04 3.03 1.28 1561 
Fundamentals 
Satrix Rafi 40 * FTSE/JSE RAFI 40 Total 
Return 
0.06 0.06 1.05 1.17 1561 
Listed-
property 
CoreShares Proptrax 
SAPY + 
FTSE/JSE South African 
Property 
0.06 0.05 0.92 0.75 1561 
Fixed-income Investec ZGOVI + FTSE/JSE GOVI 0.01 0.04 0.51 0.42 1143 
International 
broad-market 
DBX EuroStoxx 50 + EuroStoxx50 0.06 0.05 2.16 1.38 1561 
DBX UK FTSE 100 ** FTSE 100 0.06 0.06 1.12 1.05 1561 
DBX MSCI JAPAN + MSCI Japan Equity 0.07 0.06 1.85 1.51 1561 
DBX MSCI USA ** MSCI US Equity 0.09 0.09 1.28 0.92 1561 
DBX MSCI World + MSCI World Equity 0.08 0.07 1.22 0.85 1561 
 Average 0.05 0.05 1.47 1.04 1463 
Minimum  -0.08 0.00 0.51 0.42 777 
Maximum 0.09 0.09 3.40 1.51 1561 
Note: Investec ZGOVI is examined from 1st July 2009 till 21 January 2014 when it was delisted on the JSE. * denotes 
replicated return and lower risk.  ** denotes replicated return and higher risk. *** denotes replicated return and risk. + 
denotes different return and risk. 
 
Conversely, Satrix INDI is the exceptional fund which exhibit daily return and risk that closely 
resemble that of the FTSE/JSE Industrial 25. In addition to that, Satrix Rafi 40 also display 
replicated returns of 0.06% and the lowest level of risk of 1.05% versus 1.17% of the FTSE/JSE 
RAFI 40 Total Return index. With respect to tracking ability of the remaining funds, it is visible 
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that Satrix 40, Satrix SWIX Top 40, RMB Top 40, Stanlib Top 40, Satrix FINI, Satrix RESI, 
Satrix DIVI Plus, DBX UK FTSE 100 and DBX MSCI USA demonstrates daily returns which 
replicated that of their target benchmark indices at a relatively high level of risk. In addition, 
the RMB Mid Cap, Stanlib SWIX 40, Newfunds Shari’ah Top 40, CoreShares Proptrax SAPY, 
Investec ZGOVI, DBX EuroStoxx 50, DBX MSCI JAPAN and DBX MSCI World appears to 
be the funds that have returns and risk characteristics that are different from those of their target 
benchmark indices.     
Expanding the analysis to the last column of Table 6.13, it is evident that the average trading 
days over this period of examination amounted to 1463 which is relatively higher than those of 
Section 6.3 and Section 6.4 respectively. In terms of the lowest number of observation, the 
RMB Mid Cap exhibit 777 trading days along with the Investec ZGOVI which is examined for 
1143 days till the 21 January 2014 when it was delisted from the JSE. On the one hand, with 
an exception of the Stanlib Top 40 and Stanlib SWIX Top 40 all the remaining funds are 
examined for the maximum days of 1561. Consistent with the evidence presented in Section 
6.2, current results suggests that ETFs which provides investors with an exposure towards 
domestic broad-market, sectorial and fundamental indices replicates their target benchmark 
indices way better than their counterparts. Considering other comparative studies, the tracking 
ability of the RMB Mid Cap is in line with the evidence of Paliwal (2014) who reveals that the 
iShares Core S&P Mid-Cap ETF underperform its underlying index (S&P Mid-Cap 400) by 
0.03% on a daily basis between 2007 and 2012. 
In Table 6.14, the tracking ability results from linear regression suggests that the mean and 
individual funds alpha coefficients are close to zero and statistically insignificant. On the one 
hand, average beta and R-Squared estimates of 0.68 and 37% are statistically significant at the 
5% level. Comparatively, current estimates are related to 0.65 and 43% estimates revealed by 
Naumenko and Chystiakova (2015) when they examined the tracking ability of 35 Swiss ETFs 
between August 2012 and August 2014. On the question of individual funds, the outliers are 
similar to those demonstrated in Table 6.2. During this period, RMB Top 40 presents the 
highest beta coefficient and R-Squared estimates of 0.99 and 95% respectively. This suggests 
that the fund managers are buying and selling the stocks at an approximately the same 
proportion as that of the FTSE/JSE Top 40 index. Similarly, all the domestic ETFs which 
mimics broad-market equities, sector, style, fundamental and listed- property obtaines beta 
coefficient and R-Squared estimates that are not far from unity at the same time being 
statistically significant at the 1% level.   
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Table 6.14: Regression results of tracking ability 
 
This table provides the tracking ability performance results obtained from the following regression equation adopted from 
Milanos and Rompotis (2006): 
𝑅𝐸𝑇𝐹,𝑡 =  αi + 𝑏i 𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡  
The regression equation above denotes relationship between the ETF return on day t (𝑅𝐸𝑇𝐹,𝑡) as the dependent variable 
against the daily return of its respective target benchmark index (𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥,𝑡) as the independent variable.  
 
Underlying Investment 
(Exposure) 
ETF Name Alpha(𝛂𝐢) Beta(𝒃𝐢) R-Squared 
(%) 
Domestic broad-market 
Satrix 40 0.00 0.95*** 85% 
Satrix SWIX Top 40 0.00 0.84* 56% 
RMB Top 40 0.00 0.99** 95% 
Stanlib Top 40 0.00 0.56* 14% 
Stanlib SWIX 40 0.00 0.65* 23% 
Sector 
Satrix FINI 0.00 0.84*** 60% 
Satrix INDI 0.00 0.91*** 82% 
Satrix RESI 0.00 0.93*** 79% 
RMB Mid Cap -0.00 0.95* 14% 
Style 
Satrix DIVI Plus 0.00 0.84* 40% 
Newfunds Shari’ah Top40 0.00 0.61* 7% 
Fundamentals Satrix Rafi 40 0.00 0.62* 48% 
Listed-property CoreShares Proptrax SAPY 0.00 0.51* 18% 
Fixed-income Investec ZGOVI 0.00 -0.05* 0% 
International broad-
market 
DBX EuroStoxx50 0.00 0.68* 19% 
DBX UK FTSE 100 0.00 0.59* 31% 
DBX MSCI JAPAN 0.00 0.43* 12% 
DBX MSCI USA 0.00 0.44* 10% 
DBX MSCI World  0.00 0.64* 20% 
 Average 0.00 0.68 37% 
Note: * statistically significant at a 10% level, ** statistically significant at a 5% level, *** statistically significant at 1% 
level 
 
In direct contrast to that, Investec ZGOVI exhibit insignificant beta coefficient and R-Squared 
estimates of -0.05 and 0.00%. As mentioned earlier, this performance is attributable to the fact 
that the correlation to the risk-free proxy such as the FTSE/JSE GOVI should be zero. In line 
with the evidence from Table 6.10, it is evident that ETFs which provide investors with an 
exposure to the international broad-market equities exhibits relatively low beta coefficient and 
R-Squared estimates because of the diversity of their target benchmark indices as well as the 
trading hours overlap. This agrees with the argument of Rompotis (2012) when he concludes 
6-30 
 
 
that funds which imitate international indices tend to suffer from tracking inefficiency 
compared to the domestic counterparts mainly because of the trading hours overlap. Overall, 
evidence from Table 6.14 suggests that fund managers are not effectively replicating their 
underlying indices, thus result to a tracking error. 
In Table 6.15 on the next page, tracking errors are depicted according to the three commonly 
used methodology, first being the standard error term of the linear regression presented above 
in Table 6.14. According to the mean results, TE1 have improved extensively as it amount to 
1.17% compared to 1.31%, 1.37% and 1.97% presented in Section 6.2 through Section 6.4. In 
line with TE1 estimates documented in Table 6.3, the minimum and maximum estimates are 
associated with the funds provided by the RMB namely the RMB Top 40 and the RMB Mid 
Cap. With regards to the range of the return deviation, the minimum estimate obtained by the 
RMB Top 40 amount to 0.43% whilst the maximum estimate obtained by the RMB Mid Cap 
remained the same at 3.34%. In accordance to the evidence in Table 6.3, over and above the 
RMB Mid Cap above the mean tracking error are attained by the Stanlib Top 40, SWIX 40, 
Newfunds Shari’ah Top 40, DBX EuroStoxx50 and DBX MSCI USA. Similarly, in the case 
of the remaining 13 funds of which majority of them mimic local-based indices, TE1 estimates 
are way below the mean. This suggest that domestic-based ETFs, with few exception tracks 
their underlying indices effectively compared to their international counterparts.  
 
Taking a closer look at the result of the MAD or TE2, the current mean estimate is also 
comparatively minimal compared to that demonstrated in all the preceding sub-periods. In the 
same note, the range have also narrowed as the RMB Top 40 possess the lowest tracking error 
of 0.08% whilst the DBX MSCI JAPAN suffer from the highest level of 1.37%. In tandem with 
the evidence reported in Table 6.11, all the international broad-market ETFs and the Newfunds 
Shari’ah Top 40 possess MAD estimates that are above the average of 0.60%. Contrarily, the 
remaining 13 ETFs have depicts below average MAD with the funds which mimics the 
FTSE/JSE Top 40 namely, Satrix 40 and the RMB Top 40 obtaining the lowest estimates of 
0.27% and 0.08% respectively. The exceptional performance of these 2 funds could potentially 
be attributable to the liquidity of the underlying index. 
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Table 6.15: Tracking errors statistics (percentage) 
 
Table 6.15 reports the summary of the average, minimum and maximum percentage tracking errors for all the 19 ETFs over 
the period of evaluation. This have been achieved through the adoption Rompotis (2012) methodology of computing 
tracking errors which are as follows: TE1 denotes the error term of the tracking ability regression 𝑅𝐸𝑇𝐹,𝑡 =  αi +
𝑏i 𝑅𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡 , TE2 expresses the mean absolute difference (MAD) between ETFs daily returns and that of its target 
benchmark index. TE3 is obtained through the quantification of the standard deviation of return differences the ETF and its 
corresponding target benchmark index.  
 
Underlying 
Investment (Exposure) 
ETF Name 
Standard Errors 
of Regression  
(ΤΕ1) 
Mean Absolute 
Return 
Difference  
(TE2) 
Standard 
Deviation of 
Returns 
Difference 
(TE3) 
Domestic broad-
market 
Satrix 40 0.43 0.27 0.43 
Satrix SWIX Top 40 0.78 0.48 0.79 
RMB Top 40 0.24 0.08 0.24 
Stanlib Top 40 1.46 0.58 1.53 
Stanlib SWIX 40 1.22 0.55 1.27 
Sector 
Satrix FINI 0.75 0.47 0.77 
Satrix INDI 0.43 0.29 0.44 
Satrix RESI 0.72 0.46 0.73 
RMB Mid Cap 3.34 0.36 3.34 
Style 
Satrix DIVI Plus 0.92 0.56 0.93 
Newfunds  Shari’ah  Top 40 2.93 1.18 2.97 
Fundamentals Satrix Rafi 40 0.76 0.53 0.88 
Listed-property CoreShares Proptrax SAPY 0.83 0.58 0.91 
Fixed-income Investec ZGOVI 0.51 0.45 0.68 
International broad-
market 
DBX  EuroStoxx50 1.95 0.87 2.00 
DBX UK FTSE 100 0.93 0.71 1.03 
DBX MSCI JAPAN 1.73 1.37 1.93 
DBX MSCI USA 1.21 0.89 1.32 
DBX MSCI World  1.10 0.77 1.14 
 Average 1.17 0.60 1.23 
Minimum 0.24 0.08 0.24 
Maximum 3.34 1.37 3.34 
Note: Estimates highlighted in bold represent values that are larger than the mean. 
 
Finally, the results of TE3 reveals that the mean estimate amount to 1.23% whilst the RMB Top 
40 and Mid Cap achieved the lowest and highest estimates of 0.24% and 3.34% respectively. 
Taking a closer look at the best and worst tracker funds, there is a similar trend as that of ΤΕ1 
whereby the RMB Mid Cap, Stanlib Top 40, Stanlib SWIX 40, Newfunds Shari’ah Top 40, 
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DBX EuroStoxx50 and DBX MSCI USA demonstrates tracking error estimates that are above 
the mean. In the similar vein, out of the 13 remaining funds, Satrix 40 and RMB Top 40 appears 
to have the lowest amount of tracking error. 
In light of that view, the tracking error results depicted in Table 6.15 also reveals the strong 
connection between TE1 and TE3. For example, Satrix 40, Satrix SWIX Top 40, RMB Top 40, 
Satrix FINI, Satrix INDI, Satrix RESI, Satrix DIVI Plus and RMB Mid Cap have TE1 and TE3 
which resemble each other because their beta coefficients which are displayed in Table 6.14 
are relatively closer to unity. In addition to that, the tracking error estimates have declined 
during this period irrespective of which method of estimation purely because the underlying 
indices have also regained positive movements from the market upheaval. In the case of the 
international-based funds which suffer from high level of tracking errors, the diversity of their 
underlying indices and the trading hours overlap which have contributed to that such sizeable 
amount of tracking errors. When it comes to the performance of the DBX EuroStoxx50 and the 
DBX UK FTSE 100, the European debt crisis which occurred in 2011 might have also 
contributed significantly towards the volatility of these ETFs underlying indices. On the one 
hand, the fact that the RMB Mid Cap is examined for 777 trading days as opposed to other 
funds that have been examined for 1561 day, noise in the market during that remaining 777 
days might have contributed to such high level of tracking errors. 
By comparison, the results depicted in Table 6.15 are relatively higher than those documented 
by Mateus and Rahmani (2014). These authors reveals that the tracking errors of ETFs listed 
in the London Stock Exchange, post the crisis falls within the range of 0.13% and 0.41% 
compared to the 0.54% and 1.22% during the crisis period. With all that in mind, the mere fact 
that tracking errors are recorded for all these 19 ETFs confirms that external factors plays an 
important role in causing such tracking inefficiency. In light of that view, Table 6.16 
demonstrates the results of the regression model which examined the rational explanatory 
variables of the three measures of tracking errors. In line with the expectation, TER which is 
the proxy of management fees appears to have positive contribution towards all the three kinds 
of tracking errors at the 1% significance level. This highlight that management fees plays an 
integral role in explaining the magnitude of tracking errors irrespective of which market 
condition. In terms of the impact in which daily volatility of ETFs market price have towards 
the tracking ability of the fund managers, the results are different from those of the three 
preceding sections.  
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Table 6.16: Tracking error determinative factors 
 
Following the approach of Shin et al. (2010), Table 6.16 presents the summary from the cross-sectional linear regression 
with the average tracking error of the three methods as the dependant variable.  
 
𝑇𝐸𝑗,𝑡 =  𝑎1 + 𝑎2. 𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑡 + 𝑎3. 𝐷𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡 + 𝑎4 . 𝑙𝑛𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑡 + 𝑎5. 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 + 𝑒𝑡 
 
The independent or explanatory variables are as follows: Total Expense Ratio (TER), daily volatility, the natural logarithm 
of the average daily trading volume and the return on dividends. The last row depicts the R-Squared which represents the 
relevance of the regression analysis.  
 
Variables TE1 TE2 TE3 
Intercept 0.049*** 0.014** 0.050*** 
𝐚𝟐. 𝐓𝐄𝐑𝐭 1.126* 0.815* 1.279* 
𝐚𝟑. 𝐃𝐕𝐨𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐲𝐭 -0.013* -0.030* -0.076* 
𝐚𝟒 . 𝐥𝐧𝐕𝐨𝐥𝐮𝐦𝐞𝐭 -0.003*** -0.001** -0.003*** 
𝐚𝟓. 𝐃𝐢𝐯𝐢𝐝𝐞𝐧𝐝𝐭 -0.009*** -0.003** -0.009*** 
R-Squared (%) 69%*** 63%** 71%*** 
Note: * statistically significant at a 10% level, ** statistically significant at a 5% level, *** statistically significant at 1% 
level 
 
During this recovery phase, all the daily volatility variables are negative and statistically 
significant at the 10% level. This implies that the recovery of financial markets have resulted 
into less amount of tracking error because the underlying benchmark indices tend to exhibit 
positive returns. This inference is consistent with that of Shanmugham and Zabiulla (2012) 
when they find that the first-ever launched ETF in India, Nifty BeES portrays sizeable amount 
of tracking error during the bearish market condition as opposed to the period when the Indian 
market have experienced bullish trend.   
In tandem with the current findings, Meinhardt et al. (2012) also finds that management fees 
have significant influence towards the level of tracking errors with the coefficients that range 
between 0.59 and 1.06 at the 1% significance level. On the one hand, Chu (2013) from the 
Hong Kong ETFs market finds that management fees have negative influence towards the 
magnitude of the tracking errors but the opposite is true in the case of dividend yields. 
Contrarily, dividends and average daily trading volume have a negative and immaterial 
influence towards the level of tracking errors. On the same note, Meinhardt et al. (2012) reveals 
that the trading volume and dividend distribution have significant impact at the tracking errors 
but at a much lower pace. 
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With respect to the variability of the tracking errors that is explained by these four variables, 
the R-Squared suggests that the bulk of the tracking errors are attributable to these factors at 
the 1% significance level. Therefore, it is safe to infer that factors that are excluded from the 
regression might have significant explanatory power. In sum, the empirical results documented 
in this section suggests that the 19 ETFs fails to accurately imitate the movements of their 
target benchmark indices due to the management fees in which they incur whenever they 
rebalance their portfolios. This concurs with Naumenko and Chystiakova (2015) who notes 
that expense ratio which is also the proxy for management fees have significant influence 
towards the tracking inability of 35 Swiss ETFs. Having critically investigated these tracking 
ability results, Section 6.6 below, provides both the summary and the conclusion of the chapter. 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
As mentioned in the introductory section, this chapter aimed to provide an answer to the main 
question which surround ETFs as the passive investment vehicle. Amongst the academics and 
investment professionals, the conversation about ETFs revolves around their ability to 
accurately mimic the movements of their target benchmark indices. To the best knowledge of 
the author in the time of writing, this is the first empirical study to extensively investigate 
whether 19 ETFs’ fund managers successfully replicate the performance of their target 
benchmark indices between their respective launch dates and 30th September 2015. In addition 
to that, this study also took a different approach from other prior empirical studies and observed 
the tracking ability of these 19 ETFs prior, during and post the 2008 global financial crisis. The 
primary purpose of this exercise is to gain insight about the influence in which the financial 
crisis have towards the ETFs tracking ability. In line with the methodology of prior empirical 
studies, the tracking ability tests are computed through the use of raw return and risk 
characteristics, linear regression and the traditional tracking error measures. In order make a 
meaningful conclusion, these three commonly used methods of tracking errors are regressed 
against possible explanatory factors namely, management fees (TER), volatility of the ETFs’ 
daily market price, average daily trading volume and also the impact of dividend distribution.  
Beginning with the results of the overall examination period as furnished in Section 6.2, on 
average basis, ETFs exhibit daily returns that closely resemble those of their target benchmark 
indices. However, ETFs are more volatile than their target benchmark indices. Furthermore, 
the linear regression results also affirm the return and risk results as the alpha coefficients of 
all the funds are close to zero and also being statistically insignificant. By contrast, beta 
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coefficients which resembles the fund replication strategy depicts a different picture. This is 
wherein majority of the coefficients are not close to unity especially for the ETFs with 
international broad-market access. This proved that fund managers are not holding the stocks 
at the same proportional weighting as that of their target benchmark indices.  
In terms of the actual tracking errors as per the three methods mentioned earlier, it is found that 
the 19 ETFs fails to successfully imitate their underlying indices as they exhibit the mean daily 
tracking errors that amount to 1.31%, 0.79% and 1.51% respectively. During this period, the 
RMB Mid Cap appears to be the worst tracker as it exhibit sizeable daily tracking error of 
3.34% considering the first and the third method. On the positive side, Satrix 40 is the best 
tracker with the lowest daily tracking error of 0.58% according to the first and the third method. 
This kind of performance variability is mainly attributable to the period of examination since 
the RMB Mid Cap is only examined for 36 months as opposed to approximately 15 years of 
the Satrix 40. However, international broad-market ETFs exhibit above average tracking errors 
due to the trading hours overlap between the markets where the underlying stocks are traded 
and the JSE and the diversity of the underlying indices.  
With respect to the performance attribution, the magnitude of tracking error according to three 
methods of tracking errors are found to be positively associated with the management fees 
(TER) as well as the daily volatility of the fund market price. Contrarily, the average trading 
volume and the dividends distribution have insignificant impact. By comparison, these findings 
strongly support the observation of Rompotis (2006a) and Chu (2013).  
Secondly, evidence of prior-financial crisis results also paint similar picture whereby, on 
average, ETFs yield daily returns which closely resemble that of their target benchmark indices 
but with relatively high level of volatility. Further to this, the outcome of the linear regression 
also shed more light as the alpha coefficients are found to be statistically insignificant at the 
5% significance level, implying that fund managers are adopting a passive investment 
approach. With respect to the beta coefficients, individual funds also have statistically 
significant estimates. Considering the magnitude of tracking errors, it is discovered that the 
mean daily tracking errors are relatively high compared to that of the prior period as they 
equalled to 1.37%, 1.02% and 1.45%.  
Once again, Satrix 40 stands out by exhibiting the lowest tracking error of 0.43% whilst DBX 
MSCI Japan depicts the highest tracking error of 2.64%. With respect to contributors of the 
tracking errors, management fees as well as the daily volatility appears to have positive 
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influence whilst the opposite is true in the case of trading volume and dividends distribution. 
In addition to that, it is also discovered that the shorter period of evaluation of 104 days in the 
case of the DBX MSCI JAPAN, DBX MSCI USA and DBX MSCI World as opposed to 1938 
days for some of the local ETFs is the key attribute since shorter periods are characterised by 
noise in the market. In terms of comparative analysis, these results are found to be considerably 
in line with those of Milanos and Rompotis (2006) from the Swiss market but contradict those 
of Shin et al. (2010) from the international market as well as Purohit and Maholtra (2015) from 
the Indian market. 
As alluded in the earlier chapters, the JSE suffered from the effect of the 2008 global market 
upheaval for ten months between 1 September 2008 and 30 June 2009. According to the results 
in Section 6.4, the average return during this period amount to -0.04% for both the ETFs and 
their target benchmark at 2.75% and 2.37% standard deviation. The negative daily return is 
found to be in accordance to the expectation since benchmark indices tend to plummet during 
this period of market upheaval. Albeit the negative daily returns, the alpha coefficients are 
found to be close to zero and also statistically insignificant which implies that the fund 
managers are adopting passive investment strategy. On the question of beta coefficient 
estimates, majority of them are far from being close unity which implies that the fund managers 
are under pressure in replicating the exact movements of their target benchmark indices. In 
terms of the tracking errors, it is revealed that the average of three methods almost double those 
displayed in Section 6.2 and Section 6.3 respectively.   
In this instance, Investec ZGOVI and the CoreShares Proptrax SAPY are the best trackers due 
to the diversity of the target benchmark indices. Contrarily, the international broad-market 
access ETFs are the worst trackers more especially the DBX MSCI World which reached the 
highest daily tracking error of 4.23%. This came not as a surprise because this is the fund which 
listed on the JSE but replicating 1643 stocks from around the world, considering that the 
financial crisis was global phenomenon. Consistent with the findings of Qadan and Yagil 
(2012) as well as Mateus and Rahmani (2014) it is discovered that the management fees (TER) 
and daily volatility are once again the key contributors of the tracking inefficiency purely 
because of the volatile index movements.  
Lastly, evidence of the post-crisis period reveals that both the ETFs and the target benchmark 
indices surged as the average daily returns amount to 0.05%. In line with the evidence from the 
preceding sections, mean and individual alpha coefficients appears to be close to zero and 
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statistically insignificant. On the one hand, beta coefficient are also not far from unity with the 
RMB Top 40 exhibiting the highest beta coefficient of 0.99 along with the 95% R-Squared. 
With respect to the tracking errors results, the 19 ETFs under review suffered from relatively 
less amount of tracking errors with an exception of RMB Mid Cap which reached the highest 
estimate of 3.34%. According to the analysis, this is attributable to the fact that the RMB Mid 
Cap have been examined for the lowest trading days of 777 as opposed to other funds that are 
observed for 1561 days.  
Concerning the attribution of the overall tracking errors, it is observed that only management 
fees (TER) is the only driver of the tracking errors. Comparatively, these results are closely 
related to the findings of Chu (2013), Mateus and Rahmani (2014) and the most recent work 
of Naumenko and Chystiakova (2015). In summary, the observation from this chapter is that 
all the 19 ETFs have failed to successfully imitate the movements of their target benchmark 
over the various period of evaluation. Notably, the presence of these tracking errors is mainly 
attributable to the fees incurred by fund managers in the replication process and also the 
volatility of the prices. The next chapter demonstrates the discussion of the pricing efficiency 
tests results and their interpretation over the various examination period. 
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Chapter 7  Pricing Efficiency Results and Discussion 
7.1 Introduction 
The ETFs tracking ability results presented in Chapter 6 have always been coupled with the 
pricing efficiency test. This chapter demonstrates the empirical findings of the pricing 
efficiency test that have been accomplished through the implementation of the methodology 
described in Section 5.4.2. As mentioned earlier, pricing efficiency test aims to determine 
whether arbitrage opportunity exist due to the deviation between ETFs’ closing price and their 
respective NAVs. In this instance, the rand and percentage price deviation refers to a discount 
when the ETF closing price is less than the NAV, premium when the ETF closing price is 
greater than the NAV and lastly there is full efficiency if the ETF closing price and the NAV 
are equal. 
While the rand and percentage price deviation provides evidence of potential mispricing of 
ETFs, the main question of interest is the duration or the number of trading days in which such 
deviation persists. Practically, there should not be material difference between the ETFs’ 
closing price and the end of day NAV because of the creation and redemption process which 
is implemented by the authorised participants. However, over and above the inefficiency of the 
creation and redemption process, prior empirical literature documented in Chapter 4 reveals 
that factors such as the trading hours overlap, transaction cost (bid-ask spread), daily volatility 
of the ETFs market prices, trading volume, complexity of the underlying index, exchange rate 
volatility and also length of the examination period plays an integral role in causing the 
mispricing.  
Subsequent to this introductory section, Section 7.2 depicts the pricing efficiency results for 
the total sample of 19 ETFs throughout the overall examination period which stems from the 
inception date of each fund until 30 September 2015. In tandem with the approach followed in 
Chapter 6, the Investec ZGOVI have been examined until the 21 January 2014 when it was 
delisted from the JSE. In the similar vein, the examination periods have been segmented into 
three sub-periods which aims to observe the pricing efficiency of the ETFs under review before, 
during and post the 2008 global financial crisis.  
In light of that view, Section 7.3 demonstrates the pricing efficiency results for 12 ETFs during 
the pre-crisis phase which span from the launch date of each fund until 29 August 2008. Going 
further, Section 7.4 summarises the pricing efficiency results of 16 ETFs which existed during 
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the turbulent moment of the global financial crisis which occurred between 1 September 2008 
and 30 June 2009. Lastly, the pricing efficiency results for the 19 ETFs during the recovery 
period which is between 1 July 2009 and 30 September 2015 are illustrated in Section 7.5. The 
overall summary and conclusion of the chapter is in Section 7.6.  
7.2 Overall examination period results: (between launch date and 30 September 2015) 
Table 7.1 demonstrates the average, minimum, maximum and standard deviation of the rand 
value and percentage price deviation results for each of the 19 ETFs from their respective 
launch date to 30 September 2015. In accordance with the approach of prior chapters, all the 
ETFs under review are classified according to their underlying investment strategies namely, 
domestic broad-market, sector, style, fundamentals, listed-property, fixed-income and the 
international broad-market. This is done in order to deduce which strategy is more price 
efficient than the other. In this table, Panel A depicts the mean daily rand and percentage price 
deviations along with their corresponding t-test values which measures the statistical 
significance level of the mean deviations. Panel B and Panel C reflects the minimum and 
maximum estimates of both the rand and percentage price deviation. Lastly, Panel D reports 
the standard deviation of the mean deviation reflected in Panel A.  
Taking a closer look at the mean deviations displayed in Panel A of Table 7.1, it is evident that 
the Satrix 40, Satrix SWIX Top 40, RMB Top 40, Stanlib SWIX 40, Satrix FINI, Satrix INDI, 
Investec ZGOVI and CoreShares PropTrax SAPY appears to be trading at a discount to their 
NAVs. In this regard, CoreShares PropTrax SAPY demonstrates the highest daily discount of 
R0.20 and 0.47% respectively. On the contrary, Stanlib Top 40, Satrix RESI, RMB Mid Cap, 
Satrix DIVI Plus, Newfunds Shariah Top 40, Satrix Rafi 40, DBX  EuroStoxx 50, DBX UK 
FTSE 100, DBX MSCI JAPAN, DBX MSCI USA and the DBX MSCI World reveals average 
daily premiums that are statistically significant at the 1% level. In this instance, the DBX UK 
FTSE 100 and Stanlib Top 40 achieved the highest rand and percentage daily premiums of 
R0.79 and 1.88%.  
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Table 7.1: Descriptive statistics of the rand value and percentage price deviation 
 
This table presents the average, minimum, maximum and standard deviation of the rand value and percentage price deviation results for the 
19 ETFs from their respective inception date through to 30 September 2015. The t-statistics estimates in Panel A measures the statistical 
significance of the average rand and percentage price deviation.   
 
Underlying 
Investment 
(Exposure) 
Panel A:  
Mean Deviation 
Panel B: 
Minimum 
Panel C:  
Maximum 
Panel D: 
Standard deviation (%) 
Domestic broad-
market 
Rand % 
t-statistic 
Rand % Rand % Rand % 
Satrix 40 -0.02** -0.07** -8.72 -1.39 -0.06 1.16 0.06 0.11 0.01 
Satrix SWIX Top 40 -0.00** -0.03** -1.24 -0.54 -0.13 0.99 0.24 0.05 0.01 
RMB Top 40 -0.01** -0.02** -3.37 -0.99 -0.05 1.07 0.05 0.06 0.00 
Stanlib Top 40 0.52*** 1.88*** 12.34 -6.50 -0.23 6.50 0.24 1.47 0.05 
Stanlib SWIX 40 -0.01** -0.22** -3.81 -0.98 -0.12 0.55 0.08 0.11 0.02 
Sector  
Satrix FINI -0.00** -0.09** -1.92 -1.00 -0.10 0.65 0.08 0.06 0.01 
Satrix INDI -0.02*** -0.13*** -8.68 -1.57 -0.05 1.77 0.11 0.12 0.11 
Satrix RESI 0.03*** 0.06*** 2.91 -5.30 -0.09 7.04 0.10 0.42 0.01 
RMB Mid Cap 0.00** 0.04** 1.90 -0.05 -0.01 1.06 0.17 0.04 0.01 
Style  
Satrix DIVI Plus 0.00** 0.03** 2.29 -0.08 -0.05 0.23 0.05 0.01 0.01 
Newfunds Shariah Top 
40 0.01*** 0.49*** 7.21 -0.35 -0.12 1.55 0.45 0.08 0.03 
Fundamental  
Satrix Rafi 40 0.01** 0.20** 9.43 -0.56 -0.11 0.45 0.09 0.05 0.01 
Listed-property   
CoreShares PropTrax 
SAPY -0.20*** -0.47*** -17.50 -3.28 -0.08 3.40 0.07 0.50 0.01 
Fixed-income  
Investec ZGOVI -0.00*** -0.01*** -0.85 -0.44 -0.04 0.25 0.08 0.08 0.01 
International broad-
market  
 
DBX  EuroStoxx 50 0.30*** 0.85*** 26.87 -2.48 -0.07 13.98 0.49 0.55 0.02 
DBX UK FTSE 100 0.79*** 0.97*** 42.07 -6.04 -0.09 8.69 0.10 0.94 0.01 
DBX MSCI JAPAN 0.05** 0.81** 15.67 -0.87 -0.14 0.98 0.15 0.13 0.02 
DBX MSCI USA 0.10*** 0.96*** 30.60 -1.19 -0.13 2.05 0.22 0.14 0.02 
DBX MSCI World   0.16*** 1.09*** 29.60 -0.68 -0.07 2.33 0.29 0.17 0.02 
Note: Investec ZGOVI is examined from its launch date until 21 January 2014 when it was delisted on the JSE. * statistically significant at a 
10% level, ** statistically significant at a 5% level, *** statistically significant at 1% level 
 
 
By comparison, these mean deviation results are aligned with prior empirical evidence 
particularly that of Charteris (2013) when she discovered that JSE listed ETFs which mimics 
local indices trade at a significant discount whilst those which replicate international indices 
exhibit premiums to their NAVs. Additionally, these results also concurs with that of Ackert 
and Tian (2008) when they found that 19 of the 28 U.S. ETFs trade at a considerable amount 
of premiums whereas the remaining 9 trade at discount levels that are low on relative basis. 
Both Charteris (2013) as well as Ackert and Tian (2008) attributes the sizeable premiums of 
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international broad-market ETFs to the impact of trading hours overlap between the ETFs 
country of origin and the markets in which they are listed.  
When examining the minimum and maximum estimates as demonstrated in Panel B and Panel 
C, it is worth noting that they concur with the observation in Panel A. This is wherein RMB 
Mid Cap and Satrix DIVI Plus trade at the lowest daily discount and premiums of R0.05 and 
0.01% as well as R0.23 and 0.05% respectively. Contrarily, Stanlib Top 40 obtained the highest 
discount of R6.50 and 0.23% whilst the opposite is true in the case of the DBX EuroStoxx 50 
which trade at the highest premium of R13.98 and 0.49%. In line with the evidence from Panel 
A through Panel C, standard deviation estimates in Panel D reveals the volatility for each of 
the funds under review. In this instance, ETFs that have experienced significant price deviation 
also exhibits high level of volatility.  
Having observed the descriptive statistics of the rand value and percentage price deviation, 
Table 7.2 denotes the number of day (s) when each of the ETFs under review traded either on 
a premium, discount, and zero price difference during this examination period. In accordance 
to the approach of Table 7.1, these ETFs have been categorised according to their respective 
underlying strategies. Within the column of the total number trading days, it is important to 
note that Satrix 40 which is the first-ever launched ETF on the JSE have been examined for the 
highest period of 3704 trading days. On the other hand, the RMB Mid Cap which was launched 
in August 2012 reflect the least number of trading days which amount to 777.  
From the premium perspective, DBX MSCI World displays the highest frequency. Out of the 
1871 total trading days, the DBX MSCI World traded at the premium for 1580 days. On relative 
basis, CoreShares PropTrax SAPY trades at the premium for the lowest number of trading 
days. Of the 2000 total trading days, CoreShares PropTrax SAPY appears to be trading at a 
premium for 681 days. The results of international broad-market ETFs are in tandem with the 
findings of Charteris (2013) who have discovered that the international based ETFs trading on 
the JSE traded at the premium to their NAVs for more than 60% of their total trading days. In 
line with her conclusion, this magnitude of the premiums are attributable to the complexity of 
the underlying indices as these ETFs tracks indices that have trading hours that are different 
from that of the JSE.   
In direct contrast to the premiums estimates, CoreShares PropTrax SAPY trades on a discount 
for the bulk of its total trading days. In this regard, this fund trades at a discount for 1320 of 
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the 2000 total trading days. Contrarily, the lowest discount levels are associated with the DBX 
MSCI World and DBX UK FTSE 100 respectively.  
Table 7.2: Magnitude of the price deviation 
 
This table depicts the number of day (s) when each of the ETFs under review traded either on a premium, discount, 
and zero price difference. 
 
Underlying 
Investment 
(Exposure) 
ETF Name 
Total number of 
trading days 
Days of 
premium 
Days of discount 
Days of zero price 
deviation 
Domestic broad-
market 
Satrix 40 3704 1528 2172 4 
Satrix SWIX Top 40 2363 1155 1200 8 
RMB Top 40 1735 844 891 0 
Stanlib Top 40 1234 726 508 0 
Stanlib SWIX 40 1234 660 574 0 
Sector 
Satrix FINI 3400 1585 1807 8 
Satrix INDI 3400 1357 2039 4 
Satrix RESI  2363 1242 1120 1 
RMB Mid Cap  777 409 368 0 
Style 
Satrix DIVI Plus  2017 1074 931 12 
Newfunds Shari’ah 
Top 40  
1616 936 675 5 
Fundamentals Satrix Rafi 40  1734 1049 684 1 
Listed-property CoreShares Proptrax 
SAPY  
2000 681 1320 1 
Fixed-income Investec ZGOVI  1312 847 460 5 
International broad-
market 
DBX EuroStoxx 50  2489 1832 657 0 
DBX UK FTSE 100  2489 2091 398 0 
DBX MSCI JAPAN  1871 1274 597 0 
DBX MSCI USA  1871 1519 352 0 
DBX MSCI World   1871 1580 291 0 
Note: Investec ZGOVI is examined from its launch date until 21 January 2014 when it was delisted on the JSE 
 
Lastly, Satrix DIVI Plus trade at the NAV for 12 of the 2017 total trading days which is the 
highest frequency across the sample under review. Consistent with the results of Charteris 
(2013), Satrix 40, Satrix FINI and Satrix INDI trade at their NAVs for considerable amount of 
days. On the one hand, it is noted that none of the international broad-market ETFs trade at 
their NAV during this period of evaluation. This could be attributable to the fact that they have 
obtained significant amount of premiums as discussed earlier.   
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The logical inference one can make from the results depicted in Table 7.1 and Table 7.2 is that 
all the 19 ETFs under review are mispriced against their NAV which implies that there is 
potential for investors to exploit the arbitrage opportunity. Apart from the arbitrage 
opportunity, the existence of premium and discount can also be translated as the cost to an 
investor who can potentially buy an under or overvalued ETF depending on the time of the 
purchase. Theoretically, there is a possibility of inefficient execution of the creation and 
redemption process by the authorised participants of the JSE. Noticeably, significant rand and 
percentage value premiums of the international broad-market funds concurs with the 
conclusion reached by Engle and Sakar (2006) who asserts that there is higher cost and risk of 
executing the creation and redemption process for international ETFs.  
However, it is not enough to cite the inefficient execution of the creation and redemption 
process as the key attribute of the discounts and premiums without examining the number of 
days in which the price deviation persisted. According to Charteris (2013), inefficient 
execution of the creation and redemption process can be the primary cause of the price 
deviation provided that the price deviation persist for more than one trading day. In addition to 
this, previous literature also suggests that number of the underlying index constituents, 
complexity of the underlying index as well as the duration of the examination period plays an 
important role towards the persistence of the discounts and premiums. With that in mind, Table 
7.3 on the next page denotes the results of the number of trading days in which the price 
deviation persisted.  
Following the approach of prior studies particularly that of Gallagher and Segara (2005) and 
Swathy (2015), the regression intercept (α) is expected to be relatively the same as the rand 
value mean deviation depicted in Panel A of Table 7.1. On the other hand, the slope or the 
regression coefficient commonly known as beta PD is expected to be statistically insignificant. 
The insignificant coefficients implies that the price deviation does not persist beyond one 
trading day which suggests that the authorised participants are effectively implementing the 
creation and process effectively. 
When observing the intercept estimates, current results are in line with those of the above 
mentioned studies as they are statistically significant and closely resembling the rand value 
mean deviation depicted in Panel A of Table 7.1. With respect to the individual ETF regression 
coefficients, Satrix SWIX Top 40, Satrix RESI, RMB Top 40 and RMB Mid Cap portray 
coefficients are insignificant, which suggests that the price deviation have narrowed within one 
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trading day. In accordance to the assertion of Delcoure and Zhong (2007), these ETFs are 
deemed to be efficiently priced against their NAV. This implies that the authorised participants 
of these funds are effectively executing the creation and redemption process during this period 
of evaluation. 
Table 7.3: Summary statistics of the rand value price deviation persistence 
 
This table contains the summary estimates of the number of trading days in which the rand price deviation of the 19 ETFs under review 
persisted until they converged with their NAVs. These findings are the results of the regression equation adopted from Purohit and 
Malhotra (2015) that is depicted below: 
𝑷𝑫𝒕(𝒁𝑨𝑹)  =  𝜶 +  𝜷𝑷𝑫𝒕−𝟏 +  𝜺𝒕 
 
Where α is the regression intercept term; 𝜷𝑷𝑫 is the regression coefficient of 𝜷𝑷𝑫𝒕−𝟏, 𝜷𝑷𝑫𝒕−𝟐, 𝜷𝑷𝑫𝒕−𝟑, 𝑷𝑫𝒕−𝟑, 𝜷𝑷𝑫𝒕−𝟒, and 𝜷𝑷𝑫𝒕−𝟓 
which refers to the one to five trading day lagged value of the rand value premium or discount and 𝜺𝒕 is the standard error term of the 
regression. The t-statistic value validate the null-hypothesis that the premium or discount does not persist for more than one trading day.  
 
Underlying 
Investment 
(Exposure) 
 
 
ETF Name 
 
α 
 
𝜷𝑷𝑫𝒕−𝟏 
 
𝜷𝑷𝑫𝒕−𝟐 
 
𝜷𝑷𝑫𝒕−𝟑 
 
𝜷𝑷𝑫𝒕−𝟒 
 
𝜷𝑷𝑫𝒕−𝟓 
Domestic 
broad-market 
Satrix 40 -0.01** 0.15** 0.15** 0.12*** 0.09 --- 
Satrix SWIX 
Top 40 
0.00** 0.06 --- --- --- --- 
RMB Top 40 0.00** 0.06 --- --- --- --- 
Stanlib Top 
40 
0.03*** 0.94** 0.90** 0.85** 0.82** 0.80** 
Stanlib 
SWIX 40 
-0.01** 0.56*** 0.56*** 0.44*** 0.38*** 0.36*** 
Sector 
Satrix FINI 0.00** 0.16** 0.14** 0.12** 0.13*** 0.13*** 
Satrix INDI -0.02*** 0.11*** 0.02 --- --- --- 
Satrix RESI 0.02*** 0.09 --- --- --- --- 
RMB Mid 
Cap 
0.00** 0.00 --- --- --- --- 
Style 
Satrix DIVI 
Plus 
0.00** 0.23** 0.19** 0.19** 0.17** 0.12*** 
Newfunds 
Shariah Top 
40 
0.01*** 0.19* 0.12*** 0.07 --- --- 
Fundamentals 
Satrix Rafi 
40 
0.01** 0.35* 0.25** 0.25** 0.21** 0.18** 
Listed-
property 
CoreShares 
PropTrax 
SAPY 
-0.07*** 0.63** 0.51** 0.41** 0.39** 0.38** 
Fixed-income 
Investec 
ZGOVI 
0.00 0.69*** 0.49*** 0.30*** 0.12** -0.06 
International 
broad-market 
DBX  
EuroStoxx50 
0.20*** 0.33*** 0.31*** 0.27*** 0.28*** 0.26*** 
DBX UK 
FTSE 100  
0.43*** 0.46*** 0.43*** 0.40*** 0.35*** 0.32*** 
DBX MSCI 
JAPAN  
0.03** 0.41*** 0.22*** 0.20*** 0.16*** 0.14*** 
DBX MSCI 
USA  
0.09*** 0.14*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.18*** 0.14*** 
DBX MSCI 
World   
0.08*** 0.28*** 0.17*** 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.16*** 
Note: Investec ZGOVI is examined from its launch date till 21st January 2014 when it was delisted on the JSE. * statistically significant 
at a 10% level, ** statistically significant at a 5% level, *** statistically significant at 1% level 
 
In the similar vein, the fact that the Satrix INDI mimics only the top 25 industrial shares might 
have caused its discount to disappear after two trading days. By comparison, this results are in 
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contrast with that of Charteris (2013) when she discovered that the price deviation of the Satrix 
INDI have narrowed within one trading day. Albeit replicating the similar underlying index as 
the RMB Top 40 and Stanlib Top 40, the price deviation for the Satrix 40 appears to have 
persisted until the third trading day. This persistent price deviation might have been highly 
attributable to the longer examination period for Satrix 40 which is evaluated from November 
2000 as opposed to October 2008 and October 2010 in the case of its counterparts, the RMB 
Top 40 and Stanlib Top 40. Hence the price deviation for the Stanlib Top 40 have persisted 
until the fifth trading day because of the relatively less time horizon. Similar pattern is 
witnessed in the case of Stanlib SWIX Top 40 which denoted mispricing that persisted until 
the fifth trading day whilst the Satrix SWIX Top 40 has demonstrated mispricing which 
disappeared within one trading day.   
As noted earlier, the complexity of the underlying index plays an integral role in causing 
persistent price deviation. In light of that view, it could be possible that the composition of the 
FTSE/JSE Shari’ah Top 40 index might have been one of the main attribute of why the price 
deviation for the Newfunds Shari’ah Top 40 have also narrowed on the third trading day. 
Similarly, these factors might also be the fundamental attributes for the Satrix DIVI Plus, Satrix 
Rafi 40, CoreShares PropTrax SAPY and the Investec ZGOVI. On the contrary, it seems 
unusual for the Satrix FINI which replicates an index that is composed of 15 constituents to 
display price deviation which persists to the fifth trading day.  
Expanding the analysis to the international broad-market ETFs, their coefficients are 
statistically significant until the fifth trading day. This indicates that the market-makers for 
these funds have failed to accurately implement the creation and redemption process. As noted 
earlier, such persistence could be attributable to the trading hours overlap between the JSE and 
the markets in which their underlying indices are listed. A similar view is held by Delcoure and 
Zhong (2007) when they discovered that the mispricing of iShare Australia and Malaysia 
persisted for more than four trading days. When it comes to the performance of the DBX 
EuroStoxx50 and the DBX UK FTSE 100, the European debt crisis which occurred in 2011 
might have also contributed significantly towards the volatility of these funds underlying 
indices.  
Over and above the aforementioned factors behind the persistent price deviation, this research 
adopts the approach of Gozbasi and Erdem (2010) in investigating explanatory ability of 
transaction cost (bid-ask spread), daily volatility and average daily trading volume in 
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explaining the magnitude of the discounts and premiums. According to Gozbasi and Erdem 
(2010), there is a positive correlation between the level of price deviation and the cost of 
executing the creation and redemption. They found that the higher the cost which is resembled 
by the bid and ask spread the wider is the difference between the NAV and the ETF market 
price. On the other hand, the volatility in the ETF market price which occurs due to investor’s 
sentiments and how receptive they are to certain news events was also found to induce 
discounts and premiums. Lin et al. (2005) reached similar conclusion that investor’s sentiment 
plays a prominent role in causing the mispricing between the ETF market price and the NAV. 
Lastly, the ETFs trading volume induces discounts and premiums because the more the trades 
the higher is the bid and ask spread which subsequently result in a costly execution of the 
creation and redemption process. However, both the studies of Gozbasi and Erdem (2010) and 
Lin et al. (2005) asserts that the positive effect of trading volume in relation to the price 
deviation should be exercised with caution because there is the always conflicting view about 
this effect. With that being said, Table 7.4 below reports the summary of the determinative 
ability of these rational factors. 
Table 7.4: Price deviation persistence explanatory variables 
 
This table exhibits the outcome from the cross-sectional regression analysis of the rand value price deviation explanatory 
variables. The estimation of the regression comes in the following structure:  
 
𝑷𝑫𝒕(𝐙𝐀𝐑) =  𝒃𝟎  +  𝒃𝟏𝑻𝑬𝑹𝒕 +  𝒃𝟐 𝑫𝑽𝒐𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒕 + 𝒃𝟑𝒍𝒏𝑽𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒕  +  𝒆𝒕 
 
The dependent variable is the rand value price deviation (premium/discount) for the 19 JSE listed ETFs which is denoted 
as 𝑃𝐷𝑡(ZAR). The first column below presents the estimate of the independent variables namely: TER which is the proxy 
for weighted average daily bid-ask spread, daily volatility of the market price and the natural logarithm of the average 
trading volume. On the same column, On the same column, the R-Squared denotes the variation of the rand value price 
deviation (premium/discount) which is explained by the TER, daily volatility of the market price and the natural logarithm 
of the average trading volume. In addition, the statistical significance of the regression coefficients is resembled by the t-
statistics value. Lastly, the expected sign of the independent variables as deduced were from Gozbasi and Erdem (2010).  
 
Variables Estimate t-stats Expected sign 
Intercept 0.003* 0.384  
Total Expense Ratio (TER) 0.772** 1.452 positive 
DVolatility 0.520*** 2.608 positive 
LnVolume -0.001** -1.684 positive 
R-Squared 44.70%   
* statistically significant at a 10% level, ** statistically significant at a 5% level, *** statistically significant at 1% level 
 
In tandem with the evidence of prior studies, it is observed on Table 7.4 that the TER which is 
a proxy of bid-ask spread and daily volatility of ETFs market price appears to have statistically 
significant impact towards the discounts and premiums reported in Table 7.1. This suggests 
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that the volatility of these ETFs market price have resulted into wider bid and spreads which 
might have made it difficult for the authorised participants to accurately create or redeem the 
shares of the underlying indices. Subsequently, discounts and premiums have been induced as 
reflected in Table 7.1. On the one hand, the average daily trading volume appears to possess 
negative impact on the discounts and premiums of these 19 ETFs. This observation concurs 
with that of Gozbasi and Erdem (2010) but conflict that of Delcoure and Zhong (2007). Both 
studies reveals that there is conflicting view in the body of knowledge concerning the effect of 
trading volume, hence the contradiction.  
Lastly, the R-Squared reveals that 44.70% of the variation of the discounts and premiums is 
being explained by transaction cost, daily volatility as well as the daily trading volume. 
Therefore, it provides evidence that there are several rational and irrational factors which could 
explain the magnitude of this price deviation. For example, the effect of exchange rate and the 
trading-hours overlap between the JSE and home country for the international broad-market 
ETFs might also be the key driving factor of the mispricing. By comparison, this 44.70% R-
Squared is considerably high relative to a mere 11% and 13% R-Squared revealed by Gozbasi 
and Erdem (2010) as well as Delcoure and Zhong (2007). 
In summary, it is noticeable within this sub-section of the chapter that discounts and premiums 
exists amongst all the 19 ETFs under review. However, it was discovered that with an exception 
of the Satrix SWIX Top 40, Satrix RESI, RMB Top 40 and RMB Mid Cap that have been 
efficiently priced, all the remaining ETFs exhibited price deviation which persisted for more 
than one trading day. Amongst other factors, such level of persistent mispricing is 
fundamentally attributable to the inefficient execution of the creation and redemption process, 
number of the constituents of the underlying index, complexity of the underlying index, length 
of examination period, transaction cost as well as the volatility of their market prices. As 
articulated in the introduction of the chapter, Section 7.3 below presents the pricing efficiency 
results of 12 of the 19 ETFs that were launched prior the 2008 global financial crisis.  
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7.3 Pre-global financial crisis results: (between launch date and 29 August 2008) 
Having observed the pricing efficiency results for the overall examination period, this section 
provides the price efficiency results and analysis of 12 of the 19 ETFs that have been listed on 
the JSE before the 2008 global financial crisis which occurred between 1 September 2008 and 
30 June 2009. The descriptive statistics of the rand value and percentage price deviation is 
depicted in Table 7.5. In accordance to the approach of Table 7.1, 12 ETFs under review are 
also classified according to their underlying investment or the exposure in which they yield to 
investors. In the similar vein, Panel A displays the mean daily rand and percentage price 
deviations along with their corresponding t-test values which measures the statistical 
significance level of the mean deviations. Panel B and Panel C reflects the minimum and 
maximum estimates of both the rand and percentage price deviation. Lastly, Panel D reports 
the standard deviation of the mean deviation reflected in Panel A.  
Table 7.5: Descriptive statistics of the rand value and percentage price deviation 
 
This table presents the average, minimum, maximum and standard deviation of the rand value and percentage price deviation results for the 
12 ETFs from their respective inception till the 29th August 2008. The t-statistics estimates in Panel A measures the statistical significance 
of the average rand and percentage price deviation.   
 
 
Underlying 
Investment 
(Exposure) 
Panel A:  
Mean Deviation 
Panel B: 
Minimum 
Panel C:  
Maximum 
Panel D: 
Standard Deviation (%) 
Domestic broad-
market 
Rand % t-statistic Rand % Rand % Rand % 
Satrix 40 -0.03*** -0.12*** -8.97 -1.39 -0.06 0.77 0.06 0.10 0.01 
Satrix SWIX Top 
40 0.00** 0.03** 0.53 -0.30 -0.05 0.39 0.09 0.06 0.01 
Sector  
Satrix FINI -0.00*** -0.28*** -9.07 -1.00 -0.07 0.65 0.08 0.07 0.01 
Satrix INDI -0.02*** -0.21*** -10.60 -0.83 -0.05 0.36 0.05 0.08 0.08 
Satrix RESI 0.04* 0.09* 2.02 -5.30 -0.09 7.04 0.09 0.61 0.01 
Style  
Satrix DIVI Plus -0.00** -0.17** -2.06 -0.04 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.01 
Listed-property  
CoreShares 
PropTrax SAPY -0.24*** -0.72*** -7.98 -1.60 -0.05 1.56 0.05 0.45 0.01 
International 
broad-market 
 
DBX  EuroStoxx 
50 0.64*** 1.77*** 38.98 -1.93 0.00 3.71 0.08 0.44 0.01 
DBX UK FTSE 
100 1.30*** 1.59*** 39.73 -1.36 -0.02 7.08 0.10 0.90 0.01 
DBX MSCI 
JAPAN 0.15** 2.50** 11.19 -0.17 -0.03 0.52 0.09 0.14 0.02 
DBX MSCI USA 0.24*** 2.44*** 20.76 -0.05 -0.01 0.55 0.05 0.12 0.01 
DBX MSCI 
World   
0.24*** 2.08*** 13.91 -0.67 -0.07 0.52 0.05 0.17 0.02 
* statistically significant at a 10% level, ** statistically significant at a 5% level, *** statistically significant at 1% level 
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As illustrated in Panel A, Satrix 40, Satrix FINI, Satrix INDI, Satrix DIVI Plus and the 
CoreShares PropTrax SAPY demonstrates average daily rand and percentage discounts. In line 
with the results of Table 7.1, CoreShares PropTrax SAPY exhibits the highest average daily 
discount of R0.24 and 0.72%. On the other hand, Satrix SWIX Top 40, Satrix RESI, DBX 
EuroStoxx 50, DBX UK FTSE 100, DBX MSCI JAPAN, DBX MSCI USA and DBX MSCI 
World portrays premiums to their NAVs. During this period, DBX UK FTSE 100 and DBX 
MSCI JAPAN have obtained the highest daily rand and percentage premiums of R1.30 and 
2.50% respectively. As noted earlier, sizeable premiums obtained by the DBX UK FTSE 100 
and DBX MSCI JAPAN and other international broad-market ETFs is mainly attributable to 
factors such as the trading hours overlap between the JSE and the markets in which these 
underlying indices are traded as well as the complexity of the indices themselves.  
With regards to comparative empirical studies that have been conducted prior the 2008 global 
financial crisis, there is no comparable studies since that of Jiang, Feng and Tianjian (2010) 
and Gozbasi and Erdem (2010) have evaluated the performance of one fund. Jiang, Feng and 
Tianjian (2010) from China discovered that the Shanghai 50 Index ETF (SSE 50 ETF) traded 
at the premiums of 0.00 Yuan and 0.02% between February 2005 and September 2008. On the 
other hand, Gozbasi and Erdem (2010) from Turkey reveals that the Dow Jones DJIM Turkey 
Exchange Traded Fund (DJIMTR) obtained the mean daily premium of 0.03 Turkish Lira and 
0.33% respectively.  
In the case of the outliers, the minimum and maximum estimates depicted in Panel B and Panel 
C closely resemble the pattern of the mean deviation results that are presented in Panel A. 
During this period of examination, Satrix RESI which mimics the FTSE/JSE Resources 20 
index obtained the highest daily rand and percentage discount of R5.30 and 0.09% respectively. 
On the other hand, DBX MSCI USA exhibits the least discount that amounts to R0.05 and 
0.01%. As with the premium estimates, the DBX UK FTSE 100 traded at the highest daily rand 
and percentage premium of R7.08 and 0.10% whilst the lowest premium of R0.04 and 0.03% 
is associated to the Satrix DIVI Plus.   
Regarding the volatility of the price deviation that is determined by the standard deviation 
estimates in Panel D, it is visible that ETFs that are characterised of extra ordinary price 
deviation have also obtained relatively high level of volatility, vice versa. For example, Satrix 
RESI, CoreShares PropTrax SAPY and all the international broad-market based ETFs have 
relatively high standard deviation estimates as opposed to the remaining funds. Turning the 
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focus towards the frequency of the price deviation, Table 7.6 portrays the number of day (s) 
when each of the 12 ETFs under review traded either on a premium, discount, or zero price 
difference. During this period of evaluation, Satrix 40 is once again examined for the highest 
number of trading days which amounts to 1938. On the one hand, DBX MSCI JAPAN, DBX 
MSCI USA and DBX MSCI World are examined for a mere 104 days. In accordance to the 
results of Table 7.3, the international broad-market funds traded at the premium for the bulk of 
their examination period. This is wherein, the DBX MSCI USA traded at a premium for 101 
days of the overall 104 days. 
Table 7.6: Magnitude of the price deviation 
 
This table depicts the number of day (s) when each of the ETFs under review traded either on a premium, discount, and zero price 
difference. 
 
Underlying Investment 
(Exposure) 
ETF Name 
Total number of 
trading days 
Days of 
premium 
Days of 
discount 
Days of zero 
price difference 
Domestic broad-market 
Satrix 40 1938 689 1247 2 
Satrix SWIX Top 40 596 283 311 2 
Sector 
Satrix FINI 1633 717 916 0 
Satrix INDI 1633 634 999 0 
Satrix RESI 596 317 279 0 
Style Satrix DIVI Plus 250 130 122 1 
Listed-property CoreShares PropTrax 
SAPY 
233 79 153 1 
International broad-
market 
DBX  EuroStoxx 50 722 680 42 0 
DBX UK FTSE 100 722 677 45 0 
DBX MSCI JAPAN 104 90 14 0 
DBX MSCI USA 104 101 3 0 
DBX MSCI World 104 94 10 0 
 
In tandem with the inference made in the preceding sections, these sizeable amount of 
premiums could potentially be attributable to the trading hours overlap between the JSE and 
the market in which their underlying indices are traded. Similarly, the lowest frequency of 
premium is associated with the CoreShares PropTrax SAPY which traded above the NAV for 
79 of the 233 trading days under review. With respect to the discounts estimates, CoreShares 
PropTrax SAPY trades at the highest frequency of 153 days of the 233 whilst the opposite is 
true in the case of the DBX MSCI USA which traded on a discount for only 3 trading days of 
the total 104 days.  
One thing worth noting is that majority of the local-based ETFs traded at the discount to their 
NAVs for the bulk of their total trading days. As a result, the Satrix DIVI Plus, CoreShares 
PropTrax SAPY, Satrix 40 and the Satrix SWIX Top 40 traded at their NAV for a mere one 
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and two days of their overall sample period. This clearly suggests that the potential for arbitrage 
opportunity is significantly high. For that reason, Table 7.7 exhibits the persistent levels of the 
aforementioned price deviation. 
Consistent with the average rand price deviations that are demonstrated in Table 7.6, the 
intercepts of all of the funds under review reflects relatively similar discounts and premiums. 
Taking a closer look at the regression coefficients, it is evident that the coefficients for the 
Satrix RESI and CoreShares PropTrax SAPY are statistically insignificant and subsequently 
disappears within a period of one trading day. As mentioned in the previous section, discounts 
and premiums which disappears within one trading day implies that the ETFs in question are 
efficiently priced against their NAVs. This further suggests that there is no potential for 
arbitrage opportunity to the investors.  
Furthermore, the coefficients of the Satrix INDI and DBX MSCI JAPAN becomes insignificant 
when extended to the second trading day. In line with the evidence presented in Section 7.2, 
the simplicity of tracking only top 25 industrial shares might have been one of the key drivers 
of this performance in the case of Satrix INDI. Despite the complexity of the underlying index 
and trading hours overlap between the JSE and the Tokyo Stock Exchange where the 
constituents of the MSCI JAPAN index are listed, the shorter period of examination might have 
been the driving factor of the performance of the DBX MSCI JAPAN.  
Going further, Satrix SWIX Top 40 appears to be the only fund which exhibits a regression 
coefficient which becomes closer to zero on the third trading day. Similarly, the length of the 
examination period and also the tracking ability of the target benchmark index might have 
contributed significantly to the lower persistence level. By comparison, the performance of this 
fund is relatively similar to the observation of Shanmugham and Zabiulla (2012) when they 
revealed that the first-ever launched ETF in India, Nifty BeES obtained price deviation which 
disappeared on the third trading day.  
With respect to the Satrix 40 and Satrix DIVI Plus, the complexity of tracking their underlying 
indices might have been the main attribute of this persistent price deviation. As in the earlier 
sections, the length of the examination period might have been the fundamental driver of Satrix 
FINI price deviation which persisted until the fifth trading day. Finally, the coefficients of the 
DBX EuroStoxx50, DBX UK FTSE 100, DBX MSCI USA and DBX MSCI World are 
significantly far from zero until the fifth trading day. This is anticipated given the impact of 
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the complexity of the underlying indices and the trading hours overlap between the JSE and 
the markets in which the constituents of their underlying indices are traded. 
Table 7.7: Summary statistics of the rand value price deviation persistence 
 
This table contains the summary estimates of the number of trading days in which the rand price deviation of the 12 ETFs 
under review persisted until they converged with their NAVs. These findings are the results of the regression equation 
adopted from Purohit and Malhotra (2015) that is depicted below: 
𝑷𝑫𝒕(𝒁𝑨𝑹)  =  𝜶 +  𝜷𝑷𝑫𝒕−𝟏 +  𝜺𝒕 
 
Where α is the regression intercept term; 𝜷𝑷𝑫 is the regression coefficient of 𝜷𝑷𝑫𝒕−𝟏, 𝜷𝑷𝑫𝒕−𝟐, 𝜷𝑷𝑫𝒕−𝟑, 𝑷𝑫𝒕−𝟑, 
𝜷𝑷𝑫𝒕−𝟒, and 𝜷𝑷𝑫𝒕−𝟓 which refers to the one to five trading day lagged value of the rand value premium or discount and 
𝜺𝒕 is the standard error term of the regression. The t-statistic value validate the null-hypothesis that the premium or 
discount does not persist for more than one trading day.  
 
Underlying 
Investment 
(Exposure) 
 
 
ETF Name 
 
α 
 
𝜷𝑷𝑫𝒕−𝟏 
 
𝜷𝑷𝑫𝒕−𝟐 
 
𝜷𝑷𝑫𝒕−𝟑 
 
𝜷𝑷𝑫𝒕−𝟒 
 
𝜷𝑷𝑫𝒕−𝟓 
Domestic 
broad-market 
Satrix 40 -0.02** 0.26** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 
Satrix SWIX 
Top 40 
0.00*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.05 --- --- 
Sector 
Satrix FINI 0.00*** 0.22*** 0.18*** 0.15*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 
Satrix INDI -0.01** 0.21** 0.09 --- --- --- 
Satrix RESI 0.04** 0.03 --- --- --- --- 
 
Style 
Satrix DIVI 
Plus 
0.00*** 0.36** 0.27** 0.30** 0.40** 0.28** 
 
Listed-
property 
CoreShares 
PropTrax 
SAPY 
-0.08*** -0.09*** --- --- --- --- 
 
 
 
 
 
International 
broad-market 
DBX  
EuroStoxx50 
0.44*** 0.32** 0.21*** 0.18*** 0.24*** 0.21*** 
DBX UK 
FTSE 100  
1.00*** 0.24*** 0.24*** 0.24** 0.20** 0.21** 
DBX MSCI 
JAPAN  
0.11*** 0.22** -0.04** --- --- --- 
DBX MSCI 
USA  
0.17*** 0.29** 0.16** 0.20** 0.21** 0.10** 
DBX MSCI 
World   
0.16*** 0.31*** 0.27*** 0.34*** 0.30*** 0.29*** 
* statistically significant at a 10% level, ** statistically significant at a 5% level, *** statistically significant at 1% level 
Considering other empirical studies that have been conducted during this period of evaluation, 
current results are considerably higher than that of Purohit and Maholtra (2015) for Indian 
ETFs. During their pre-crisis period which spans from January 2002 until December 2007, 
these authors revealed that the persistence level of the Indian market ETFs persisted only up to 
the fourth trading day. In light of that view, Table 7.8 displays the impact in which transaction 
cost in the form of bid-ask spread, volatility of the ETFs market price and trading volume have 
towards the persistence of the price deviation.   
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Table 7.8: Price deviation persistence explanatory variables 
 
This table exhibits the outcome from the cross-sectional regression analysis of the rand value price deviation explanatory 
variables. The estimation of the regression comes in the following structure:  
 
𝑷𝑫𝒕(𝐙𝐀𝐑) =  𝒃𝟎  + 𝒃𝟏𝑻𝑬𝑹𝒕 + 𝒃𝟐 𝑫𝑽𝒐𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒕 +  𝒃𝟑𝒍𝒏𝑽𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒕  +  𝒆𝒕 
 
The dependent variable is the rand value price deviation (premium/discount) for the 19 JSE listed ETFs which is denoted 
as 𝑃𝐷𝑡(ZAR). The first column below presents the estimate of the independent variables namely: TER which is the proxy 
for weighted average daily bid-ask spread, daily volatility of the market price and the natural logarithm of the average 
trading volume. On the same column, the R-Squared denotes the variation of the rand value price deviation 
(premium/discount) which is explained by the TER, daily volatility of the market price and the natural logarithm of the 
average trading volume. In addition, the statistical significance of the regression coefficients is resembled by the t-statistics 
value. Lastly, the expected sign of the independent variables as deduced were from Gozbasi and Erdem (2010).  
 
Variables Estimate t-stats Expected sign 
Intercept -0.071** -2.407  
Total Expense Ratio (TER) 7.545*** 4.911 Positive 
DVolatility 0.052*** -0.103 Positive 
LnVolume 0.003*** 1.307 Positive 
R-Squared 84.02%   
* statistically significant at a 10% level, ** statistically significant at a 5% level, *** statistically significant at 1% level 
 
In line with the expectation of Gozbasi and Erdem (2010), discounts and premiums exhibited 
during this period of evaluation are positively and statistically influenced by transaction costs, 
daily volatility of the ETFs market price and also the trading volume. As noted earlier, this 
suggests that the wide bid and ask spread rates that are brought by high trading volume could 
have subsequently resulted into wider dispersion between the ETFs market prices and the 
NAVs. Subsequently, it becomes difficult for the authorised participants to redeem the shares 
in case of a premium and buy more shares when there is a discount.  
Pertaining to the influence of the volatility, investors sentiment about the looming sub-prime 
crisis could possibly have a material impact towards the volatility of the ETFs market price 
which then caused wider dispersion with the NAV. Lastly, the R-Squared of 84.02% indicates 
that transaction cost, daily volatility and average trading volume adequately explained the 
magnitude of the price deviation. Having seen these results, Section 7.4 below reports the 
pricing efficiency results of 16 ETFs during the turbulent moment of the global financial crisis 
which occurred between 1 September 2008 and 30 June 2009.  
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7.4 Global financial crisis results: (between 1 September 2008 and 30 June 2009) 
In order to draw meaningful conclusion about the efficiency of a particular market, its empirical 
analysis should be conducted in various conditions such as the bullish, bearish as well turbulent 
market conditions. For that purpose, it becomes clearer to observe the impact in which market 
swings have towards the level of market efficiency. With that being said, this section of the 
chapter aims to establish whether the 16 ETFs that have been listed on the JSE during the period 
of the 2008 global financial crisis are efficiently priced against their NAVs. Table 7.9 presents 
the average, minimum, maximum and standard deviation of the rand value and percentage price 
deviation results for the 16 ETFs during the 2008 global financial crisis which occurred 
between 1 September 2008 and the 30 June 2009. 
Consistent with the approach of Section 7.2 and Section 7.3, the 16 ETFs under review are also 
classified according to their underlying investment style. Similarly, Table 7.9 is also composed 
of Panel A through Panel D. This is wherein Panel A reflects the average daily rand and 
percentage price deviation along with their corresponding t-statistics estimates. On the other 
hand, Panel B and Panel C denotes the minimum and maximum rand and percentage estimates. 
Finally, Panel D indicates the standard deviation of the average price deviation depicted in 
Panel A.  
As Panel A suggests, discount estimates are associated with the Satrix 40, Satrix SWIX Top 
40, RMB Top 40, Satrix INDI and the Satrix DIVI Plus. During this turbulent moment, Satrix 
SWIX Top 40 exhibits the highest average daily discounts of R0.01 and 0.23% respectively. 
Contrarily, Satrix FINI, Satrix RESI, Newfunds Shariah Top 40, Satrix Rafi 40, CoreShares 
PropTrax SAPY,  Investec ZGOVI, DBX  EuroStoxx 50, DBX UK FTSE 100, DBX MSCI 
JAPAN, DBX MSCI USA and the DBX MSCI World  reflects premiums to their NAVs, more 
especially those which imitates the international broad-market indices. This is wherein the 
DBX UK FTSE 100 traded at the highest daily rand value premium of R0.89 whilst the DBX 
MSCI World exhibits the highest daily percentage premium of 2.80%.  
Consistent with the attribution analysis mentioned earlier, considerably high premiums 
obtained by the international broad-market ETFs are possibly attributed to the trading hours 
overlap between the JSE and the markets in which their underlying indices are listed. In 
addition to that, volatility of the markets in which the constituents of the international broad-
market indices are listed might have resulted to such levels of premiums given the fact that the 
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financial crisis have already started in major global economies such as Asia, Europe and the 
U.S.A.  
Table 7.9: Descriptive statistics of the rand value and percentage price deviation 
 
This table presents the average, minimum, maximum and standard deviation of the rand value and percentage price deviation results for 
the 16 ETFs during the 2008 global financial crisis which occurred between the 1 September 2008 and the 30 June 2009. The t-statistics 
estimates in Panel A measures the statistical significance of the average rand and percentage price deviation.   
 
 
Underlying 
Investment 
(Exposure) 
Panel A:  
Mean Deviation 
Panel B: 
Minimum 
Panel C:  
Maximum 
Panel D: 
Standard deviation (%) 
 
Domestic broad-
market 
Rand % 
t-statistic 
Rand % Rand % Rand % 
Satrix 40 -0.01** -0.05** -1.12 -0.47 -0.02 0.49 0.03 0.12 0.01 
Satrix SWIX Top 
40 -0.01*** -0.23 *** -1.76 -0.54 -0.13 0.26 0.07 0.08 0.02 
RMB Top 40 -0.02** -0.09** -1.66 -0.99 -0.05 0.58 0.03 0.14 0.01 
Sector  
Satrix FINI 0.00** 0.06** 0.81 -0.21 -0.05 0.20 0.04 0.06 0.01 
Satrix INDI -0.01** -0.08** -0.99 -0.40 -0.03 1.77 0.11 0.18 0.01 
Satrix RESI 0.06* 0.14* 1.42 -2.10 -0.05 2.88 0.08 0.55 0.01 
Style  
Satrix DIVI Plus -0.00** -0.07** -0.79 -0.05 -0.04 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.01 
Newfunds Shariah 
Top 40 0.02*** 1.05*** 2.22 -0.33 -0.12 0.15 0.07 0.09 0.04 
Fundamental  
Satrix Rafi 40 0.03*** 0.58*** 4.84 -0.56 -0.11 0.37 0.09 0.07 0.02 
Listed-property  
CoreShares 
PropTrax SAPY 0.03** 0.10** 1.21 -1.22 -0.04 0.91 0.03 0.33 0.01 
Fixed-income  
Investec ZGOVI 0.01** 0.07** 1.06 -0.37 -0.04 0.25 0.03 0.08 0.01 
International 
broad-market 
 
DBX  EuroStoxx 
50 0.26*** 0.88*** 7.31 -2.48 -0.07 1.58 0.05 0.55 0.02 
DBX UK FTSE 
100 0.89*** 1.43*** 11.53 -5.22 -0.07 4.24 0.07 1.16 0.02 
DBX MSCI 
JAPAN 0.05*** 1.18*** 4.29 -0.87 -0.17 0.62 0.11 0.21 0.04 
DBX MSCI USA 0.17*** 0.17*** 11.23 -0.36 -0.04 2.05 0.22 0.23 0.03 
DBX MSCI World   0.24*** 2.80*** 9.54 -0.63 -0.06 2.33 0.29 0.36 0.04 
* statistically significant at a 10% level, ** statistically significant at a 5% level, *** statistically significant at 1% level 
   
 
According to Panel B, the DBX UK FTSE 100 and Newfunds Shariah Top 40 reflects the 
highest discount estimates of R5.22 and 0.12%. On the one hand, Satrix DIVI Plus and Satrix 
40 denotes the lowest daily discounts of R0.05 and 0.02% respectively. Turning the focus 
towards the maximum estimates, Panel C reveals that the highest daily premiums of R4.24 and 
0.29% are associated to both the DBX UK FTSE 100 and DBX MSCI World. This is 
accompanied by the lowest premium estimates of R0.05 and 0.02% that have been earned by 
Satrix DIVI Plus. These results contradict that of Purohit and Maholtra (2015) from the Indian 
market where they discovered that the rupee and percentage discounts ranged between -50.27 
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and 0.19% whilst the corresponding premiums were 54.47 and 0.16% respectively. Lastly, 
Panel D also paint similar picture wherein funds that have obtained the highest price deviation 
also exhibit relatively high standard deviation estimates, vice versa. For example, international 
broad-market ETFs reflects relatively high standard deviation estimates compared to that of 
their counterparts, the domestic broad-market ETFs.   
Having reported the descriptive statistics of the rand and percentage price deviation, Table 7.10 
displays the number of day (s) when each of the 16 ETFs under review traded either on a 
premium, discount, or zero price difference.  
Table 7.10: Magnitude of the price deviation 
 
This table depicts the number of day (s) when each of the 16 ETFs under review traded either on a premium, discount, and zero price 
difference. 
 
Underlying Investment 
(Exposure) 
ETF Name 
Total number 
of trading days 
Days of 
premium 
Days of 
discount 
Days of zero price 
deviation 
Domestic broad-market 
Satrix 40 206 96 109 1 
Satrix SWIX Top 40 206 94 111 1 
RMB Top 40 174 67 81 0 
Sector 
Satrix FINI 206 106 100 0 
Satrix INDI 206 88 118 0 
Satrix RESI 206 101 105 0 
Style 
Satrix DIVI Plus 206 101 105 0 
Newfunds Shariah Top 40 55 37 18 0 
Fundamentals Satrix Rafi 40 173 129 44 0 
Listed-property CoreShares PropTrax SAPY 188 102 86 0 
Fixed-income Investec ZGOVI 170 114 54 1 
International broad-
market 
DBX  EuroStoxx 50 206 146 60 0 
DBX UK FTSE 100 206 168 38 0 
DBX MSCI JAPAN 206 131 75 0 
DBX MSCI USA 206 173 33 0 
DBX MSCI World   206 181 25 0 
 
According to the table above, with the exception of RMB Top 40, Newfunds Shariah Top 40, 
Satrix Rafi 40, Satrix Rafi 40, CoreShares PropTrax SAPY and Investec ZGOVI, all the 
remaining funds have been examined for the total period of the crisis which amounted to 206 
days. In this regard, the highest frequency of premiums is obtained by the DBX MSCI World 
which traded above the NAVs for 181 of the total sample size of 206 days. In contrast to that, 
the RMB Top 40 traded on a premium for 67 of the 174 total trading days under review. In line 
with the evidence of Charteris (2013), all the ETFs which mimics local indices appears to be 
trading mostly at the discounts to their NAVs. In this instance, Satrix INDI traded at the 
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discount for 118 of 206 days. On the one hand, DBX MSCI World have the lowest level of 
discount of 33 days of the total sample size of 206 days. Lastly, across all the observation, 
Satrix 40, Satrix SWIX Top 40 and the Investec ZGOVI are the only ETFs that traded to their 
NAVs for a mere one trading day. For that reason, it is safe to infer that the global financial 
crisis have a negative influence towards the pricing efficiency of these JSE listed ETFs.  
In this regard, the key question worth to be answered is the persistence level of these price 
deviation. In light of this view, Table 7.11 denotes the summary statistics of rand value price 
deviation persistence level. As expected, the first column of Table 7.11 illustrates statistically 
significant intercepts of the regression that are relatively similar to the average rand value price 
deviation that is recorded in Panel A of Table 7.9.  
Expanding the analysis to the regression coefficients, it is noticeable that the estimates for the 
Satrix 40, RMB Top 40, Satrix FINI, Satrix INDI, DBX EuroStoxx50 and the DBX MSCI 
USA are statistically insignificant at the 1% level within the period of one trading day. As noted 
earlier, this provides evidence that these funds are efficiently priced against their NAVs. This 
implies that there is no potential of arbitrage opportunity for investors. Additionally, this further 
suggests that the authorised participants of these funds were effectively executing the creation 
and redemption process.  
For the Satrix SWIX Top 40, Satrix RESI, DBX MSCI JAPAN and the DBX MSCI World the 
coefficients became statistically insignificant during the second trading day. This implies that 
these funds are mispriced to their NAVs because of the inefficient execution of the creation 
and redemption process. In the case of DBX MSCI JAPAN and the DBX MSCI World, 
disparity of trading hours between the JSE and the markets in which the underlying indices are 
listed could have attributed heavily to the inefficient execution of the creation and redemption 
process. By comparison, current results are in line with the findings of Delcoure and Zhong 
(2007) who examined ETFs which mimics international broad-market indices and discovered 
that trading hours overlap plays an integral role towards the successful execution of creation 
and redemption process. In line with the performance of the Nifty Bees and Kotak Sensex ETFs 
during the crisis period as recorded by Purohit and Maholtra (2015), discount and premiums 
obtained by the Satrix DIVI Plus and the Investec ZGOVI persists for three trading days and 
subsequently disappear when extended to the fourth day. 
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Table 7.11: Summary statistics of the rand value price deviation persistence 
 
This table contains the summary estimates and t-stats results of the number of trading days in which the rand price deviation of the 16 ETFs 
persisted during this period of financial crisis. These findings are the results of the regression equation adopted from Purohit and Malhotra 
(2015) that is depicted below: 
 
𝑷𝑫𝒕(𝒁𝑨𝑹)  =  𝜶 +  𝒃𝑷𝑫𝒕−𝟏 +  𝜺𝒕 
 
Where α is the regression intercept term; 𝜷𝑷𝑫 is the regression coefficient of 𝜷𝑷𝑫𝒕−𝟏, 𝜷𝑷𝑫𝒕−𝟐, 𝜷𝑷𝑫𝒕−𝟑, 𝑷𝑫𝒕−𝟑, 𝜷𝑷𝑫𝒕−𝟒, and 𝜷𝑷𝑫𝒕−𝟓 
which refers to the one to five trading day lagged value of the rand value premium or discount and 𝜺𝒕 is the standard error term of the 
regression. The t-statistic value validate the null-hypothesis that the premium or discount does not persist for more than one trading day.  
 
Underlying 
Investment 
(Exposure) 
 
 
ETF Name 
 
α 
 
βPD (t-1) 
 
βPD (t-2) 
 
βPD (t-3) 
 
βPD (t-4) 
 
βPD (t-5) 
 
 
Domestic broad-
market 
Satrix 40 -0.01** 0.08** --- --- --- --- 
Satrix SWIX 
Top 40 
-0.01*** 0.11*** 0.02*** --- --- --- 
RMB Top 40 -0.02*** 0.03*** --- --- --- --- 
 
 
Sector 
Satrix FINI 0.00** -0.04** --- --- --- --- 
Satrix INDI -0.01** -0.04** --- --- --- --- 
Satrix RESI 0.05*** 0.19*** -0.01*** --- --- --- 
 
 
Style 
Satrix DIVI 
Plus 
0.00** 0.27** 0.24** 0.27** 0.06** --- 
Newfunds 
Shariah Top 
40 
0.01*** 0.55*** 0.35*** 0.25*** 0.15*** 0.14*** 
Fundamentals Satrix Rafi 40 0.02*** 0.29*** 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 
Listed-property 
CoreShares 
PropTrax 
SAPY 
0.01*** 0.39**** 0.39*** 0.25*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 
Fixed-income 
Investec 
ZGOVI 
0.00** 0.61*** 0.39*** 0.21*** 0.01*** --- 
International 
broad-market 
DBX  
EuroStoxx50 
0.25*** 0.02*** --- --- --- --- 
DBX UK 
FTSE 100  
0.72*** 0.19*** 0.21*** 0.19*** 0.15*** 0.03*** 
DBX MSCI 
JAPAN  
0.03** 0.35** 0.06** --- --- --- 
DBX MSCI 
USA  
0.18*** -0.09*** --- --- --- --- 
DBX MSCI 
World   
0.20*** 0.14*** -0.03*** --- --- --- 
* statistically significant at a 10% level, ** statistically significant at a 5% level, *** statistically significant at 1% level 
 
As note earlier, inefficient execution of the creation and redemption is the primary contributor 
of this persistent mispricing. This could potentially be driven by the complexity of these ETFs 
underlying indices. Similarly, these factors might have also contributed heavily towards the 
persistent mispricing of the Newfunds Shariah Top 40, Satrix Rafi 40, CoreShares PropTrax 
SAPY and the DBX UK FTSE 100 which disappeared after the fifth trading day. Having 
observed the effect of the creation and redemption process towards the efficiency of the ETFs 
under review, Table 7.12 shed more light by depicting the impact in which of transaction cost 
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which is a proxy of bid-ask spread, daily volatility and trading volume have towards the level 
of discounts and premiums. 
Table 7.12: Price deviation persistence explanatory variables 
 
 
As Table 7.12 suggests, transaction cost and daily volatility of the ETFs market price positively 
influence the occurrence of discounts and premiums. In this instance, turbulence in the financial 
markets caused by the 2008 global financial crisis might have resulted in high level of volatility 
amongst the underlying indices of the ETFs under review. As a result, wider spreads between 
the bid and offer prices caused significant deviation between the ETFs closing prices and the 
NAV. On the other side of the coin, trading volume appears to have negative influence that is 
statistically significant at 1% level. This could suggests that ETFs investors trading pattern 
have less impact on causing wide dispersion between the closing price and NAVs.  
Lastly, the R-Squared of 51% suggests that the variation of the price deviation is partially 
explained by the TER, daily volatility of the market price and the natural logarithm of the 
average trading volume. Therefore, it is fair to infer that several rational factors should yield 
better explanation of the price deviation. Having known the performance of the 16 ETFs during 
the period of global financial crisis, Section 7.5 below, presents pricing efficiency results of 
the overall sample of 19 ETFs during the period when the capital markets were recovering from 
the 2008 global financial crisis.  
 
Table 7.12 exhibits the outcome from the cross-sectional regression analysis of the percentage price deviation 
explanatory variables. The estimation of the regression comes in the following structure:  
 
𝑷𝑫𝒕 =  𝒃𝟎  +  𝒃𝟏𝑻𝑬𝑹𝒕 +  𝒃𝟐 𝑫𝑽𝒐𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒕 + 𝒃𝟑𝒍𝒏𝑽𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒕  +  𝒆𝒕 
 
The dependent variable is the rand value price deviation (premium/discount) for the 19 JSE listed ETFs which is denoted 
as 𝑃𝐷𝑡(ZAR). The first column below presents the estimate of the independent variables namely: TER which is the 
proxy for weighted average daily bid-ask spread, daily volatility of the market price and the natural logarithm of the 
average trading volume. On the same column, the R-Squared denotes the variation of the rand value price deviation 
(premium/discount) which is explained by the TER, daily volatility of the market price and the natural logarithm of the 
average trading volume. In addition, the statistical significance of the regression coefficients is resembled by the t-
statistics value. Lastly, the expected sign of the independent variables as deduced were from Gozbasi and Erdem (2010).  
 
 
Variables Estimate t-stats Expected sign 
Intercept 0.002** 0.202  
Total Expense Ratio (TER) 2.080*** 2.228 Positive 
DVolatility 0.190*** 1.015 Positive 
LnVolume -0.001*** -1.347 Positive 
R-Squared 51.00%   
* statistically significant at a 10% level, ** statistically significant at a 5% level, *** statistically significant at 1% 
level 
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7.5 Post-global financial crisis results: (between 1 July 2009 and 30 September 2015) 
In an attempt to shed light pertaining to the level of efficiency of the ETFs listed on the JSE, 
this section of the chapter presents the pricing efficiency results for the overall sample of 19 
ETFs under review post- the 2008 global financial crisis. In this regard, Table 7.13 depicts the 
average, minimum, maximum and standard deviation of the rand value and percentage price 
deviation results for the 19 ETFs during the recovery phase which spans from 1 July 2009 until 
30 September 2015. There are four panels which denotes the mean, minimum, maximum and 
standard deviation of price deviation.  
As the mean price deviation results furnished in Panel A suggests, Satrix 40, Satrix SWIX Top 
40, RMB Top 40, Stanlib SWIX 40, Satrix FINI, Satrix INDI, CoreShares PropTrax SAPY and 
the Investec ZGOVI traded at the discount to their NAVs. In line with the evidence documented 
in Table 7.1, the highest daily discount level is associated with the CoreShares PropTrax SAPY. 
During this period of evaluation, this fund obtained the average daily discounts of R0.22 and 
0.51% respectively. On the other side of the coin, it is clear that the Stanlib Top 40, Satrix 
RESI, RMB Mid Cap, Satrix DIVI Plus, Newfunds Shariah Top 40, Satrix Rafi 40, DBX  
EuroStoxx 50, DBX UK FTSE 100, DBX MSCI JAPAN, DBX MSCI USA and the DBX 
MSCI World exhibits substantial amount of premium estimates. In this instance, Stanlib Top 
40 stood out to be one of the local based ETFs that have earned the highest level of premium 
which equate to R0.52 and 1.88% respectively. 
Considering the comparable empirical studies that have been conducted in other parts of the 
world during the recovery phase, current findings contrast those of Baş and Sarıoğlu (2015) 
from the Turkish market and also that of Swathy (2015) from the Indian market. Both studies 
reveals that their ETFs under review were efficiently priced against their NAVs. Bringing this 
closer to home, the mean deviations presented in Panel A, are substantially higher than that of 
Charteris (2013) when she discovered that the mean estimates for the JSE listed ETFs were as 
low as 0.04% and as high as 1.07% between 30 June 2008 and 7 December 2012. However, 
using the same examination period, Charteris (2014) reveals rand value average price deviation 
for the Satrix 40, Satrix FINI, Satrix INDI and Satrix RESI are relatively in line with that of 
the current study.    
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Table 7.13: Descriptive statistics of the rand value and percentage price deviation 
 
This table presents the average, minimum, maximum and standard deviation of the rand value and percentage price deviation results for the 
19 ETFs during the recovery phase which spans from 1 July 2009 until 30 September 2015. The t-statistics estimates in Panel A measures 
the statistical significance of the average rand and percentage price deviation.   
 
Underlying 
Investment 
(Exposure) 
Panel A:  
Mean Deviation 
Panel B: 
Minimum 
Panel C:  
Maximum 
Panel D: 
Standard deviation (%) 
 
Domestic broad-
market 
Rand % 
t-statistic 
Rand % Rand % Rand % 
Satrix 40 -0.00*** 0.46*** -0.41 -1.21 -0.08 1.14 0.52 0.18 0.03 
Satrix SWIX Top 
40 -0.00** -0.03** -1.20 -0.49 -0.10 0.99 0.24 0.05 0.01 
RMB Top 40 -0.00** -0.01** -3.11 -0.02 -0.02 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 
Stanlib Top 40 0.52*** 1.88*** 12.57 -6.50 -0.23 6.50 0.24 1.47 0.05 
Stanlib SWIX 40 -0.01** -0.22** -4.83 -0.98 -0.12 0.55 0.08 0.11 0.01 
Sector  
Satrix FINI -0.00** -0.05** -10.04 -0.80 -0.10 0.38 0.03 0.05 0.01 
Satrix INDI -0.02*** -0.07*** -6.78 -1.57 -0.03 1.61 0.05 0.14 0.00 
Satrix RESI 0.01** 0.03** 1.98 -1.39 -0.03 4.00 0.09 0.29 0.00 
RMB Mid Cap 0.00** 0.04** 1.91 -0.05 -0.01 1.06 0.17 0.04 0.00 
Style  
Satrix DIVI Plus 0.00*** 0.08** 4.23 -0.08 -0.05 0.23 0.14 0.01 0.00 
Newfunds Shariah 
Top 40 0.01*** 0.46*** 7.19 -0.35 -0.08 1.55 0.52 0.08 0.03 
Fundamentals  
Satrix Rafi 40 0.01** 0.19** 10.51 -0.35 -0.05 0.45 0.07 0.05 0.00 
Listed-property  
CoreShares 
PropTrax SAPY -0.22** -0.51** -17.23 -3.28 -0.08 3.40 0.07 0.52 0.01 
Fixed-income  
Investec ZGOVI -0.00** -0.03** -1.30 -0.44 -0.04 0.14 0.01 0.07 0.01 
International 
broad-market 
 
DBX  EuroStoxx 
50 0.14*** 0.42*** 9.43 -1.14 -0.05 13.98 0.49 0.52 0.02 
DBX UK FTSE 
100 0.50*** 0.62*** 25.07 -6.04 -0.09 8.69 0.10 0.82 0.01 
DBX MSCI 
JAPAN 0.04*** 0.65*** 14.11 -0.45 -0.08 0.98 0.15 0.10 0.02 
DBX MSCI USA 0.08*** 0.71*** 26.48 -1.19 -0.13 1.15 0.06 0.12 0.01 
DBX MSCI World   0.09*** 0.80*** 30.64 -0.68 -0.07 1.02 0.13 0.11 0.01 
Note: Investec ZGOVI is examined from its launch date until 21 January 2014 when it was delisted on the JSE. * statistically significant 
at a 10% level, ** statistically significant at a 5% level, *** statistically significant at 1% level 
 
 
Consistent with the results presented in Table 7.1, Panel B and Panel C reflects that the Stanlib 
Top 40 obtains the highest daily discount of R6.50 and 0.23% whilst the opposite is true in 
case of the DBX UK FTSE 100 which obtained the highest daily premium of R13.98 and 0.49% 
respectively. In the similar vein, the RMB Mid Cap possess the lowest discount estimates of 
R0.05 and 0.01% whilst the lowest premium of R0.14 and 0.01% is associated with the Investec 
ZGOVI. Comparatively, these results of minimum and maximum estimates are relatively lower 
compared to that of Purohit and Maholtra (2015) who noted that the price deviation for the 
Indian based ETFs between 2010 and 2013 ranged from 40.79 rupee and 0.01% discount and 
the highest daily premiums of 46.01 rupee and 0.23% respectively. Lastly, the standard 
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deviation estimates in Panel D are also in accordance with the results presented in Panel A 
through Panel C. This is wherein the highest discount and premium estimates are accompanied 
by high level of volatility. Given the summary statistics of the discounts and premiums 
presented in Table 7.13, attention is taken to Table 7.14 which documents the number of day 
(s) when each of the 19 ETFs under review traded either on a premium, discount, or zero price 
difference. 
Table 7.14: Magnitude of the price deviation 
This table depicts the number of day (s) when each of the ETF under review traded either on a premium, discount, and zero price 
difference. 
 
Underlying 
Investment 
(Exposure) 
ETF Name 
Total number of 
trading days 
Days of 
premium 
Days of discount 
Days of zero price 
deviation 
Domestic broad-
market 
Satrix 40 1561 743 816 2 
Satrix SWIX Top 40 1561 780 776 5 
RMB Top 40 1561 765 796 0 
Stanlib Top 40 1234 726 508 0 
Stanlib SWIX 40 1234 660 573 0 
Sector 
Satrix FINI 1561 762 791 8 
Satrix INDI 1561 635 922 4 
Satrix RESI  1561 824 736 1 
RMB Mid Cap  777 409 368 0 
Style 
Satrix DIVI Plus  1561 846 704 11 
Newfunds Shari’ah 
Top 40  
1561 899 657 5 
Fundamentals Satrix Rafi 40 1561 927 633 1 
Listed-property CoreShares Proptrax 
SAPY  
1561 490 1071 0 
Fixed-income Investec ZGOVI 1143 733 406 4 
International broad-
market 
DBX EuroStoxx 50  1561 1005 556 0 
DBX UK FTSE 100  1561 1246 315 0 
DBX MSCI JAPAN  1561 1053 508 0 
DBX MSCI USA  1561 1245 316 0 
DBX MSCI World   1561 1305 256 0 
Note: Investec ZGOVI is examined from its launch date until 21 January 2014 when it was delisted on the JSE 
 
During this period of evaluation, with an exception of the Stanlib Top 40, Stanlib SWIX 40, 
RMB Mid Cap and the Investec ZGOVI, all the remaining funds have been examined for the 
longest duration of 1561 days. When it comes to the frequency of the premiums, current results 
are in agreement with that of Table 7.2 such that the highest and lowest frequency of premiums 
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are associated with the DBX MSCI World and the CoreShares Proptrax SAPY. This is wherein 
the DBX MSCI World traded at the premium for 1305 of the 1561 days. Contrarily, the 
CoreShares Proptrax SAPY traded at the premium for only 490 days of the 1561 overall sample 
period.  
Turning the focus towards the frequency of the discounts estimates, it is evident that these 
estimates are the reverse of that of the premiums. In this instance, the CoreShares Proptrax 
SAPY traded at the highest frequency of discounts for 1071 days of the 1561 overall sample 
period. On the other hand, out of the 1561 total trading days, the DBX MSCI World traded on 
a discount for only 256 days. Considering the duration when the price deviation amounted to 
zero, it is evident that only the Satrix 40, Satrix SWIX Top 40, Satrix FINI, Satrix INDI, Satrix 
RESI, Satrix DIVI Plus, Newfunds Shari’ah Top 40, Satrix Rafi 40 and the Investec ZGOVI 
have managed to trade to their NAVs. In this regard, Satrix DIVI Plus appears to be trading on 
the NAV for the highest frequency of 11 days out of the overall sample period of 1561 days.  
In order to draw an insightful inference about the level of efficiency of these 19 ETFs, it is of 
great importance to observe the number of days in which their discounts and premiums 
persisted over time. As noted earlier, any of the 19 ETFs under review can be deemed 
efficiently priced provided that their price deviation does not persist for more than one trading 
day. Intuitively, creation and redemption process executed by the authorised participants is 
given credit for the efficiency between the closing prices and the NAVs. For that reason, Table 
7.15 illustrates the number of days in which the mispricing between the ETFs’ market prices 
and NAVs for the 19 ETFs persisted throughout the examination period.   
On examination of the regression intercepts, the estimates of this period closely resembles the 
rand value mean deviation depicted in Panel A of Table 7.14. When it comes to the regression 
coefficients, the estimates for the Satrix 40, Satrix SWIX Top 40, RMB Top 40 and the RMB 
Mid Cap exhibits statistically insignificant within one trading day. To put this into perspective, 
these ETFs are considered to be efficiently priced to their NAVs, attributing this performance 
to the effective execution of the creation and redemption process by the authorised participants. 
This further indicates that there is no potential of arbitrage by investors who wish to add value 
to their portfolios. These results concurs to that of Swathy (2015) from the Indian market when 
he discovered that price deviations of five ETFs became negligible within one trading day.  
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Table 7.15: Summary statistics of the rand value price deviation persistence 
 
This table contains the summary estimates and t-stats results of the number of trading days in which the rand price deviation of the 19 ETFs 
persisted during this recovery phase. These findings are the results of the regression equation adopted from Purohit and Malhotra (2015) that 
is depicted below: 
 
𝑷𝑫𝒕(𝒁𝑨𝑹)  =  𝜶 +  𝒃𝑷𝑫𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜺𝒕 
 
Where α is the regression intercept term; 𝜷𝑷𝑫 is the regression coefficient of 𝜷𝑷𝑫𝒕−𝟏, 𝜷𝑷𝑫𝒕−𝟐, 𝜷𝑷𝑫𝒕−𝟑, 𝑷𝑫𝒕−𝟑, 𝜷𝑷𝑫𝒕−𝟒, and 𝜷𝑷𝑫𝒕−𝟓 
which refers to the one to five trading day lagged value of the rand value premium or discount and 𝜺𝒕 is the standard error term of the 
regression. The t-statistic value validate the null-hypothesis that the premium or discount does not persist for more than one trading day.  
 
 
Underlying 
Investment 
(Exposure) 
 
 
ETF Name 
 
α 
 
βPD (t-1) 
 
βPD (t-2) 
 
βPD  (t-3) 
 
βPD (t-4) 
 
βPD (t-5) 
 
 
 
 
Domestic 
broad-market 
Satrix 40 0.00*** 0.03*** --- --- --- --- 
Satrix SWIX 
Top 40 
0.00*** 0.06*** --- --- --- --- 
RMB Top 40 0.00*** 0.09*** --- --- --- --- 
Stanlib Top 
40 
0.00*** 0.94** 0.90** 0.85** 0.82** 0.80** 
Stanlib SWIX 
40 
-0.01*** 0.56*** 0.56*** 0.44*** 0.38*** 0.36*** 
 
 
 
Sector 
Satrix FINI 0.00*** 0.10*** 0.09*** --- --- --- 
Satrix INDI -0.02*** 0.10*** 0.01*** --- --- --- 
Satrix RESI 0.01*** 0.12*** 0.07*** --- --- --- 
RMB Mid 
Cap 
0.00** 0.00** --- --- --- --- 
 
 
Style 
Satrix DIVI 
Plus 
0.00*** 0.19*** 0.16*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.08*** 
Newfunds 
Shariah 
Top40 
0.01** 0.17** 0.11** 0.06** --- --- 
 
Fundamentals 
 
Satrix Rafi 40 0.01*** 0.36*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.22*** 0.19*** 
 
Listed-
property 
CoreShares 
PropTrax 
SAPY 
-0.08*** 0.62*** 0.49*** 0.39*** 0.37*** 0.36*** 
 
Fixed-income 
Investec 
ZGOVI 
0.00**** 0.71*** 0.50*** 0.32*** 0.13*** -0.06*** 
 
 
 
 
International 
broad-market 
DBX  
EuroStoxx50 
0.11*** 0.19*** 0.17*** 0.13*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 
DBX UK 
FTSE 100  
0.27*** 0.51*** 0.43*** 0.38*** 0.29*** 0.28*** 
DBX MSCI 
JAPAN  
0.02*** 0.42*** 0.29*** 0.19*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 
DBX MSCI 
USA  
0.07*** 0.12*** 0.10*** --- --- --- 
DBX MSCI 
World   
0.07*** 0.27*** 0.21*** 0.20*** 0.22*** 0.20*** 
Note: Investec ZGOVI is examined from 1 July 2009 until 21 January 2014 when it was delisted on the JSE * statistically significant at a 
10% level, ** statistically significant at a 5% level, *** statistically significant at 1% level 
On the other hand, the coefficient for the Satrix FINI, Satrix INDI, Satrix RESI and the DBX 
MSCI USA becomes insignificant when extended to the second trading day. As noted earlier, 
the complexity of the underlying indices for these funds might have caused their authorised 
participants to ineffectively execute their creation and redemption process. In accordance to 
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the evidence revealed in Table 7.3, the Newfunds Shariah Top 40 is the only fund that exhibits 
coefficients which becomes insignificant on the third trading day. Similarly, such level of 
persistence could also be attributable to the fact that the authorised participants have failed to 
effectively execute the creation and redemption process due to the complexity of replicating 
the FTSE/JSE Shari’ah Top 40.  
In the similar vein, the complexity of the underlying indices towards the effectiveness of the 
creation and redemption process could have also caused the persistent price deviation for the 
Stanlib Top 40, Stanlib SWIX 40, Satrix DIVI Plus, Satrix Rafi 40, CoreShares PropTrax 
SAPY and the Investec ZGOVI up until the fifth trading day. Over and above the complexity 
of the underlying indices, trading hours overlap between the JSE and the markets in which the 
underlying indices for the DBX EuroStoxx 50, DBX UK FTSE 100, DBX MSCI JAPAN and 
the DBX MSCI World are listed might have made it difficult for their authorised participants 
to effectively execute the creation and redemption process. Considering the performance of the 
DBX EuroStoxx50 and the DBX UK FTSE 100, the European debt crisis which occurred in 
2011 might have also contributed significantly towards the volatility of these funds’ underlying 
indices.  
By comparison, current results are aligned to that of Purohit and Maholtra (2015) who 
discovered that the Kotak Sensex ETF exhibited mispricing which became insignificant during 
the fifth trading day. In line with the results of Table 7.3, the price deviation persistence level 
of Satrix 40, Satrix FINI, Satrix INDI, Satrix RESI, DBX UK FTSE 100, DBX MSCI JAPAN 
and the DBX MSCI World contradict with those presented by Charteris (2013). This is when 
she discovered that the price deviation for these funds failed to persist over two trading days. 
Empirical literature suggests that several rational and irrational factors carry significant power 
in explaining the size of the premium and discount persistence level. 
Amongst other rational explanatory variables, Table 7.16, illustrates the determinative ability 
of transaction cost, daily volatility and average daily trading volume. In accordance to the 
expectation of Gozbasi and Erdem (2010), the results of Table 7.16 reveals that the price 
deviation reported during this period of evaluation is explained by the effect of transaction cost 
(bid-ask spread) , daily volatility of the ETFs market price and the average daily trading 
volume. As noted earlier, the wider the bid-ask spread the larger is the deviation between the 
ETFs market price and the NAVs due to the fact that the transaction costs serve as the incentive 
to earn potential arbitrage opportunity. 
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Table 7.16: Price deviation persistence explanatory variables 
 
Table 7.16 exhibits the outcome from the cross-sectional regression analysis of the percentage price deviation explanatory 
variables. The estimation of the regression comes in the following structure:  
 
𝑷𝑫𝒕 =  𝒃𝟎  +  𝒃𝟏𝑻𝑬𝑹𝒕 +  𝒃𝟐 𝑫𝑽𝒐𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒕 + 𝒃𝟑𝒍𝒏𝑽𝒐𝒍𝒖𝒎𝒆𝒕  +  𝒆𝒕 
 
The dependent variable is the rand value price deviation (premium/discount) for the 19 JSE listed ETFs which is denoted 
as 𝑃𝐷𝑡(ZAR). The first column below presents the estimate of the independent variables namely: TER which is the proxy 
for weighted average daily bid-ask spread, daily volatility of the market price and the natural logarithm of the average 
trading volume. On the same column, the R-Squared denotes the variation of the rand value price deviation 
(premium/discount) which is explained by the TER, daily volatility of the market price and the natural logarithm of the 
average trading volume. In addition, the statistical significance of the regression coefficients is resembled by the t-statistics 
value. Lastly, the expected sign of the independent variables as deduced were from Gozbasi and Erdem (2010).  
 
 
Variables Estimate t-stats Expected sign 
Intercept 0.008*** 0.998  
Total Expense Ratio (TER) 0.426*** 0.658 Positive 
DVolatility 0.087** -0.316 Positive 
LnVolume 0.001*** -0.882 Positive 
R-Squared 8.04%   
* statistically significant at a 10% level, ** statistically significant at a 5% level, *** statistically significant at 1% level 
 
On the one hand, the volatility of market prices as a result of the reaction by market participants 
also plays an integral role towards the existence of discounts and premiums. In the similar vein, 
significant amount of trading of the ETFs which comes from wider bid-ask spread is expected 
to cause sizeable amount of mispricing between the ETFs market price and the NAVs.  
With respect to the explanatory power of these variables, the R-Squared of 8% demonstrate 
that 92% of the discounts and premiums of these ETFs remain unexplained. This variation is 
considerably less relative to comparative empirical studies of Delcoure and Zhong (2007) as 
well as Gozbasi and Erdem (2010) who revealed the R-Squared of 11% and 13% respectively. 
In line with the inference drawn from these empirical studies, the explanatory power of other 
rational and behavioural attributes should be examined. Having critically investigated these 
price deviation results, Section 7.6 below, provides both the summary and the conclusion of 
the chapter. 
7.6 Conclusion 
This chapter sought to critically evaluate the pricing efficiency of the 19 JSE listed ETFs in 
order to establish whether there is potential arbitrage opportunity. In achieving this objective, 
the following tests are conducted: descriptive statistics of the rand value and percentage price 
deviation, magnitude of the price deviation, persistence level of the price deviation as well as 
the examination of the price deviation explanatory variables. In tandem with the approach of 
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Chapter 6, these tests are conducted during the four main sub-periods namely, overall 
examination period which spans from the launch date of each of the 19 ETFs, pre 2008 global 
financial crisis, during the 2008 global financial crisis and lastly the period of recovery.  
During the overall examination period, Satrix 40, Satrix SWIX Top 40, RMB Top 40, Stanlib 
SWIX 40, Satrix FINI, Satrix INDI and CoreShares PropTrax SAPY traded at a discounts to 
their NAVs on average basis. In this regard, CoreShares PropTrax SAPY demonstrates the 
highest daily discount of R0.20 and 0.47% respectively. On the contrary, Stanlib Top 40, Satrix 
RESI, RMB Mid Cap, Satrix DIVI Plus, Newfunds Shariah Top 40, Satrix Rafi 40, DBX 
EuroStoxx 50, DBX UK FTSE 100, DBX MSCI JAPAN, DBX MSCI USA and the DBX 
MSCI World demonstrates daily premiums that are statistically significant at the 1% level. This 
is wherein, the DBX UK FTSE 100 and Stanlib Top 40 obtained the highest rand value and 
percentage daily premiums of R0.79 and 1.88%.  
Across all the observation, CoreShares PropTrax SAPY trade at the discount to the NAV for 
the bulk of the days under review, whilst the opposite is true in the case of the DBX MSCI 
World which traded at the premium. On the other hand, Satrix DIVI Plus trade at the NAV for 
12 of the 2017 total trading days which is the highest frequency across the sample under review. 
With the exception of the Satrix SWIX Top 40, Satrix RESI, RMB Top 40 and RMB Mid Cap, 
the price deviation for all the remaining funds was found to persist for more than one trading 
day. For that reason, these four ETFs are deemed to be efficiently priced since there is no 
potential for arbitrage opportunity. In case of the remaining funds, inefficient execution of the 
creation and redemption process, complexity of the underlying indices and also the trading 
hours overlap between the JSE and the markets in which the target indices of the international 
broad-market ETFs are listed have been cited to be the key attributors. In addition to that, 
transaction costs which are in a form of bid-ask spreads and the volatility of the ETFs market 
prices also appeared to have significantly influenced the price deviation.  
In examining the 12 ETFs that are listed in the JSE prior the 2008 global financial crisis, 
discounts and premiums are also discovered. This is wherein the Satrix 40, Satrix FINI, Satrix 
INDI, CoreShares PropTrax SAPY, Investec ZGOVI and the Satrix DIVI Plus traded at the 
discount to their NAVs. In tandem with the results of Section 7.2, CoreShares PropTrax SAPY 
exhibit the highest daily discount. Contrarily, all the remaining funds trade at the premiums to 
their NAVs with the DBX UK FTSE 100 and DBX MSCI JAPAN obtaining the highest daily 
rand and percentage premiums respectively. In the same vein, CoreShares PropTrax SAPY 
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appears to be trading on the discounts for the bulk of the trading days whilst the reverse is true 
in the case of the DBX MSCI USA. In the case of the funds which traded at their NAVs, Satrix 
DIVI Plus, CoreShares PropTrax SAPY, Satrix 40 and Satrix SWIX Top 40 trade at their NAV 
for a mere one and two days of their overall sample period. 
Regarding the price deviation persistence level, Satrix RESI and the CoreShares PropTrax 
SAPY demonstrated discounts and premiums which disappears within one trading day whilst 
the opposite in the case of the remaining 10 ETFs. In line with the conclusion reached earlier, 
the persistent price deviation have been attributable to the complexity of underlying index and 
trading hours overlap between the JSE and the markets in which the international broad-market 
ETFs underlying indices have been listed. In accordance to the expectation of the prior work 
of Gozbasi and Erdem (2010), the presence of the discounts and premiums exhibited during 
this period of evaluation appears to be positively and statistically influenced by the effect of 
transaction costs, daily volatility of the ETFs market price and also the average daily trading 
volume. 
In the case of the crisis period, it is also observed that the discounts and premiums have slightly 
increased compared to that of pre-crisis period. During this period, the Satrix 40, Satrix SWIX 
Top 40, RMB Top 40, Satrix INDI and the Satrix DIVI Plus trade at the discount to their NAVs. 
Contrarily, all the remaining funds trade at a significant premiums with the DBX UK FTSE 
100 trading at the highest daily rand value premium of R0.89 whilst the DBX MSCI World 
exhibits the highest daily percentage premium of 2.80%. As in the earlier sections, the highest 
frequency of discounts and premiums is found to be associated to the Satrix INDI and the DBX 
MSCI World. On the one hand, Satrix 40, Satrix SWIX Top 40 and the Investec ZGOVI trade 
to their NAVs for a mere one trading day. Despite the crisis period, Satrix 40, RMB Top 40, 
Satrix FINI, Satrix INDI, DBX EuroStoxx 50 and the DBX MSCI USA were efficiently priced 
as their mispricing disappeared within one trading day. This have been attributable to the 
successful execution of the creation and redemption process executed by the authorised 
participants. For the remaining funds, composition of their underlying indices, bid-ask spread 
and the volatility of these indices are found to be the driving force behind such level of 
mispricing. 
Lastly, this chapter have also evaluated the pricing efficiency of the 19 ETFs after the 2008 
global financial crisis. Based on the average price deviation estimates, it is found that all the 
funds under review traded at either a discount or premium. One thing noticeable about the 
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current results is that they are relatively the same as that of Section 7.2. This is wherein, Satrix 
40, Satrix SWIX Top 40, RMB Top 40, Stanlib SWIX 40, Satrix FINI, Satrix INDI, CoreShares 
PropTrax SAPY and the Investec ZGOVI trade at the discounts to their NAVs. In line with the 
evidence documented in Table 7.1, the highest daily discount level is associated with the 
CoreShares PropTrax SAPY. On the contrary, the Stanlib Top 40, Satrix RESI, RMB Mid Cap, 
Satrix DIVI Plus, Newfunds Shariah Top 40, Satrix Rafi 40, DBX EuroStoxx 50, DBX UK 
FTSE 100, DBX MSCI JAPAN, DBX MSCI USA and the DBX MSCI World have exhibited 
substantial amount of premium estimates. Similarly, the Stanlib Top 40 trade at the highest 
premium.  
Considering the frequency of the premium estimates, current results are in agreement with that 
of Table 7.2 such that the highest and lowest frequency of premiums are associated to the DBX 
MSCI World and the CoreShares Proptrax SAPY. On the question of the persistence level of 
the mispricing, successful execution of the creation and redemption process have been seen as 
the primary driver of behind the efficiency of the Satrix 40, Satrix SWIX Top 40, RMB Top 
40 and the RMB Mid Cap which exhibited price deviation which disappeared within one 
trading day. In contrast, all the remaining funds appears to be inefficiently priced. In addition 
to the ineffective execution of the creation and redemption process, the European debt crisis 
might have influenced significantly the price deviation of the DBX EuroStoxx50 and the DBX 
UK FTSE 100. Altogether, the overall observation from this chapter is that; deviation between 
ETFs market price and the NAVs is highly attributable to ineffective execution of the creation 
and redemption process which is mostly driven by the complexity of the underlying indices, 
trading hours overlap in the case of international broad-market ETFs, bid-ask spread, volatility 
of the ETFs market price and trading volume. The next chapter illustrates the consolidated 
summary of the key findings of the research and their interpretation along with the suggestion 
for further research. 
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Chapter 8 Conclusion and Recommendation of further research 
8.1 Background summary 
Although 2016 marks the 40th anniversary since the launch of the first index-tracking 
investment product, Vanguard 500 index fund, there is a rich academic literature behind this 
phenomenon that is dated to early 1950s. This art of investing hinges upon the foundation laid 
down by the seminal work of Markowitz (1952) when he introduced the Modern Portfolio 
Theory (MPT) which asserts that investors are better off by holding a well-diversified portfolio 
of assets from different asset classes. This proposition is commonly known as mean-variance 
efficiency as it simply argues that when investors in an efficient market are faced with a choice 
to invest, they should be averse to risk such that they pick assets which yields the maximum 
expected return for a given level of risk and shun the one which yields low expected return for 
the given level of risk.  
Soon after the introduction of the MPT, Kendall (1953) began to shed more light with regards 
to the efficiency of capital markets by observing the weekly movements of 22 stocks and 
commodity prices for the period of 51 years which spans from 1883 to 1934. His results 
suggested that all the price movements were random in nature in such a way that none of the 
market participants have an opportunity to predict their future trends. However, Tobin (1958) 
challenged the MPT proposition by introducing the separation theorem. This is the theory 
which alludes to the fact some investors can be less risk averse compared to others therefore, 
investors should separate the choice of their portfolios into two steps namely: identifying the 
mean-variance efficient risky portfolio, known as the market portfolio; and subsequently 
allocate their capital to a combination of risk-free assets and the market portfolio. 
Sharpe (1964) and Litner (1965), combined the reasoning of both the MPT and the separation 
theorem and came up with a mathematical linear model called the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) which relates the expected return of an asset or portfolio to its systematic or the market 
risk that cannot be diversified. Most importantly, this model is found to hold in a competitive 
capital market where all investors pool their funds into the mean-variance efficient portfolio at 
a zero transaction and taxation cost. In tandem with the establishment of the CAPM, Fama 
(1965) emerged with the concept of the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). In the academic 
literature of finance, the EMH is deemed to be one of the prominent theory as it sets the base 
for passive investing. In simple terms, EMH argues that the stock markets are efficient when 
the prices fully and speedily incorporate all the available information due to the rational 
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behaviour of the market participants. As a result, in an efficient market, investors cannot 
consistently earn abnormal return; instead they are better off by investing into the buy and hold 
strategy. In a follow-up study, Fama (1970) suggested that the EMH cannot hold unilaterally, 
instead it should always be tested bilaterally with the market equilibrium model such as the 
CAPM. Due to their common assumptions, tests on the EMH in conjunction of the CAPM was 
then called tests of the joint hypothesis. It was under this joint hypothesis proposition which 
Fama (1970) utilised to divide the testable levels of market efficiency, namely, the weak form, 
semi-strong and strong form EMH.  
In spite of its popularity, the EMH and the entire concept of market efficiency suffered from a 
great deal of criticisms amongst academics and investment professionals. Albeit fully 
documented in the early 2000 by Shiller (2003), behavioural finance stands to be one of the 
theory contrary to the assumption of market particularly the psychological aspect of market 
participants. Most importantly, behavioural finance hinges upon the fact that capital market 
participants suffer from mental errors in processing information which subsequently results in 
irrational decision-making. According Ricciardi and Simon (2000), the mental errors in which 
behavioural finance exposes are financial cognitive dissonance, prospect theory, 
overconfidence and theory of regret. These authors described financial cognitive dissonance as 
the motivation to reduce tensions that market participants have when their attitude and 
behaviour are in conflict with one another.  
On the one hand, the prospect theory was popularised by the seminal work of two 
psychologists, Kahnemenan and Tversky (1979) when they exposed the inadequacy of the 
expected utility theory. They exhibited the irrationality of individuals by revealing their choices 
under the condition of uncertainty. In direct contrast to the main assumption of investor’s 
rationality, behavioural economist appealed that investors tend to be overconfident about their 
investment decisions. This usually occurs when investors overestimate their knowledge or 
skills and subsequently take much more risk. Lastly, the regret theory is described as a 
cognitive shortcoming which occurs when an individual compares a given outcome or state of 
events with a state of foregone choice. 
Over and above the criticism based on the behavioural aspect of investors, market efficiency 
suffered further critics after the discovery of capital market anomalies. Amongst a whole host 
of counter arguments to the assumptions of the market efficiency, the value effect, size effect, 
short-term momentum effect and long-term mean reversion (also known as the overreaction 
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hypothesis) stand out as the prominent anomalies in the capital markets. Subsequently, 
investment professionals used the underlying style of these anomalies in an attempt to gain 
abnormal returns globally and also within the South African equity market. Despite the 
enormous growth, the explanation of these capital market anomalies remains an ongoing debate 
amongst academics and investment professionals. As clearly documented by van Rensburg 
(2001), there are three main school of thoughts that are contending to provide a better 
explanation of this phenomenon namely, methodological bias, rational bias as well as irrational 
bias.  
The growing interest about the existence and the interpretation of capital market anomalies 
subsequently resulted in endless debate about the active versus passive management. Notably, 
market efficiency has been the centre of attention, whereby the proponents of active 
management agrees with the notion of beating the market yet passive management proponents 
contend for investing into buy and hold strategies as proposed by the pioneers of market 
efficiency proposition. As furnished by Dellva (2001) passive investment vehicles such as 
index mutual funds and ETFs grew rapidly due to three main factors: lower cost, lower turnover 
and superior performance relative to their active management counterparts.  
For that purpose, the launch of the first index mutual fund, the Vanguard 500 index mutual 
fund in August 1976 paved the way for similar tracker product called ETFs. Rompotis (2011) 
described ETFs as the hybrid of ordinary stocks and open-ended mutual funds that aim to gain 
significant returns by mimicking the movements of a specific underlying index. Since the 
inception of the Canadian Toronto Index Participation (TIPs) in 1989 as well as the Standard 
and Poor Depository Receipt ETF (also commonly known as the Spiders) on the American 
Stock Exchange (AMEX) in 1993, ETFs grew in leaps and bounds. However, the growth was 
mainly in the U.S. market as they took foothold in the African continent on the 27th November 
2000 when the Satrix 40 was launched on the JSE. As identified by ETF SA industry review 
report in June (2014), the proliferation of ETFs on the JSE commenced with Satrix in 2000 and 
grew significantly to 45 listed funds in 2014.  
Having witnessed such a significant and sustained growth, JSE listed ETFs merit the 
investigation of both their tracking ability and their pricing efficiency. Following the 
methodological procedure of Baş and Sarıoğlu (2015) from the Turkish market as well as 
Purohit and Malhotra (2015) from the Indian market, this research explore the tracking ability 
as well pricing efficiency of 19 of the 45 JSE listed ETFs which yield investors with the 
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following exposure, domestic broad-market, sector, style, fundamental, listed-property, fixed-
income and international broad-market indices. This was achieved across four sub-periods. 
Firstly, these joint test were ran from the launch date of each of the ETFs under review until 
30 September 2015. For the purpose of mitigating the effect of survivorship bias, the Investec 
ZGOVI was examined until the 21 January 2014 when it was delisted. Furthermore, this 
research has taken an unprecedented route and resolved to investigate the effect in which the 
2008 global financial crisis had towards both the tracking ability and pricing efficiency of these 
19 ETFs. For that reason, the second examination period which was considered to be the pre-
crisis period and spanned from the ETF launch date until 29 August 2008. Thirdly, the crisis 
period was between 1 September 2008 and 1 June 2009. Lastly, the post crisis period was from 
1 July 2009 through 30 September 2015.   
8.2 Summary of key results and their interpretation 
Beginning with the tracking ability results, the findings across all the sub-periods suggested 
that, on average, ETFs yields daily returns which closely resemble that of their target 
benchmark indices but with relatively high level of volatility. From the replication ability point 
of view, all 19 ETFs under review exhibited alpha coefficients that were statistically 
insignificant which implied that the fund managers’ sole intention was to fully replicate the 
target underlying indices. In spite of that, beta coefficients portrayed the picture that fund 
managers were not holding the same constituents as that of their benchmark indices since all 
the funds under review demonstrated beta coefficients that were close to unity. This was very 
prevalent amongst the international broad-market access ETFs due to diversity of their 
underlying indices.  
With regard to the tracking error as measured by the three commonly used methods, it was 
discovered that the ETFs under review were inadequately replicating the movements of their 
target benchmark indices irrespective of the examination period. In tandem with the evidence 
documented by Mateus and Rahmani (2014) from the London Stock Exchange, tracking errors 
were substantially high during the 2008 global financial crisis as opposed to that of the prior 
and the post crisis period. This was found to be attributable to volatility of all the underlying 
benchmark indices. Interestingly, during this period of global market turmoil, the DBX MSCI 
World depicted the highest daily average tracking error of 4.23%, which, by comparison, more 
than double the average tracking errors of the other sub-periods. This came not as a surprise 
since this ETF mimics the MSCI World index which have 1643 constitutes across the world. 
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Looking at the recovery phase results, the European debt crisis was found to have significantly 
contributed to the sizeable amount of tracking error estimates of both the DBX EuroStoxx 50 
and the DBX UK FTSE 100.  
On one hand, Satrix 40 had relatively the lowest level of tracking error estimate throughout the 
various economic cycle. From the analysis, this was primarily driven by the liquidity of its 
target benchmark index, the FTSE/JSE Top 40. In light of that view, this research further 
discovered that high level of tracking errors were associated with ETFs which imitates the 
movement of illiquid underlying benchmark indices. For example, due to lower liquidity of the 
underlying instruments, the international broad-market access ETFs exhibited high level of 
tracking errors as opposed to the ETFs that replicates local-based and most liquid underlying 
benchmark indices.  
In addition to that, it was also discovered that the longer the examination period the lower the 
tracking error hence the RMB Mid Cap which is evaluated for the shortest period exhibited 
significantly high level of tracking error estimates of 3.34% in both the overall and the post-
crisis period. As clearly articulated above, Satrix 40 which is the first-ever listed ETF in the 
JSEA exhibited relatively lower level of tracking error. This might possibly be attributable to 
the volatility or noise in the market in the short-term which makes it difficult for fund managers 
to fully replicate the movements of their target indices.  
Altogether, the magnitude of tracking errors across all the sub-periods were largely driven by   
management fees (TER) and daily volatility of the ETFs market price, more especially during 
the crisis period. On the one hand, trading volume and the effect of dividend distribution had a 
negative influence towards the level of tracking errors. By comparison, this observation was 
consistent to the findings Chu (2013), Mateus and Rahmani (2014) and the most recent work 
of Namenko and Chystiakova (2015). 
Turning the focus towards the pricing efficiency test, the empirical findings documented in 
Chapter 7 concurs to the results from both local and international markets. According to the 
descriptive statistics, all the 19 ETFs exhibited the rand value and percentage price deviation 
in a form of discount or a premium across all the sub-periods. Consistent with the prior work 
on the JSE by Charteris (2013), ETFs which mimic local based indices were found to be trading 
mostly on a discount to the NAV whilst the opposite was true in the case of the international 
broad-market access ETFs. With regards to the pricing efficiency of the DBX EuroStoxx 50 
and the DBX UK FTSE 100 post the 2008 global financial crisis, the European debt crisis was 
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identified to have also influenced the mispricing of these funds which replicates European 
based target benchmark indices.  
When closely evaluating the price deviation according to the various cycles of the economy, 
current results appeared to be aligned to that of Purohit and Maholtra (2015) from the Indian 
market whereby the daily discount and premium estimates of the crisis period was relatively 
higher than that of the pre-crisis period but less than that of the post-crisis period. In line with 
the results of the tracking errors presented in Chapter 6, the DBX MSCI World which mimics 
the MSCI World index which has 1643 constituents from around the world appeared to be 
trading at the highest daily premium during the 2008 global financial crisis. This suggests that 
the financial crisis was indeed the global phenomenon.    
Considering the number of days in which the price deviation persisted until they converged, 
similar trend was observed whereby the price deviation for the domestic broad-market access 
ETFs generally disappeared within one trading day. For that reason, the ETFs were considered 
to be efficiently priced to their NAVs attributing such performance to the efficient execution 
of the creation and redemption process by the authorised participants. This further implied that 
there was limited opportunity to arbitrage. On the contrary, discounts and premiums exhibited 
by ETFs which mostly mimics the style based and the international broad-market access indices 
appeared to be persistent even to the fifth trading day. From the attribution point of view, the 
complexity of these ETF underlying indices as well as the trading hours overlap between the 
JSE and the host market of these indices were found to be the main drivers of such level of 
mispricing.  
Further to this, the performance attribution results from the linear regression suggested that the 
pricing inefficiency of the 19 ETFs irrespective of the cycle of the economy was also driven 
by transaction cost (bid-ask spread), daily volatility of the ETFs’ market prices as well as the 
impact of trading volume. This was found to be consistent with the findings of Gozbasi and 
Erdem (2010) from the Turkish market. In summary, the general implication of this study is 
that both retail and institutional investors who wish to invest in JSE listed ETFs should be 
aware of the fact these ETFs suffer from tracking errors which are mainly driven by the 
management fees, daily volatility of the ETFs market price, trading volume and also the effect 
cash drag as a result of corporate action such as dividends distribution. Additionally, these 
investors should also be cognisant of the fact that these ETFs tend to be mispriced against their 
NAVs as a result of inefficient execution of the creation and redemption process by the 
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authorised participants. To the investors who wish to gain international market exposure as a 
way diversification, they should be cognisant of the fact that ETFs which replicates 
international indices suffers from high level of tracing errors but yield profit potential from the 
persistent price deviation.  
8.3 Suggestion for further research 
As clearly stated in Chapter 5, one of the limitation of this research is the fact that only a 
handful of ETFs listed in the JSE have a historical performance that is beyond three years, 
hence, this study examined only 19 of 45 JSE listed ETFs. This implies that less than half of 
the total size of the ETFs on the JSE have not been evaluated. Further to this, this research have 
also been constrained by the unavailability of the bid and ask spreads as well as the data 
attributes for the Absa Capital NewFunds SWIX and GOVI. Therefore, the possible expansion 
of this research should be expanding the sample size by including the omitted ETFs and also 
establish whether the findings of the current study also applies to a larger sample size. 
In the recent past the local ETF market has witnessed the launch of the ETFs which provide 
investors with an international exposure namely, CoreShares S&P 500 and CoreShares S&P 
Global Property. At the same time the exchange rate between the rand and the U.S. dollar have 
significant impact towards the performance of the JSE. With that in mind, it can be of great 
value for further empirical research to be devoted towards evaluating the effect in which 
exchange rate volatility has towards tracking errors of the ETFs which provide investors with 
the international index exposure. Lastly, the extension of this research includes analysis of the 
ways in which active and hedge fund managers can use ETFs to hedge and also optimize their 
portfolios.  
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